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1824. Jan<hi rend="superscript">y.</hi> 9. Sun 8 Aug. 1831<lb/><head>Constitutional Code.</head><p>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>§. Occasional</p><p>1.<lb/>Occasional Deputes.<lb/>In large proportion<lb/>they would be arbitrators<lb/>expressly or virtually<lb/>chosen by joint<lb/>act of parties.</p><p>2.<lb/>True, were Judicature<lb/>secret, and the choice<lb/>absolutely in the Judge,<lb/>fertile would here<lb/>be the source of<lb/>corruption.</p><p>3.<lb/>But by the aggregate<lb/>of the following<lb/>arrangements, corruption<lb/>would be effectually<lb/>excluded.<lb/>1. <del>The</del> To parties and<lb/>Quasi-Jurors, unlimited<lb/>power of<lb/>interrogating Principal<lb/>and Depute as to aptitude<lb/>of the choice, and<lb/>the inducements to<lb/>make it.</p><p>4.<lb/>2. From Depute as<lb/>from Principal,<lb/>Appeal would lie.</p><p>5.<lb/>With so little probability<lb/>of success, and so<lb/>much danger of<lb/>detection in the attempt,<lb/>small indeed the<lb/>probability that even a<lb/>corruptly disposed Judge<lb/>sh<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi> venture to make<lb/>the corrupt choice,<lb/>or a corruptly<lb/>disposed instrument<lb/>of a party venture<lb/>upon</p><pb/>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>§. Occasional<p>5. contin<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi><lb/>upon acceptance,<lb/>yet both would be<lb/>necessary to corrupt success.</p><p>6.<lb/>By the openly declared<lb/>suspicions of the party<lb/>menaced, the eyes of<lb/>Quasi-Jurors and<lb/>Judicial visitors<lb/>would all along be<lb/>kept wide open to<lb/>the danger.</p><p>7. Suits most<lb/><gap/><lb/>Complex Suits a class<lb/>of suits which, <add><hi rend="underline">Complex.</hi></add> in a large<lb/>proportion, <add>Contra,</add> would be<lb/>likely thus to be disposed<lb/>of: and the aggregate<lb/>of Judicial time<lb/>thus saved from an<lb/>indefinitely copious<lb/>drain.</p><p>8. Remuneration<lb/>Conditions on which,<lb/>in a case of this class,<lb/>pecuniary compensation<lb/>to Deputes might<lb/>be necessary and<lb/>innoxious.<lb/>1. Of the arbitrator (the<lb/>occasional Depute)<lb/>the choice sh<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi> proceed<lb/>from the <hi rend="underline">parties</hi><lb/>acting conjointly: <hi rend="underline">not</hi><lb/>from the <hi rend="underline">Judge</hi>.<lb/>Thus alone could<lb/>corruption be excluded.</p><pb/>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>§.<p>9. Remuneration<lb/>not as time<lb/>employed.<lb/>The measure of payment<lb/>should be the<lb/>preestimated<lb/>magnitude of the task,<lb/>taken in the aggregate:<lb/>not the quantity of the<lb/><sic>arbitrators</sic> time<lb/>actually expended on it.<lb/>For if yes, thus would<lb/>his interest be set<lb/>in opposition to his<lb/>duty. Unlimited is<lb/>the force of the<lb/>temptation which his<lb/>probity w<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi> have to combat:<lb/>unlimited the<lb/>quantity of factitious<lb/>delay, the needlessness<lb/>of which could<lb/>not be proved for<lb/>purpose of censure.</p><pb/>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>Occasional<lb/>§.
<p>1824. Jan<hi rend="superscript">y.</hi> 9. Sun 8 Aug. 1831</p>
<head>Constitutional Code.</head>
 
<p>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>
§. Occasional</p>
 
<p>1.<lb/>
Occasional Deputes.<lb/>
In large proportion<lb/>
they would be arbitrators<lb/>
expressly or virtually<lb/>
chosen by joint<lb/>a
ct of parties.</p>
 
<p>2.<lb/>True, were Judicature<lb/>
secret, and the choice<lb/>
absolutely in the Judge,<lb/>
fertile would here<lb/>
be the source of corruption.</p>
 
<p>3.<lb/>
But by the aggregate<lb/>
of the following arrangements,<lb/>
corruption<lb/>
would be effectually<lb/>
excluded.<lb/>
 
1. <del>The</del> To parties and<lb/>
Quasi-Jurors, unlimited<lb/>
power of interrogating<lb/>
Principal<lb/>
and Depute as to aptitude<lb/>
of the choice, and<lb/>
the inducements to<lb/>make it.</p>
 
<p>4.<lb/>
2. From Depute as<lb/>
from Principal, Appeal<lb/>
would lie.</p>
 
<p>5.<lb/>
With so little probability<lb/>
of success, and so<lb/>
much danger of detection<lb/>
in the attempt,<lb/>
small indeed the probability<lb/>
that even a<lb/>
corruptly disposed Judge<lb/>
sh<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi> venture to make<lb/>
the corrupt choice,<lb/>
or a corruptly disposed<lb/>
instrument<lb/>
of a party venture<lb/>upon</p><pb/>
 
