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<p>13 Sept 1814</p> | |||
<head>Logic or Ethics</head> | |||
<note>Ch. Aristotelian Virtues<lb/> | |||
Virtue in general</note> | |||
<p>According to the view here taken of the subject, the opinion<lb/> | |||
of virtue consists in <del><gap/></del> its being in its general nature<lb/> | |||
conducive in some shape or other to well-being: <del>viz.</del><lb/> | |||
to the well-being viz. to the agent <add>very man</add> in question himself, or <add>to</add> some<lb/> | |||
other person or persons.</p> | |||
<p>According to Aristotle and <add>or</add> his Oxford disciples, it<lb/> | |||
consists in <hi rend="underline">mediocrity</hi>:—<add>so</add> in Latin at least: but of the<lb/> | |||
Latin <hi rend="underline"><foreign>mediocritas</foreign></hi> moderation would perhaps be thought the more congruous interpretation.<lb/> | |||
If at Oxford virtue <add>morality</add><lb/> | |||
had been regarded as<lb/> | |||
a thing for use, a<lb/> | |||
living language and<lb/> | |||
not a dead one would<lb/> | |||
have been the language<lb/> | |||
in which it would have<lb/> | |||
been taught: the language<lb/> | |||
of the many, not the<lb/> | |||
language of the few.</p> | |||
<p>Of <del>the species</del> any <del>definition</del> exposition which<lb/> | |||
in the shape of an ordinary definition or in any other<lb/> | |||
shape is given of a thing—be it a real entity<lb/> | |||
be it a fictitious entity what is the use? what is<lb/> | |||
the object <add>end</add> in view?—that <del><gap/> <gap/></del> for <add>to</add> what purpose<lb/> | |||
so ever <del>the</del> such knowledge may be necessary or useful<lb/> | |||
we may know it when we meet with—we may on<lb/> | |||
each occasion, <del>know what</del> <add>in relation to any</add> individual object <del>do</del><lb/> | |||
that can come to be proposed we may know whether<lb/> | |||
that name be or be not with propriety applicable to it<lb/> | |||
whether it does or does not come under that name.</p> | |||
<p><del>To</del> <add>To so desirable an end</add> Unfortunately how it is to this end how it is <add>in what way</add><lb/> | |||
<del>that this reference</del> <add>But to discover</add> <add>say</add> <add>how it is</add> in the nature of the reference<lb/> | |||
thus made—the reference to mediocrity—to be conducive<lb/> | |||
is a question which seems not very easy to <add>seems not very</add> <add>altogether</add> <add>easy to</add> resolve<lb/> | |||
<add>to discover this</add> there lies the difficulty.</p> | |||
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}} | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}} | ||
13 Sept 1814
Logic or Ethics
Ch. Aristotelian Virtues
Virtue in general
According to the view here taken of the subject, the opinion
of virtue consists in its being in its general nature
conducive in some shape or other to well-being: viz.
to the well-being viz. to the agent very man in question himself, or to some
other person or persons.
According to Aristotle and or his Oxford disciples, it
consists in mediocrity:—so in Latin at least: but of the
Latin mediocritas moderation would perhaps be thought the more congruous interpretation.
If at Oxford virtue morality
had been regarded as
a thing for use, a
living language and
not a dead one would
have been the language
in which it would have
been taught: the language
of the many, not the
language of the few.
Of the species any definition exposition which
in the shape of an ordinary definition or in any other
shape is given of a thing—be it a real entity
be it a fictitious entity what is the use? what is
the object end in view?—that for to what purpose
so ever the such knowledge may be necessary or useful
we may know it when we meet with—we may on
each occasion, know what in relation to any individual object do
that can come to be proposed we may know whether
that name be or be not with propriety applicable to it
whether it does or does not come under that name.
To To so desirable an end Unfortunately how it is to this end how it is in what way
that this reference But to discover say how it is in the nature of the reference
thus made—the reference to mediocrity—to be conducive
is a question which seems not very easy to seems not very altogether easy to resolve
to discover this there lies the difficulty.
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