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JB/026/039/001

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Mar 1809 2
Press. Judge's Opinion. Concluding Observations. Ch.2. Judicial

§§.4. Judge's shufflingness

1.
Shufflingness of the Judges
The right recognized,
folly to contest it — this
the recognition half
extracted —

Moral obligation
trumped up to prevent
the exercise of the right.
p.1.

2.
Use of their shuffling
1 of the recognition —
direct contestation hopeless,
praise of candour
sought. p.1. —

3
2. Uses of the la half
contestation —
1. As to Parliament, to
cause it to regard
parliamentary recognition
as needless
"better than
"
p.2.

4.
2. As to Juries to
persuade them to
abstain from the
exercise of this right
partial & refractory
might resist — impartial
& conscientious
would be effectually
influenced.
p.2.

5.
So Ld Mansfield
their consciences
& did it at their
peril. But why more
as to law than as to
fact. Putting aside
conscience peril as
no greater in libel, in
criminali than in
civili. p.2.

6
Nor originally so
great. No attaint
in civili. p.3.

7.
Where could be the
ground of this notion
of half incompetency.
1. Not in the Record
Guilty decides law
as well as fact —
Guilty is the discourse
of Jury. On the
record, no discourse
of Judge. p.3.


---page break---

§§.4. Judge's shufflingness

8
Every special Verdictt
recognizes the lawfulness
of the practice in
Verdicts. Neme dat quod
non habet.
p.4.

9.
Reason remains as
the sole ground of the
pretended incompetency
Sole reason of unintelligibility
of law. p.4.

10.
Oft fact is admitted:
the consequence does
not follow.

The reason applies
properly no further than
as the law is obscure
or ambiguous — to the
Jury in question of
which they are the best
Judges. p.4.

11
Even under Common
law some cases are
clear enough: in under Statutes
more. p.4.

12.
In some instances
when the law is clear
fact is obscure. Ex. gr.
Canning & Donellan.
p.4.

13.
If difficulty of intellection
were then a
sufficient ground for
taking the cognizance
from Juries they ought
to obs abstain form it
as to fact as well as to
law. p.5.

14.
In both cases no man
can know so well as
Jurors themselves whether
the case be difficult to
them: if difficult it
rests with them to recur
to Judge for assistance.
p.5.

15
With regard to the question
of law, his opinion as
to the law is like a scientific
witnesses opinion [called
evidence] as to a scientific
matter of fact.
p.6.


---page break---

§§.4. Judge's shufflingness

16
What could be done to
this end was done by
our 12 Judges. Admitting
perforce the right of
Juries to
& affecting to brand with
folly the denial of
right — they set up
an opposite duty —
like taylor's wife
in ducking stool.
p.4.

17.
How much more
honourable would an
unreserved acknowledgement
have been.
p.4.


---page break---

In Carr v a Jury At 1806.
Law Journal p.509. Ld Elland.
"There ought to be such
"precision, that it might
"be known distinctly to the Court
"and Jury, what is to be the
"proper provision of both."
i.e. Law not then within
the Jury's province. Janes
in R. v. Cobbet 1804.



Identifier: | JB/026/039/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 26.

Date_1

1809-03

Marginal Summary Numbering

1-17

Box

026

Main Headings

law amendment

Folio number

039

Info in main headings field

press judge's opinion concluding observations

Image

001

Titles

Category

marginal summary sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d2

Penner

john herbert koe

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

jeremy bentham

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

8772

Box Contents

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