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JB/026/064/001

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23.
As to law, main object
main object maintenance
of uniformity — as to fact,
satisfaction to the public
mind.
p.6

24
As to fact, uniformity
inapplicable: of no two
cases can the decision
of either serve for the other.
p.5

25
Thence, useless for supreme
power to occupy itself about
such uniformity. p.6.

26
On law — as on fact satisfaction
to public
mind (admitted to be)
desirable: but
as to law, that provided
for by the Constitution.
p.6.

27
On the part of the supreme
power all acts done proceed
on the supposition of a
disposition (formed by
habit) to take (unless in
extreme cases) its will
for the rule of action, and
standard of rectitude;
thence uniform
conformity to it is alike
reasonable & natural.
p.6

28.
By permanent judicature
alone the maximum
of public confidence
can not always be secured.
Admitted that as to intelligence
its claim is better
than that of ever-changing:
but as to probity,
thought it may mostly be
consistent, yet it will not
always, be generally thought
so: particularly where the
people take cognizance of
public affairs. p.7.

29.
Hence supreme superintendance
(standing excluded, as
above, from the question of fact)
affords no resource. p7.


---page break---

30
— nor any intermediate
judicature, if permanent.
p7.

31.
Ever changing judicature
operating without
controul would be still
less competent to secure or
merit public confidence.
p8.

32.
Supposing moral endowments
secured by exclusion
of sinister interest,
intellectual will be continually
apt to fail. p 8.

33.
In the composite judicature
composed of an ever-changing,
instructible by a permanent,
all endowments combinable
p.9.

34
Ulterior recourse allowed,
without pre-determinate
limit to the number of
its degrees; the public by
this means, as many as
choose, obtain a sort of cognizance
of the suit.

Successive Juries so many
Committees, of the pubic
— but open. p9.

35
Case unimportant, mis-decision
produces no
sensible public dissatisfaction;
important the
public eye the best security
against mis-decision
p9

36
Multitude of degrees of
recurrence will give a
derivative importance
to a suit originally the
most unimportant.
p.9.

37.
In permanent judicature
each ulterior stage, is &
ought to be, superior in dignity
to each antecedent
stage — Sheriffs Court —
Session — H. of Lords.
p10.

38.
Secus in everchanging judicature.
p10.

39
Special Jury, beyond Common
Jury, an arrangement
possible but not desirable.
It would breed parties:
democracy & aristocracy
mutually jealous & adverse p10


---page break---

40
Better put a Special
Juryman or two into the
Common Jury-box. having
no power over them
he will not be an object of
their jealousy: their inferior
will naturally bow
down to his superior intelligence.
He will be,
officially or virtually, Foreman.
p.11.

41.
Judicature permanent,
and thence ulterior superior
in dignity to
prior, number of stages
necessarily predeterminate.
p.12.

42
Secus in ever-changing
judicature: the number
will find its proper limits
in the peculiar circumstances
of the each individual
case. p.12.

43.
On the question of fact
in Jury trial, the stages
the fewer the better, but
the number can not be
limited. p13

44
Inconveniences of limitation.
1. Last Jury despotic: as
powerful as to fact, as the
legislator as to law, and
without his title to confidence.
p.13.

45
2. Division of the power
with the quiet and safe appeal
to the people involved
in it, would thus be frustrated.
p.13

46
3. The stage at which
this assemblage of unexperienced
minds would be
despotic, is that in which
they would be most likely
to be hated and warped.
p13.

47
4. Besides misconduct in
the Jury there are other good
grounds for new Trial, & such
as may take place at any
stage: ex.gr. non-forthcomingness
of evidence, through
fraud, accident; &c. — Limiting
the number of trials on the
one ground leaving it open on
the other, unnecessary complication. p 14


Identifier: | JB/026/064/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 26.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

23-47

Box

026

Main Headings

scotch reform

Folio number

064

Info in main headings field

Image

001

Titles

Category

marginal summary sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d1

Penner

john herbert koe

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

8797

Box Contents

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