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<p>1823. May 28<lb/> | |||
<!-- pencil --><head>Constitut. Code</head></p> | |||
<p>The relative uselessness of the division of power where<lb/> | |||
comes it? Answer – from this. Of the authorities any <add>among</add><lb/> | |||
which the aggregate of the mass of power in a state is <del><gap/></del> <add>shared</add><lb/> | |||
a set of <del>men</del> functionaries in the <hi rend="underline">location</hi> of which <add>in the character of its appointed Agents</add> the great<lb/> | |||
body of the people have in reality or in appearance <add><del>the choice</del></add> a more<lb/> | |||
or less considerable share, is one. But <del><gap/> sh</del> of the <del><gap/></del><lb/> | |||
external instruments of felicity the aggregate extracted <add>mass exacted</add> from<lb/> | |||
the people under the notion of its being necessary to the maintenance<lb/> | |||
of government – and giving execution and effect <del><gap/></del><lb/> | |||
to the laws by which <del>sec</del> <add>subsistence, abundance and protection are secured</add> security is given to all<lb/> | |||
the distribution is lodged in the hands of <del>a set of one of</del> <add>another of those</add><lb/> | |||
<del><gap/></del> <add>same</add> authorities. Of this whole mass <add>aggregate</add> of the objects of general<lb/> | |||
desire there is not perhaps a particle which at the<lb/> | |||
hands of the independent authority improperly called<lb/> | |||
the Executive, those <del>A</del> same Agents of the people have<lb/> | |||
not by their own hands or by <del>the</del> other hands which<lb/> | |||
to this purpose are the same as their own, the faculty<lb/> | |||
of receiving. Hence it is that if those same Agents or<lb/> | |||
apparent and self pretended Agents are to be considered and<lb/> | |||
spoken of as <del><gap/></del> Trustees, the trust reposed in them is as regularly<lb/> | |||
betrayed as it is received: the condition of the people<lb/> | |||
as to other <del><gap/></del> matters is the same as if in matter of war<lb/> | |||
their commander in chief were in the regular pay of the<lb/> | |||
enemy obeying ever order received <del><gap/></del> from the <add>enemy</add> commander<lb/> | |||
in chief: and thus it is that the interest pursued by the<lb/> | |||
<del>too</del> <gap/> instead of being the interest of the people<lb/> | |||
is the <del><gap/> <gap/></del> separate <add>particular</add> and sinister interest composed<lb/> | |||
by <add>of</add> the union of those two separate and sinister interests.</p> | |||
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{ | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}} | ||
1823. May 28
Constitut. Code
The relative uselessness of the division of power where
comes it? Answer – from this. Of the authorities any among
which the aggregate of the mass of power in a state is shared
a set of men functionaries in the location of which in the character of its appointed Agents the great
body of the people have in reality or in appearance the choice a more
or less considerable share, is one. But sh of the
external instruments of felicity the aggregate extracted mass exacted from
the people under the notion of its being necessary to the maintenance
of government – and giving execution and effect
to the laws by which sec subsistence, abundance and protection are secured security is given to all
the distribution is lodged in the hands of a set of one of another of those
same authorities. Of this whole mass aggregate of the objects of general
desire there is not perhaps a particle which at the
hands of the independent authority improperly called
the Executive, those A same Agents of the people have
not by their own hands or by the other hands which
to this purpose are the same as their own, the faculty
of receiving. Hence it is that if those same Agents or
apparent and self pretended Agents are to be considered and
spoken of as Trustees, the trust reposed in them is as regularly
betrayed as it is received: the condition of the people
as to other matters is the same as if in matter of war
their commander in chief were in the regular pay of the
enemy obeying ever order received from the enemy commander
in chief: and thus it is that the interest pursued by the
too instead of being the interest of the people
is the separate particular and sinister interest composed
by of the union of those two separate and sinister interests.
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Identifier: | JB/037/300/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 37. |
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1823-05-28 |
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037 |
constitutional code |
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300 |
constitut. code |
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001 |
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text sheet |
1 |
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recto |
c6 |
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jeremy bentham |
j whatman turkey mill 1822 |
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jonathan blenman |
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1822 |
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11515 |
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