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<p><head>Alterations<lb/> | |||
in the large</head><lb/> | |||
After Prevention<lb/> | |||
of prevarication<lb/> | |||
by non-attendance.</p> | |||
<p>1<lb/> | |||
The reputation<lb/> | |||
of a Judge stands<lb/> | |||
on <add>of</add> its own <unclear>bottom</unclear>.<lb/> | |||
Numbers help<lb/> | |||
a man to raise<lb/> | |||
a schism in the<lb/> | |||
public, and draw<lb/> | |||
after them the<lb/> | |||
suffrages of the<lb/> | |||
unreflecting part<lb/> | |||
by <del><gap/></del> force of<lb/> | |||
prejudice in<lb/> | |||
spite of evidence.</p> | |||
<p>2.<lb/> | |||
After causes<lb/> | |||
of delay & expence<lb/> | |||
add<lb/> | |||
nobody to help<lb/> | |||
him to form a<lb/> | |||
party against<lb/> | |||
the <unclear>legislators</unclear>.</p> | |||
<p>3<lb/> | |||
<add>From</add> Efficient <unclear>causes</unclear><lb/> | |||
of arbitrary power.<lb/> | |||
1. Exemption from<lb/> | |||
<gap/> of a superior<lb/> | |||
3. – from the superintending<lb/> | |||
scrutiny<lb/> | |||
of the public eye<lb/> | |||
2. – from the obligation<lb/> | |||
of giving<lb/> | |||
reasons.</p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p>1<lb/> | |||
One Judge is preferable<lb/> | |||
to any greater<lb/> | |||
number – reasons<lb/> | |||
why. p.1.</p> | |||
<p>2<lb/> | |||
<add>Reference to</add> Proof drawn from<lb/> | |||
experience of the<lb/> | |||
state of judicature<lb/> | |||
in Great Britain.<lb/> | |||
p.3.</p> | |||
<p>3<lb/> | |||
Difference in<lb/> | |||
point of expence<lb/> | |||
as far as concerns<lb/> | |||
the amount of<lb/> | |||
Judges Salaries.<lb/> | |||
p.4.</p> | |||
<p>4<lb/> | |||
Not decided by<lb/> | |||
the Committee<lb/> | |||
whether their Judges<lb/> | |||
are ever to separate.<lb/> | |||
p.5.</p> | |||
<p>5.<lb/> | |||
If not, as numbers<lb/> | |||
in point of dispatch<lb/> | |||
numbers are not<lb/> | |||
equal to one,<lb/> | |||
one of their Courts<lb/> | |||
can not do so<lb/> | |||
much business as<lb/> | |||
one of mine.</p> | |||
<p>6<lb/> | |||
If not, their principle<lb/> | |||
is departed<lb/> | |||
from, and complication<lb/> | |||
introduced by the questions<lb/> | |||
<hi rend="underline">when</hi> they are to<lb/> | |||
separate, & how many<lb/> | |||
must sit together. p.7.</p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p>7<lb/> | |||
My plan alone<lb/> | |||
makes provision<lb/> | |||
for a trial of the<lb/> | |||
additional number<lb/> | |||
necessary without<lb/> | |||
additional expence.<lb/> | |||
p.9.</p> | |||
<p>8<lb/> | |||
Predilection of the<lb/> | |||
Committee for<lb/> | |||
numbers shown<lb/> | |||
by their Courts<lb/> | |||
encreasing in numbers<lb/> | |||
as they rise<lb/> | |||
in importance.<lb/> | |||
p.11.</p> | |||
<p>9<lb/> | |||
Supposed causes of<lb/> | |||
this predilection<lb/> | |||
1. Mathematical<lb/> | |||
notions. p.12</p> | |||
<p>10<lb/> | |||
2. Force of habit<lb/> | |||
though the <unclear>smaller</unclear><lb/> | |||
<gap/> of the<lb/> | |||
old establishment was<lb/> | |||
the result not of a<lb/> | |||
regard to justice,<lb/> | |||
but of the rapacity<lb/> | |||
of the Sovereign. p.13</p> | |||
<p>11<lb/> | |||
concluding observation<lb/> | |||
the <hi rend="underline">onus probandi</hi><lb/> | |||
lies on the advocates<lb/> | |||
for complication and<lb/> | |||
expence. p.13.</p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p>12<lb/> | |||
In case of doubt<lb/> | |||
the simple system<lb/> | |||
claims the preference<lb/> | |||
of the first experiment,<lb/> | |||
since it<lb/> | |||
is easier to add<lb/> | |||
than to retrench.<lb/> | |||
p.15</p> | |||
<p>13<lb/> | |||
Those who would<lb/> | |||
not give up plurality<lb/> | |||
altogether<lb/> | |||
might be content<lb/> | |||
to see it established<lb/> | |||
in the Superior<lb/> | |||
Court where it<lb/> | |||
would suffice upon<lb/> | |||
their own principles.<lb/> | |||
p.17</p> | |||
<p>14<lb/> | |||
