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of Truth.
<head>1</head>
I think it will not need many words to shew that these pleasures, great and real as they are, (or, to speak more accurately sources of pleasure,) depend as entirely upon the pleasures of the body, as those which he has allow'd to do so.
               
"As for Justice", continues he very candidly, I don't know very well what to make of it, that's true.  Indeed it is not necessary.  "All that is necessary to mean, and all I mean by the practise of it, is, the fulfilling what a man imagines to be his duty, be it what it may.
                <p><hi rend='underline'>of Truth.</hi></p>
"No more is it necessary to give an exact definition here, of Truth.  All I mean by view of truth is, that perception which a man experiences when he is satisfied with the evidence with which things appear to him."
                <p> I think it will not need many words to<lb/>
For precision sake I will take his definitions instead of the terms defined: and begin with the pleasure which a man feels at fulfilling what he thinks his duty.
                    <sic>shew</sic> that these pleasures, great and real<lb/>
This fulfilling what he thinks his duty is either the doing of some act which he thinks it his duty to do, or the abstaining from some act, which he thinks it his duty to abstain from.
                    as they are, (or, <del>rather as I would call</del><add>to speak more accurately</add><lb/>
I will take an example from each branch of duty, Private and Public: and inquire whether the pleasure a man has from each of them, does not as much require the existence of the pleasures of the body, as any other does.
                    <del>them</del> sources of pleasure,) depend as entirely<lb/>
To begin with a duty of the Private kind.  It is a duty in a man to behave with affection to his wife, and that in preference to any other woman. The man I take for my example,[?] is of that opinion[?].  Preferring her society to that of any other woman, he goes on partaking with her, amongst others, of those physical pleasures, which to partake of with another woman, [without her consent,] would be breach of duty to her.  Thus far, I suppose there is none of that pleasure which consists in the fulfilling of what a man imagines to be his duty, and which has nothing to do, says our Author with the pleasures of the body.  The pleasure which a man reaps in repeating an act, must be that which is all along the motive with him to that act.  It is too absurd to think of any other motive for the act we are speaking of, than the pleasure which a man would find in it and which men did find in it, before any such word, or such a notion as that of duty came into their heads.
                    upon the pleasures of the body, as<lb/>
We now suppose him under a temptation to enter into the same course of pleasure with another woman, and he resists it.  He has a desire to enjoy it, but notwithstanding he abstains.  Now he has the pleasure of fulfilling his duty; of abstaining from what it is his duty to abstain from.
                    those which he has allow'd to do so.</p>
I should be glad now to know wherein the pleasure he now has consists.  It consists not I suppose in the mere consciousness that he is abstaining that he is /that he is/ not doing what by this supposition he would take a pleasure in doing: what he has a desire to do: in short in the being under restraint: one might as well lay it down as a general maxim that a man finds a pleasure in thinking that he is going to prison.
                <p> "As for Justice", continues he very candidly,<lb/>
Maupertuis
                    I don't know very well what to make of<lb/>
                    it, that's true.  <del>All I mean by it</del> <add>Indeed it is not necessary.  "All that</add><lb/>
                    "is necessary <add>to mean</add>, and <del><gap/></del> all <del>that</del> I mean by the<lb/>
                    "practise of it, is, the fulfilling what <del>one</del> <add>a man</add><lb/>
                    "imagines to be <del><unclear>one's</unclear></del> his duty, be it what it<lb/>
                    "may.</p>
                <p> "No more is it necessary to give an exact<lb/>
                    "definition here, of Truth.  All I mean by<lb/>
                    "<add><unclear>the</unclear></add> view of truth is, that perception which a<lb/>
                    "man experiences when he is satisfied<lb/>
                    </p>
                    <pb/>
            </div>
            <div>
                   
                    <head>2</head>
                   
                   
                <p>  "with the evidence with which things appear<lb/>
                    to him."</p>
                <p> <add>For precision sake</add> I will take his definitions <del>for</del> <add>instead of</add> the terms<lb/>
                    defined: and begin with the pleasure which<lb/>
                    a man feels at <del>doing</del> <add>fulfilling</add> what he thinks his duty.</p>
                <p> This <del>doing</del> <add>fulfilling</add> what he thinks his duty is either<lb/>
                    the doing of some act which he thinks<lb/>
                    it his duty to do, or the <del>forbearing of</del> <add>abstaining from</add> some<lb/>
                    act, <del>from</del> which he thinks it his duty to abstain<lb/>
                    from.</p>
                <p> I will take an example from each branch<lb/>
                    of duty,<del> <gap/></del> <del>Public</del> Private and Public: and<lb/>
                    inquire whether the pleasure <del> <gap/></del> a man has<lb/>
                    from each of them, does not as much require<lb/>
                    the existence of the pleasures of the body, as any other does.</p>
                <p> To begin with <del>the</del> <add>a duty of the</add> Private kind.  It is a<lb/>
                    duty in a man to behave with affection to his<lb/> </p>
                   
