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<note>Comportment towards Superiors</note> | <note>Comportment towards Superiors</note> | ||
<p>By <del>superiority, as above,</del> <add>superiority in general</add> is to be understood superiors<lb/> in power: and, consequently, on the part of the persons<lb/> who are considered as their inferiors, there exists, as towards<lb/> them, a correspondent degree of dependence.<lb/> In regard to the deportment proper to be maintained<lb/> as towards such superiors by their inferiors, <add>the</add> error <add>of which we have spoken</add> is<lb/> apt to have place <add>and it in</add> of a sort prejudicial, at once, so beneficence,<lb/> as well as prudence:<lb/> <note>and which is<lb/> apt not to stop at<lb/> the breach of these<lb/> negative virtues, but<lb/> to go on to a violation<lb/> of the corresponding<lb/> positive ones.</note><lb/> A sort of merit is attached, by some, to the <add> <gap/> to</add> manifest<del>ing</del>, towards the feelings<lb/> of superiors, <del>a</del> <add>that</add> degree of regard which, by the same<lb/> persons, would not be refused to equals or to inferiors.<lb/> To this supposed merit is annexed more or less or self-<lb/> praise on the score of spirit, as it is called: on the<lb/> score of a spirit of independence. But, if there is no<lb/> merit in the violation of the dictates of a single virtue,<lb/> viz beneficence, negative or positive, still less<lb/> can there be, in the violation of the dictates of that<lb/> same virtue, added to the dictates of self-regarding prudence. </p> | <p>By <del>superiority, as above,</del> <add>superiority in general</add> is to be understood superiors<lb/> in power: and, consequently, on the part of the persons<lb/> who are considered as their inferiors, there exists, as towards<lb/> them, a correspondent degree of dependence.<lb/> In regard to the deportment proper to be maintained<lb/> as towards such superiors by their inferiors, <add>the</add> error <add>of which we have spoken</add> is<lb/> apt to have place <add>and it in</add> of a sort prejudicial, at once, so beneficence,<lb/> as well as prudence:<lb/> <note>and which is<lb/> apt not to stop at<lb/> the breach of these<lb/> negative virtues, but<lb/> to go on to a violation<lb/> of the corresponding<lb/> positive ones.</note><lb/> A sort of merit is attached, by some, to the <add> <gap/> to</add> manifest<del>ing</del>, towards the feelings<lb/> of superiors, <del>a</del> <add>that</add> degree of regard which, by the same<lb/> persons, would not be refused to equals or to inferiors.<lb/> To this supposed merit is annexed more or less or self-<lb/> praise on the score of spirit, as it is called: on the<lb/> score of a spirit of independence. But, if there is no<lb/> merit in the violation of the dictates of a single virtue,<lb/> viz beneficence, negative or positive, still less<lb/> can there be, in the violation of the dictates of that<lb/> same virtue, added to the dictates of self-regarding prudence. </p> | ||
<p>In this particular, a difference may have place<lb/> according as, on the occasion in question, third persons<lb/> are, or are not, present.</p> | <p>In this particular, a difference may have place<lb/> according as, on the occasion in question, third persons<lb/> are, or are not, present.</p> | ||
<p>Where <add>the case</add> third persons are preset, is the case<lb/> in which a display of this sort of spirit is most<lb/> apt to be made.</p> | <p>Where <add>the case</add> third persons are preset, is the case<lb/> in which a display of this sort of spirit is most<lb/> apt to be made.</p> | ||
<p>It will depend, however, upon the cast of <lb/><gap/> that has place on the part of the persons<lb/> <gap/> present. It may happen that, in the <del>eyes</del> <add>opinion</add> of<lb/> <gap/> or some of them, the character of the person<lb/> in question may be raised by this display of independence:<lb/> so far as this is the case, what a man loses<lb/> in the affection and regard of the superior in<lb/> question, this, or more, he may gain by increase<lb/> <gap/> regard on the part of these same third persons.<lb/> So much for the case where third persons are present.<lb/> In this case, a sort of conflict has place between<lb/> the two virtues. The dictates of beneficence are<lb/> neglected: those of prudence — self-regarding prudence<lb/> are consulted and conformed to.</p> | <p>It will depend, however, upon the cast of <lb/><gap/> that has place on the part of the persons<lb/> <gap/> present. It may happen that, in the <del>eyes</del> <add>opinion</add> of<lb/> <gap/> or some of them, the character of the person<lb/> in question may be raised by this display of independence:<lb/> so far as this is the case, what a man loses<lb/> in the affection and regard of the superior in<lb/> question, this, or more, he may gain by increase<lb/> <gap/> regard on the part of these same third persons.<lb/> So much for the case where third persons are present.<lb/> In this case, a sort of conflict has place between<lb/> the two virtues. The dictates of beneficence are<lb/> neglected: those of prudence — self-regarding prudence<lb/> are consulted and conformed to.</p> | ||
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}} | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}} | ||
1820. 31 May. Deontology Comportment towards Superiors
By superiority, as above, superiority in general is to be understood superiors
in power: and, consequently, on the part of the persons
who are considered as their inferiors, there exists, as towards
them, a correspondent degree of dependence.
In regard to the deportment proper to be maintained
as towards such superiors by their inferiors, the error of which we have spoken is
apt to have place and it in of a sort prejudicial, at once, so beneficence,
as well as prudence:
and which is
apt not to stop at
the breach of these
negative virtues, but
to go on to a violation
of the corresponding
positive ones.
A sort of merit is attached, by some, to the to manifesting, towards the feelings
of superiors, a that degree of regard which, by the same
persons, would not be refused to equals or to inferiors.
To this supposed merit is annexed more or less or self-
praise on the score of spirit, as it is called: on the
score of a spirit of independence. But, if there is no
merit in the violation of the dictates of a single virtue,
viz beneficence, negative or positive, still less
can there be, in the violation of the dictates of that
same virtue, added to the dictates of self-regarding prudence.
In this particular, a difference may have place
according as, on the occasion in question, third persons
are, or are not, present.
Where the case third persons are preset, is the case
in which a display of this sort of spirit is most
apt to be made.
It will depend, however, upon the cast of
that has place on the part of the persons
present. It may happen that, in the eyes opinion of
or some of them, the character of the person
in question may be raised by this display of independence:
so far as this is the case, what a man loses
in the affection and regard of the superior in
question, this, or more, he may gain by increase
regard on the part of these same third persons.
So much for the case where third persons are present.
In this case, a sort of conflict has place between
the two virtues. The dictates of beneficence are
neglected: those of prudence — self-regarding prudence
are consulted and conformed to.
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454 |
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john flowerdew colls |
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