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<head>1820. Aug. 24. 1822 Aug. 4</head> | <head>1820. Aug. 24. 1822 Aug. 4</head> | ||
<head>Constitut. Code</ | <head>Constitut. Code <del><gap/> Spanish</del></head> | ||
< | |||
< | <note>Summary<lb/> | ||
S.4. Corruptive influence</note> | |||
<p>S. 4 Corruptive influence</p> | |||
<p>84. 36. 24 or 9.</p> | |||
<p>The more matter of corruptive<lb/> influence, the nearer<lb/> the period of pure despotism.<lb/> By the dominion it <lb/> would be more than doubled.<lb/> Population greater; and, being<lb/> more dispersed, more<lb/> funtionaries would be required.</p> | <p>The more matter of corruptive<lb/> influence, the nearer<lb/> the period of pure despotism.<lb/> By the dominion it <lb/> would be more than doubled.<lb/> Population greater; and, being<lb/> more dispersed, more<lb/> funtionaries would be required.</p> | ||
< | <p>85.37. 25 or 10.</p> | ||
<p>True, under Constitution,<lb/> great defalcations by the<lb/> popular composition of the<lb/> provincial <hi rend="underline">deputations</hi>,<lb/> and subprovincial <foreign>ayuntamientos</foreign>:<lb/> appointment<lb/> given not <add>to</add> a King, or King<lb/> and Council, but to the people<lb/> through the three ranks <lb/> of intermediate electors.</p> | <p>True, under Constitution,<lb/> great defalcations by the<lb/> popular composition of the<lb/> provincial <hi rend="underline">deputations</hi>,<lb/> and subprovincial <foreign>ayuntamientos</foreign>:<lb/> appointment<lb/> given not <add>to?</add> a King, or King<lb/> and Council, but to the people<lb/> through the three ranks <lb/> of intermediate electors.</p> | ||
< | <p>86.38. 26 or 11.</p> | ||
<p>Yet all the patronage, composing<lb/> lucrative offices,<lb/> will be in other hands: in<lb/>1. Household,<lb/>2. Ecclesiastical establishment<hi rend="superscript">t</hi><lb/> 3. Judicial establishment,<lb/> 4. Army,<lb/>5. Navy,<lb/> 6. Foreign department,<lb/> 7. Financial establishment,<lb/> 8. Education department.</p> | <p>Yet all the patronage, composing<lb/> lucrative offices,<lb/> will be in other hands: in<lb/>1. Household,<lb/>2. Ecclesiastical establishment<hi rend="superscript">t</hi><lb/> 3. Judicial establishment,<lb/> 4. Army,<lb/>5. Navy,<lb/> 6. Foreign department,<lb/> 7. Financial establishment,<lb/> 8. Education department.</p> | ||
< | <p>87.39. 27 or 12.</p> | ||
<p>In no instances, but the<lb/> Ecclesiastical and Judicial,<lb/> are the hands mentioned<lb/> in which the patronage<lb/> shall be: viz. King and <lb/> Council: King choosing<lb/> the functionary out of the<lb/> three presented by Council.</p> | <p>In no instances, but the<lb/> Ecclesiastical and Judicial,<lb/> are the hands mentioned<lb/> in which the patronage<lb/> shall be: viz. King and <lb/> Council: King choosing<lb/> the functionary out of the<lb/> three presented by Council.</p> | ||
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<p>Vast the sum already<lb/> allotted to the household.<lb/> How, consistently with<lb/> this, the necessary services<lb/> can be provided for, <lb/> seems inconceivable.</p> | <p>Vast the sum already<lb/> allotted to the household.<lb/> How, consistently with<lb/> this, the necessary services<lb/> can be provided for, <lb/> seems inconceivable.</p> | ||
<pb/> | <pb/> | ||
< | |||
<p>S. 4 Corruptive influence</p> | |||
<p>88.4. 28 or 13.</p> | |||
<p>The whole public expenditure<lb/> is but a part of the <lb/> matter fit and likely to be<lb/> made matter of corruptive <lb/>influence, in virtue of the<lb/> hands it is lodged in. In<lb/> no other state did this matter<lb/> so strongly require to be minimized:<lb/> to the financial <lb/>considerations, by which<lb/> frugality is prescribed, in<lb/> every government, are added<lb/> the constitution d<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. in<lb/> <hi rend="underline">this</hi>. Principles as to this<lb/> are in readiness: but must<lb/> here be omitted.</p> | <p>The whole public expenditure<lb/> is but a part of the <lb/> matter fit and likely to be<lb/> made matter of corruptive <lb/>influence, in virtue of the<lb/> hands it is lodged in. In<lb/> no other state did this matter<lb/> so strongly require to be minimized:<lb/> to the financial <lb/>considerations, by which<lb/> frugality is prescribed, in<lb/> every government, are added<lb/> the constitution d<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. in<lb/> <hi rend="underline">this</hi>. Principles as to this<lb/> are in readiness: but must<lb/> here be omitted.</p> | ||