                    <pb/>
                   
            </div>
            <div>
                    <head>3</head>
                   
                   
                <p>  wife, and that in preference to any other woman.<lb/>
                    The <del>person I suppose for</del> <add>man I take for my</add> example's<!-- JB should have deleted the "'s" but did not. --><lb/>
                    <del>sake</del> is of that opinion.  Preferring her society<lb/>
                    to that of any other woman, he goes<lb/>
                    on partaking with her, amongst others, of<lb/>
                    those <add>physical</add> pleasures, which to partake of with<lb/>
                    another woman, [without her consent,] would<lb/>
                    be breach of duty to her.  Thus far, I <lb/>
                    suppose there is none of that pleasure<lb/>
                    which consists in the fulfilling of what a man<lb/>
                    imagines to be his duty, and which has <lb/>
                    nothing to do, says our Author with the pleasures<lb/>
                    of the body.  The pleasure which a man<lb/>
                    reaps in <del>doing</del> <add>repeating</add> an act, must be that which<lb/>
                    <del><unclear>embodies</unclear></del> <add>is all along</add> the motive with him to that act.  It<lb/>
                    <del>would be a</del> is too absurd to think of any<lb/>
                    other <add>motive</add> for the act we are speaking of, than <lb/>
                    </p>
                    <pb/>
                   
            </div>
            <div>
                    <head>4</head>
                   
                   
                  <p>  the pleasure which a man would find in it<lb/>
                    and which men did find in it, before any<lb/>
                    such word, or such a notion as that<lb/>
                    of duty came into their heads.</p>
                <p> We now suppose him under a temptation<lb/>
                    to enter into the same course of pleasure with<lb/>
                    another woman, and he resists it.  <note>He has a desire to enjoy it, but <add>notwithstanding</add> he abstains.</note> Now<lb/>
                    he has the pleasure of <del>doing</del> fulfilling his<lb/>
                    duty; of abstaining from what it <del><gap/></del> <add>is</add> his<lb/>
                    duty to abstain from.</p>
                <p> I should be glad now to know wherein the<lb/>
                    pleasure he<add> now</add> has consists.  It consists not<lb/>
                    I suppose in the mere <add>consciousness that he is</add> abstaining <del>for abstaining</del><lb/>
                    <del>sake</del> <del>in the</del> <add>that he is</add> not doing what <unclear>he</unclear> <add>by this</add> supposition<lb/>
                    he would take a pleasure in doing:<lb/>
                    what he <add>has a</add> desire<del>s</del> to do: in <add>short in</add> the being under<lb/>
                    restraint: one might as well lay it down as<lb/>
                    a general maxim that a man finds a pleasure<lb/>
                    in thinking <add><del>knowing</del></add> that he is going to prison.</p>
                <head>II Maupertuis</head>
            </div>




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1
               

of Truth.

I think it will not need many words to
shew that these pleasures, great and real
as they are, (or, rather as I would callto speak more accurately
them sources of pleasure,) depend as entirely
upon the pleasures of the body, as
those which he has allow'd to do so.

"As for Justice", continues he very candidly,
I don't know very well what to make of
it, that's true. All I mean by it Indeed it is not necessary. "All that
"is necessary to mean, and all that I mean by the
"practise of it, is, the fulfilling what one a man
"imagines to be one's his duty, be it what it
"may.

"No more is it necessary to give an exact
"definition here, of Truth. All I mean by
"the view of truth is, that perception which a
"man experiences when he is satisfied

                   
---page break---
                   2
                   
                   

"with the evidence with which things appear
to him."

For precision sake I will take his definitions for instead of the terms
defined: and begin with the pleasure which
a man feels at doing fulfilling what he thinks his duty.

This doing fulfilling what he thinks his duty is either
the doing of some act which he thinks
it his duty to do, or the forbearing of abstaining from some
act, from which he thinks it his duty to abstain
from.

I will take an example from each branch
of duty, Public Private and Public: and
inquire whether the pleasure a man has
from each of them, does not as much require
the existence of the pleasures of the body, as any other does.

To begin with the a duty of the Private kind. It is a
duty in a man to behave with affection to his

                   
---page break---
                   3
                   
                   

wife, and that in preference to any other woman.
The person I suppose for man I take for my example's
sake is of that opinion. Preferring her society
to that of any other woman, he goes
on partaking with her, amongst others, of
those physical pleasures, which to partake of with
another woman, [without her consent,] would
be breach of duty to her. Thus far, I
suppose there is none of that pleasure
which consists in the fulfilling of what a man
imagines to be his duty, and which has
nothing to do, says our Author with the pleasures
of the body. The pleasure which a man
reaps in doing repeating an act, must be that which
embodies is all along the motive with him to that act. It
would be a is too absurd to think of any
other motive for the act we are speaking of, than

                   
---page break---
                   4
                   
                   

the pleasure which a man would find in it
and which men did find in it, before any
such word, or such a notion as that
of duty came into their heads.

We now suppose him under a temptation
to enter into the same course of pleasure with
another woman, and he resists it. He has a desire to enjoy it, but notwithstanding he abstains. Now
he has the pleasure of doing fulfilling his
duty; of abstaining from what it is his
duty to abstain from.

I should be glad now to know wherein the
pleasure he now has consists. It consists not
I suppose in the mere consciousness that he is abstaining for abstaining
sake in the that he is not doing what he by this supposition
he would take a pleasure in doing:
what he has a desires to do: in short in the being under
restraint: one might as well lay it down as
a general maxim that a man finds a pleasure
in thinking knowing that he is going to prison.

               II Maupertuis




Identifier: | JB/096/129/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 96.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

096

Main Headings

legislation

Folio number

129

Info in main headings field

maupertuis ii

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

f1 / f2 / f3 / f4

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::gr [crown motif] [britannia with shield motif]]]

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

31133

Box Contents

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