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<p>Now suppose a President disposed to acquire or<lb/>exercise exorbitant power, where can he find fitter instruments.<lb/>He and they agreeing— and the <sic>smalness</sic> of the<lb/> number, especially if the majority suffice, renders the<lb/> agreements comparatively easy— let him do what he will, he and<lb/> they are unpunishable. Oh yes— removed from office he may be<lb/> for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours"—<lb/>removed, but no otherwise punished. Removed? yes: but by whom?<lb/> by a majority of these aristocrats, his supposed confederates and<lb/> co-deliquents— not otherwise.</p> | <p>Now suppose a President disposed to acquire or<lb/>exercise exorbitant power, where can he find fitter instruments.<lb/>He and they agreeing— and the <sic>smalness</sic> of the<lb/> number, especially if the majority suffice, renders the<lb/> agreements comparatively easy— let him do what he will, he and<lb/> they are unpunishable. Oh yes— removed from office he may be<lb/> for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours"—<lb/>removed, but no otherwise punished. Removed? yes: but by whom?<lb/> by a majority of these aristocrats, his supposed confederates and<lb/> co-deliquents— not otherwise.</p> | ||
<p><!-- manicule -->Contrast the mischiefs to which this institution of the Senate exposes the<lb/> Constitution with imaginariness of the mischiefs sought to be guarded<lb/> against by qualification-requiring arrangements.</p> | <p><!-- manicule -->Contrast the mischiefs to which this institution of the Senate exposes the<lb/> Constitution with imaginariness of the mischiefs sought to be guarded<lb/> against by qualification-requiring arrangements.</p> | ||
<p>Yet neither from the antecedent and original establishment<lb/> of the Constitution Anno 1787, nor | <p>Yet neither from the antecedent and original establishment<lb/> of the Constitution Anno 1787, nor yet from the establishment of<lb/> the Confederation in 1778-1781, on the part of the functionaries<lb/> in question has delinquency in any such shape as that<lb/> in question as yet manifested itself. True: but such <lb/> innoxiousness— to what preventive cause is it to be ascribed?<lb/> Not to any punitive or dislocative arrangement in this<lb/>Code, for no such check does it provide. To what then?<lb/> To the influence of the Public Opinion Tribunal and northing<lb/>else: and of this judicatory, had not the liberticide laws<lb/> of 1801 been suffered to expire, the influence would<lb/> have at least been deplorably weakened, if not destroyed<lb/> altogether. Public Opinion Tribunal excepted, what is there<lb/> to prevent the President with a majority of the Senate from<lb/>selling to any foreign State a negative or any necessary war<lb/> or useful treaty, or alliance, & c?</p> | ||
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Under the U.S. in the situation here in question as they are
not dislocable so neither in any other mode are malefactors punishable.
The President, yes: even he is punishable. The Executive
Monarch, he is punishable: but of this Aristocracy, let the
mischief done by it be ever so great, no one member is punishable
or (as above) so much as dislocable.
Now suppose a President disposed to acquire or
exercise exorbitant power, where can he find fitter instruments.
He and they agreeing— and the smalness of the
number, especially if the majority suffice, renders the
agreements comparatively easy— let him do what he will, he and
they are unpunishable. Oh yes— removed from office he may be
for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours"—
removed, but no otherwise punished. Removed? yes: but by whom?
by a majority of these aristocrats, his supposed confederates and
co-deliquents— not otherwise.
Contrast the mischiefs to which this institution of the Senate exposes the
Constitution with imaginariness of the mischiefs sought to be guarded
against by qualification-requiring arrangements.
Yet neither from the antecedent and original establishment
of the Constitution Anno 1787, nor yet from the establishment of
the Confederation in 1778-1781, on the part of the functionaries
in question has delinquency in any such shape as that
in question as yet manifested itself. True: but such
innoxiousness— to what preventive cause is it to be ascribed?
Not to any punitive or dislocative arrangement in this
Code, for no such check does it provide. To what then?
To the influence of the Public Opinion Tribunal and northing
else: and of this judicatory, had not the liberticide laws
of 1801 been suffered to expire, the influence would
have at least been deplorably weakened, if not destroyed
altogether. Public Opinion Tribunal excepted, what is there
to prevent the President with a majority of the Senate from
selling to any foreign State a negative or any necessary war
or useful treaty, or alliance, & c?
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Identifier: | JB/044/148/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 44. |
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j whatman turkey mill 1829 |
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jonathan blenman |
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1829 |
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13933 |
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