<add>Conclusion?</add> | <p>89. Conclusion<lb/> | ||
<add>Conclusion?</add> 41 or 29</p> | |||
<p>In no other state has the<lb/> conjunction been so favourable.<lb/> After such misrule &<lb/> misery solicitude for individual, <lb/>is absorbed by d<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. <lb/> for that universal benefit<lb/> without which no individual<lb/> would be secure. What, <lb/> in England, would be ruin<lb/> would, in Spain, be comfort.<lb/> Where nothing has been<lb/> secure, the smallest secure<lb/> provision will be a blessing.<lb/> To a functionary, before whose<lb/> eyes soldiers have been seen<lb/> for years without pay, those<lb/> who have not perished being<lb/> preserved by chance, a <lb/> lot reducing him from precarious<lb/> superfluity to certain<lb/> subsistence, would<lb/> not be unfortunate.</p> | <p>In no other state has the<lb/> conjunction been so favourable.<lb/> After such misrule &<lb/> misery solicitude for individual, <lb/>is absorbed by d<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. <lb/> for that universal benefit<lb/> without which no individual<lb/> would be secure. What, <lb/> in England, would be ruin<lb/> would, in Spain, be comfort.<lb/> Where nothing has been<lb/> secure, the smallest secure<lb/> provision will be a blessing.<lb/> To a functionary, before whose<lb/> eyes soldiers have been seen<lb/> for years without pay, those<lb/> who have not perished being<lb/> preserved by chance, a <lb/> lot reducing him from precarious<lb/> superfluity to certain<lb/> subsistence, would<lb/> not be unfortunate.</p> | ||
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1820. Aug. 24. 1822 Aug. 4 Constitut. Code Spanish
Summary
S.4. Corruptive influence
S. 4 Corruptive influence
84. 36. 24 or 9.
The more matter of corruptive
influence, the nearer
the period of pure despotism.
By the dominion it
would be more than doubled.
Population greater; and, being
more dispersed, more
funtionaries would be required.
85.37. 25 or 10.
True, under Constitution,
great defalcations by the
popular composition of the
provincial deputations,
and subprovincial ayuntamientos:
appointment
given not to? a King, or King
and Council, but to the people
through the three ranks
of intermediate electors.
86.38. 26 or 11.
Yet all the patronage, composing
lucrative offices,
will be in other hands: in
1. Household,
2. Ecclesiastical establishmentt
3. Judicial establishment,
4. Army,
5. Navy,
6. Foreign department,
7. Financial establishment,
8. Education department.
87.39. 27 or 12.
In no instances, but the
Ecclesiastical and Judicial,
are the hands mentioned
in which the patronage
shall be: viz. King and
Council: King choosing
the functionary out of the
three presented by Council.
Of his household the offices
will naturally be in his
nomination, at least in
a greater degree than any
others.
Vast the sum already
allotted to the household.
How, consistently with
this, the necessary services
can be provided for,
seems inconceivable.
---page break---
S. 4 Corruptive influence
88.4. 28 or 13.
The whole public expenditure
is but a part of the
matter fit and likely to be
made matter of corruptive
influence, in virtue of the
hands it is lodged in. In
no other state did this matter
so strongly require to be minimized:
to the financial
considerations, by which
frugality is prescribed, in
every government, are added
the constitution do. in
this. Principles as to this
are in readiness: but must
here be omitted.
89. Conclusion
Conclusion? 41 or 29
In no other state has the
conjunction been so favourable.
After such misrule &
misery solicitude for individual,
is absorbed by do.
for that universal benefit
without which no individual
would be secure. What,
in England, would be ruin
would, in Spain, be comfort.
Where nothing has been
secure, the smallest secure
provision will be a blessing.
To a functionary, before whose
eyes soldiers have been seen
for years without pay, those
who have not perished being
preserved by chance, a
lot reducing him from precarious
superfluity to certain
subsistence, would
not be unfortunate.
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1820-08-24 |
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constitut. code |
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corruptive influence |
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john flowerdew colls |
[[watermarks::i&m [prince of wales feathers] 1818]] |
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arthur wellesley, duke of wellington |
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