JB/044/030/001: Difference between revisions

Transcribe Bentham: A Collaborative Initiative

From Transcribe Bentham: Transcription Desk

Find a new page on our Untranscribed Manuscripts list.

JB/044/030/001: Difference between revisions

BenthamBot (talk | contribs)
No edit summary
TB Editor (talk | contribs)
No edit summary
 
(2 intermediate revisions by one other user not shown)
Line 2: Line 2:
'''[{{fullurl:JB/044/030/001|action=edit}} Click Here To Edit]'''
'''[{{fullurl:JB/044/030/001|action=edit}} Click Here To Edit]'''
<!-- ENTER TRANSCRIPTION BELOW THIS LINE -->
<!-- ENTER TRANSCRIPTION BELOW THIS LINE -->
 
<p>1823. March 17<lb/>
''This Page Has Not Been Transcribed Yet''
<head>U.S.</head></p>
 
<p><head>&sect;. 2.  Reasons for <del>the non-employment</del> <add>non-adoption</add> in the several cases.</head></p>
 
<p>I.  First as to the case of a monarch superadded to a<lb/>
 
Legislative Assembly <del>elected or</del> composed of members elected<lb/>
or supposed or pretended to be elected by the great body of the people.</p>
<p>This case has already been considered:  namely under the<lb/>
question why bring into action the great body of the people<lb/>
in the character of sharers in the Supreme Constitutive powers.<lb/>
A government in which the <del><gap/></del> whole or any part of the supreme<lb/>
legislative or Supreme Executive power is in the hands of a single<lb/>
person has there been shown to be altogether incompatible<lb/>
with good government:  to be in a state of <del><gap/></del> direct repugnance<lb/>
to the greatest happiness principle:  inconsistent with the pursuit<lb/>
of the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the character<lb/>
of the end of government.</p>
<p>A Monarch <add>be his share of power ever so great or ever so small</add> is a person whose interest is in a state of<lb/>
perpetual and irreconciliable hostility to the universal interest<lb/>
of the members of the community in which he is Monarch:<lb/>
a person having a particular and sinister interest of his own<lb/>
to which the interest of the greatest number is <del>made</del> to a vast<lb/>
extent made a continual sacrifice.</p>
<p>II.  Next as to the case of an Aristocracy whether without<lb/>
a Monarch, or acting in <add>subordination to and in</add> conjunction with a Monarch.</p>
<p>Of This institution likewise it has been shown that it is not<lb/>
only superfluous but positively mischievous:  no less plainly repugnant<lb/>
to the happiness and <add>best</add> interests of the greater number than<lb/>
that of Monarchy is.</p>
<!-- DO NOT EDIT BELOW THIS LINE -->
<!-- DO NOT EDIT BELOW THIS LINE -->
{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Untranscribed}}
{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}}

Latest revision as of 13:00, 13 October 2023

Click Here To Edit

1823. March 17
U.S.

§. 2. Reasons for the non-employment non-adoption in the several cases.

I. First as to the case of a monarch superadded to a
Legislative Assembly elected or composed of members elected
or supposed or pretended to be elected by the great body of the people.

This case has already been considered: namely under the
question why bring into action the great body of the people
in the character of sharers in the Supreme Constitutive powers.
A government in which the whole or any part of the supreme
legislative or Supreme Executive power is in the hands of a single
person has there been shown to be altogether incompatible
with good government: to be in a state of direct repugnance
to the greatest happiness principle: inconsistent with the pursuit
of the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the character
of the end of government.

A Monarch be his share of power ever so great or ever so small is a person whose interest is in a state of
perpetual and irreconciliable hostility to the universal interest
of the members of the community in which he is Monarch:
a person having a particular and sinister interest of his own
to which the interest of the greatest number is made to a vast
extent made a continual sacrifice.

II. Next as to the case of an Aristocracy whether without
a Monarch, or acting in subordination to and in conjunction with a Monarch.

Of This institution likewise it has been shown that it is not
only superfluous but positively mischievous: no less plainly repugnant
to the happiness and best interests of the greater number than
that of Monarchy is.


Identifier: | JB/044/030/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 44.

Date_1

1823-03-17

Marginal Summary Numbering

or 1 - or 2

Box

044

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

030

Info in main headings field

constitut. code us

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d5 / e1 / f17

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

Marginals

jeremy bentham

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

13815

Box Contents

UCL Home » Transcribe Bentham » Transcription Desk
  • Create account
  • Log in