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<p>1823. April 16<lb/>
''This Page Has Not Been Transcribed Yet''
<!-- pencil --><head>Constitut. Code</head></p>
 
<p>4.  Course here pursued <add>Means here employed</add> for surmounting it<lb/>
 
<del>4.  Course <add>here to be</add> taken in the <gap/> for the <gap/> of <add>all</add> those <gap/><lb/>
 
obstacles.</del></p>
<p>To the devising of any <del><gap/></del> well grounded and rational<lb/>
course for the surmounting of the obstacles <add>the <unclear>constant</unclear> preference of the universal to every narrow interest</add> opposed to good government<lb/>
by <add>universal</add> self-preference in the breasts of the functionaries of<lb/>
government constituted guardians of the <del><gap/></del> universal<lb/>
interest the first step was the <del><gap/></del> <add>taking a new observation</add> recognizing of the<lb/>
existence and shape of that same <add>universal <unclear>private</unclear></add> particular and sinister<lb/>
interest.  This problem <add>theory</add> being accomplished, correspondent<lb/>
and accordant practice follow <add>becomes</add> as a matter of course.<lb/>
<add>Hence the leading with</add> <hi rend="underline">Minimize confidence</hi>: <del><add>for</add> in those</del> into the compass of those<lb/>
two words may be condensed the all-directing and leading<lb/>
rule.  Such then <del><gap/></del> is the advice which the framers<lb/>
of this Constitution have not been backward in giving to<lb/>
all <del>who</del> <add>who are</add> whom it finds disposed to accept it.  Confine<lb/>
within the strictest limits of necessity whatsoever confidence<lb/>
you feel disposed <add>may be inclined</add> it repose either in us or in any<lb/>
<del>some</del> of those whom it is possible for us to have for our<lb/>
successors.</p>
<p>At the same time, here as in a <del><gap/></del> watch<lb/>
this this main spring require another to antagonize with<lb/>
it.  Of <del>every</del> <add>all</add> constituents to it at the same time the <unclear>error</unclear><lb/>
from no delegate to withhold any of that power which may<lb/>
eventually be necessary to the maximization of the service<lb/>
looked for at their hands.  While confidence is minimized<lb/>
let no power be <unclear>starved</unclear>.  For security against breach<lb/>
of trust the sole apt remedy is – <add>on the part of <unclear>trustees</unclear></add> not impotence but<lb/>
constant responsibility, and as towards those creators <add>the authors of this <unclear>political</unclear> being<lb/>
on every occasion and at all times and on every occasion</add> the strictest and most absolute dependence.  In the first<lb/>
place with powers not <add>no</add> otherwise limited on the part of the <add>supreme</add> legislature<lb/>
the most absolute dependence on the supreme constitution<lb/>
and thus in a choice reading due from the supreme legislature<lb/>
down to the lowest functionary, <add>of</add> each <unclear>trade</unclear> through the medium of the <add>such</add><lb/>
several increasing <unclear>texts</unclear> in<lb/>
a state of equally perfect<lb/>
dependence on the supreme legislature, and thus and by those means in the supreme Constitution.  <add><unclear>Divorce</unclear> of power beyond absolutely necessity not in any part of that <unclear>choice</unclear>.</add> If the supreme Constitution were <add>in a single hand</add> in the hands of a single person<hi rend="superscript">⊞1</hi><lb/>
were in the <unclear>hands</unclear> of a Monarch, no<lb/>
objection would there be on his part<lb/>
to <gap/> <gap/> of this choice of dependence<lb/>
none on the part of any of those who<lb/>
that the many may <del>depe</del> be dependent<lb/>
on them, are well content to be<lb/>
dependent on that one.  Let it be<hi rend="superscript">⊞2</hi><lb/>
<hi rend="superscript">⊞2</hi> seen <add>it will be seen</add> whether there is less reason for content<lb/>
when the few are thus dependant<lb/>
to the strength of this choice<hi rend="superscript">⊞3</hi><lb/>
<hi rend="superscript">⊞3</hi> <gap/> the all, is as<lb/>
near to the being <del>th</del><lb/>
all as the unchangeable<lb/>
condition of human<lb/>
nature will allow<lb/>
them to be.</p>
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Untranscribed}}
{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}}

Latest revision as of 14:42, 16 January 2025

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1823. April 16
Constitut. Code

4. Course here pursued Means here employed for surmounting it
4. Course here to be taken in the for the of all those
obstacles.

To the devising of any well grounded and rational
course for the surmounting of the obstacles the constant preference of the universal to every narrow interest opposed to good government
by universal self-preference in the breasts of the functionaries of
government constituted guardians of the universal
interest the first step was the taking a new observation recognizing of the
existence and shape of that same universal private particular and sinister
interest. This problem theory being accomplished, correspondent
and accordant practice follow becomes as a matter of course.
Hence the leading with Minimize confidence: for in those into the compass of those
two words may be condensed the all-directing and leading
rule. Such then is the advice which the framers
of this Constitution have not been backward in giving to
all who who are whom it finds disposed to accept it. Confine
within the strictest limits of necessity whatsoever confidence
you feel disposed may be inclined it repose either in us or in any
some of those whom it is possible for us to have for our
successors.

At the same time, here as in a watch
this this main spring require another to antagonize with
it. Of every all constituents to it at the same time the error
from no delegate to withhold any of that power which may
eventually be necessary to the maximization of the service
looked for at their hands. While confidence is minimized
let no power be starved. For security against breach
of trust the sole apt remedy is – on the part of trustees not impotence but
constant responsibility, and as towards those creators the authors of this political being
on every occasion and at all times and on every occasion
the strictest and most absolute dependence. In the first
place with powers not no otherwise limited on the part of the supreme legislature
the most absolute dependence on the supreme constitution
and thus in a choice reading due from the supreme legislature
down to the lowest functionary, of each trade through the medium of the such
several increasing texts in
a state of equally perfect
dependence on the supreme legislature, and thus and by those means in the supreme Constitution. Divorce of power beyond absolutely necessity not in any part of that choice. If the supreme Constitution were in a single hand in the hands of a single person⊞1
were in the hands of a Monarch, no
objection would there be on his part
to of this choice of dependence
none on the part of any of those who
that the many may depe be dependent
on them, are well content to be
dependent on that one. Let it be⊞2
⊞2 seen it will be seen whether there is less reason for content
when the few are thus dependant
to the strength of this choice⊞3
⊞3 the all, is as
near to the being th
all as the unchangeable
condition of human
nature will allow
them to be.


Identifier: | JB/036/228/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 36.

Date_1

1823-04-16

Marginal Summary Numbering

1-2

Box

036

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

228

Info in main headings field

constitut. code

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d9 / e1

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

j whatman turkey mill 1822

Marginals

jeremy bentham

Paper Producer

jonathan blenman

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

1822

Notes public

ID Number

11152

Box Contents

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