<p>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>§. Occasional</p>
 
<p>5. contin<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi><lb/>
upon acceptance,<lb/>
yet both would be necessary<lb/>
to corrupt success.</p>
 
<p>6.<lb/>
By the openly declared<lb/>
suspicions of the party<lb/>
menaced, the eyes of<lb/>
Quasi-Jurors and<lb/>
Judicial visitors<lb/>
would all along be<lb/>
kept wide open to<lb/>
the danger.</p>
 
<p>7. Suits most<lb/><unclear>Suitable</unclear><lb/>
Complex Suits a class<lb/>
of suits which, <add><hi rend="underline">Complex.</hi></add> in a large<lb/>
proportion, <add>Contra,</add> would be<lb/>
likely thus to be disposed<lb/>
of: and the aggregate<lb/>
of Judicial time<lb/>
thus saved from an<lb/>
indefinitely copious<lb/>
drain.</p>
 
<p>8. Remuneration<lb/>
Conditions on which,<lb/>
in a case of this class,<lb/>
pecuniary compensation<lb/>
to Deputes might<lb/>
be necessary and innoxious.<lb/>
1. Of the arbitrator (the<lb/>
occasional Depute)<lb/>
the choice sh<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi> proceed<lb/>
from the <hi rend="underline">parties</hi>acting<lb/>
conjointly: <hi rend="underline">not</hi><lb/>
from the <hi rend="underline">Judge</hi>.<lb/>
Thus alone could<lb/>
corruption be excluded.</p><pb/>
 
<p>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>§.</p>
 
<p>9. Remuneration<lb/>not as time<lb/>employed.<lb/>
The measure of payment<lb/>
should be the<lb/>
preestimated magnitude<lb/> of the task,<lb/>
taken in the aggregate:<lb/>
not the quantity of the<lb/>
<sic>arbitrators</sic> time actually<lb/>
expended on it.<lb/>For if yes, thus would<lb/>
his interest be set<lb/>
in opposition to his<lb/>
duty. Unlimited is<lb/>
the force of the temptation<lb/>
which his probity<lb/>
w<hi rend="superscript">d.</hi> have to combat:<lb/>
unlimited the<lb/>
quantity of factitious<lb/>
delay, the needlessness<lb/>
of which could<lb/>not be proved for<lb/>
purpose of censure.</p><pb/>
 
<p>Ch. XV Judge Deputes<lb/>Occasional<lb/>§.</p>






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1824. Jany. 9. Sun 8 Aug. 1831

Constitutional Code.

Ch. XV Judge Deputes
§. Occasional

1.
Occasional Deputes.
In large proportion
they would be arbitrators
expressly or virtually
chosen by joint
a ct of parties.

2.
True, were Judicature
secret, and the choice
absolutely in the Judge,
fertile would here
be the source of corruption.

3.
But by the aggregate
of the following arrangements,
corruption
would be effectually
excluded.
1. The To parties and
Quasi-Jurors, unlimited
power of interrogating
Principal
and Depute as to aptitude
of the choice, and
the inducements to
make it.

4.
2. From Depute as
from Principal, Appeal
would lie.

5.
With so little probability
of success, and so
much danger of detection
in the attempt,
small indeed the probability
that even a
corruptly disposed Judge
shd. venture to make
the corrupt choice,
or a corruptly disposed
instrument
of a party venture
upon


---page break---

Ch. XV Judge Deputes
§. Occasional

5. contind.
upon acceptance,
yet both would be necessary
to corrupt success.

6.
By the openly declared
suspicions of the party
menaced, the eyes of
Quasi-Jurors and
Judicial visitors
would all along be
kept wide open to
the danger.

7. Suits most
Suitable
Complex Suits a class
of suits which, Complex. in a large
proportion, Contra, would be
likely thus to be disposed
of: and the aggregate
of Judicial time
thus saved from an
indefinitely copious
drain.

8. Remuneration
Conditions on which,
in a case of this class,
pecuniary compensation
to Deputes might
be necessary and innoxious.
1. Of the arbitrator (the
occasional Depute)
the choice shd. proceed
from the partiesacting
conjointly: not
from the Judge.
Thus alone could
corruption be excluded.


---page break---

Ch. XV Judge Deputes
§.

9. Remuneration
not as time
employed.
The measure of payment
should be the
preestimated magnitude
of the task,
taken in the aggregate:
not the quantity of the
arbitrators time actually
expended on it.
For if yes, thus would
his interest be set
in opposition to his
duty. Unlimited is
the force of the temptation
which his probity
wd. have to combat:
unlimited the
quantity of factitious
delay, the needlessness
of which could
not be proved for
purpose of censure.


---page break---

Ch. XV Judge Deputes
Occasional
§.




Identifier: | JB/038/362/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 38.

Date_1

1824-01-09

Marginal Summary Numbering

1-9

Box

038

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

362

Info in main headings field

constitutional code

Image

001

Titles

ch. xv judge deputes occasional

Category

marginal summary sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

e5

Penner

john flowerdew colls

Watermarks

j whatman turkey mill 1822

Marginals

Paper Producer

jonathan blenman

Corrections

jeremy bentham

Paper Produced in Year

1822

Notes public

ID Number

11999

Box Contents

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