– or without further<lb/> | |||
expence to<lb/> | |||
the public, a<lb/> | |||
still higher occasional<lb/> | |||
Court<lb/> | |||
might be provided,<lb/> | |||
the expence<lb/> | |||
to be borne by the<lb/> | |||
party who applied<lb/> | |||
for it. p.18</p> | |||
<p>15<lb/> | |||
No addition to<lb/> | |||
the number could<lb/> | |||
properly be made<lb/> | |||
by calling in occasionally<lb/> | |||
such single Judges whose<lb/> | |||
Courts might happen<lb/> | |||
to be unoccupied.<lb/> | |||
p.21.</p> | |||
<!-- DO NOT EDIT BELOW THIS LINE --> | <!-- DO NOT EDIT BELOW THIS LINE --> | ||
{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{ | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}} |
Alterations
in the large
After Prevention
of prevarication
by non-attendance.
1
The reputation
of a Judge stands
on of its own bottom.
Numbers help
a man to raise
a schism in the
public, and draw
after them the
suffrages of the
unreflecting part
by force of
prejudice in
spite of evidence.
2.
After causes
of delay & expence
add
nobody to help
him to form a
party against
the legislators.
3
From Efficient causes
of arbitrary power.
1. Exemption from
of a superior
3. – from the superintending
scrutiny
of the public eye
2. – from the obligation
of giving
reasons.
---page break---
1
One Judge is preferable
to any greater
number – reasons
why. p.1.
2
Reference to Proof drawn from
experience of the
state of judicature
in Great Britain.
p.3.
3
Difference in
point of expence
as far as concerns
the amount of
Judges Salaries.
p.4.
4
Not decided by
the Committee
whether their Judges
are ever to separate.
p.5.
5.
If not, as numbers
in point of dispatch
numbers are not
equal to one,
one of their Courts
can not do so
much business as
one of mine.
6
If not, their principle
is departed
from, and complication
introduced by the questions
when they are to
separate, & how many
must sit together. p.7.
---page break---
7
My plan alone
makes provision
for a trial of the
additional number
necessary without
additional expence.
p.9.
8
Predilection of the
Committee for
numbers shown
by their Courts
encreasing in numbers
as they rise
in importance.
p.11.
9
Supposed causes of
this predilection
1. Mathematical
notions. p.12
10
2. Force of habit
though the smaller
of the
old establishment was
the result not of a
regard to justice,
but of the rapacity
of the Sovereign. p.13
11
concluding observation
the onus probandi
lies on the advocates
for complication and
expence. p.13.
---page break---
12
In case of doubt
the simple system
claims the preference
of the first experiment,
since it
is easier to add
than to retrench.
p.15
13
Those who would
not give up plurality
altogether
might be content
to see it established
in the Superior
Court where it
would suffice upon
their own principles.
p.17
14
– or without further
expence to
the public, a
still higher occasional
Court
might be provided,
the expence
to be borne by the
party who applied
for it. p.18
15
No addition to
the number could
properly be made
by calling in occasionally
such single Judges whose
Courts might happen
to be unoccupied.
p.21.
Identifier: | JB/051/063/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 51. |
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1-3, 1-15 |
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051 |
evidence; procedure code |
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063 |
judges number contents tit. ii |
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001 |
alterations in the large |
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marginal summary sheet |
2 |
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recto |
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jeremy bentham |
[[watermarks::l munn [britannia with shield motif]]] |
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benjamin constant |
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16228 |
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