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JB/014/233/001

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1819 June 11

Interests and Duties Preface or Introd.

2

1. object — Practice

In the course of this inquiry what will also be seen is
that all the relation which Virtue and Vice — the Virtues and the
Vices have to man's interests his happiness and his duties: that no
one with propriety is to any good purpose be termed virtuous,
except any further than in so far as its in its tendency it is conducive to the
augmentation of the sum of happiness: and so contrariwise in regard to Vice.

It will moreover be seen that all Virtues may with
propriety and in respect of clearness with good advantage be
considered as modifications of two all-embracing all comprehensive or card ones
to wit prudence and benevolence. For that on this occasion
all that is ultimately and for its own sake worth regard is happiness: this happiness
will on each occasion be the happiness of a man's self
or of other men, or of both together. In so far as in it is
to a man's own happiness that the act is conducive, it is
a prudential one if such be the object as well is the effect of it an act of prudence: in so far as it is to
the happiness of others that it is conducive — if such be have been the
object as well as the effect of it, it is an act of benevolence

For its ultimate and practical object result this work has for its object
the pointing out to each man what on each occasion what line course of conduct
promises to be in the highest degree conducive — to his happiness:
to his own happiness first and last: to other p the happiness
of others no far farther than in so far as his happiness is promoted
by promoting theirs — then his interest coincides with theirs: for that
in the case of man in general should have regard should regard should any
further be had to the happiness of others will be shewn to be neither
possible nor upon the whole desirable: but though on the other hand what
will also be shewn is in how many different ways more than is very generally
understood each man's happiness is ultimately promoted, by an
intermediate regard for the shewn a for the happiness of others.

5
Should be the
relation of Virtue and
Vice to interests and
duties: and that Virtue
is in proportion to his
duty to promote happiness:

6
All virtues a
modification either
of prudence or beneficence
or both: all
that is worth regard
for its own sake being
happiness: all happiness
the do of the agent
or others.

7
Ultimate practical
object shewing to each
what conduct will be most
conducive to his own
happiness: to do of
others no otherwise
than in so far as do
of others interest of others coincides with
his; i.e by promoting
do. of others he promotes
his: that any further
regard should be shewn
had for do of others is
shewn to be neither
generally possible nor
beneficent: but
more than
generally



Identifier: | JB/014/233/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 14.

Date_1

1819-06-11

Marginal Summary Numbering

5-7

Box

014

Main Headings

deontology

Folio number

233

Info in main headings field

interests and duties

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

e2

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::[prince of wales feathers] i&m 1818]]

Marginals

jeremy bentham

Paper Producer

arthur wellesley, duke of wellington

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

1818

Notes public

ID Number

4996

Box Contents

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