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<p>1819 Nov. 27</p> | |||
<head>Deontology</head> <note>§ Theoretical</note> | |||
<p>1</p> | |||
<note><unclear>Acts</unclear> Virtuous & <unclear>Vicious</unclear><lb/> | |||
Virtues Vices</note> | |||
<p>§ Actions, virtuous and vicious — virtues<lb/> | |||
and vices — vice — the ideas whence and how deduced —<lb/> | |||
every virtuous action is in effect or in tendency<lb/> | |||
beneficial to the community: every vicious action pernicious.</p> | |||
<p>To be <del>beneficial</del> <add>virtuous</add>, every action must then <add>must</add> be<lb/> | |||
<del>in</del> either in effect or in tendency beneficial as above.<lb/> | |||
But of actions that are beneficial to the community,<lb/> | |||
it is not every one that is virtuous. For a<lb/> | |||
beneficial action to be virtuous, <del>it is necess</del> some effort<lb/> | |||
most accompany the performance of it. The<lb/> | |||
actions that are most beneficial to society <add>community</add> are those<lb/> | |||
by which the Individual is preserved and those by<lb/> | |||
which the species is preserved: to neither of these two<lb/> | |||
species of acts <add>as such</add> is any such epithet as that of virtuous<lb/> | |||
ever attributed. For a species of action to be regarded<lb/> | |||
as having a claim to the appellation of virtuous,<lb/> | |||
it seems necessary that some effort should in<lb/> | |||
some degree have accompanied it. Of this effort,<lb/> | |||
the nature would be different according to the mode<lb/> | |||
in which the action is virtuous of which presently.<lb/> | |||
To be beneficial, an action must be so either to the<lb/> | |||
agent himself or to another person or other persons<lb/> | |||
or to both. In so far as being thus beneficial <add>to the agent himself</add> it is<lb/> | |||
virtuous a virtue is considered as being exercised<lb/> | |||
by the performance of it: and this virtue is termed<lb/> | |||
Prudence viz. <add>in particular</add> self regarding Prudence.<lb/> | |||
In so far as being beneficial to others it is also<lb/> | |||
virtuous, virtue in another shape is considered<lb/> | |||
as exercised by the performance of it. This virtue<lb/> | |||
is termed beneficence.</p> | |||
<p>In so far as the intention or disposition<lb/> | |||
In so far as the effect which it is the intention or<lb/> | |||
disposition to produce is regarded as being in the opinion<lb/> | |||
<hi rend="underline">of the agent</hi> beneficial to others, the action<lb/> | |||
it termed benevolent and the virtue benevolence:<lb/> | |||
and this whether any benefit to any other person be<lb/> | |||
or be not among the effects of it.</p> | |||
<p><!-- This paragraph appears to be added later, in pencil, in a different hand --> Next as to the effort <del>in</del> <unclear>of</unclear> the understanding<lb/> | |||
in one case — of the will in the other</p> | |||
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}} | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Completed}} | ||
1819 Nov. 27
Deontology § Theoretical
1
Acts Virtuous & Vicious
Virtues Vices
§ Actions, virtuous and vicious — virtues
and vices — vice — the ideas whence and how deduced —
every virtuous action is in effect or in tendency
beneficial to the community: every vicious action pernicious.
To be beneficial virtuous, every action must then must be
in either in effect or in tendency beneficial as above.
But of actions that are beneficial to the community,
it is not every one that is virtuous. For a
beneficial action to be virtuous, it is necess some effort
most accompany the performance of it. The
actions that are most beneficial to society community are those
by which the Individual is preserved and those by
which the species is preserved: to neither of these two
species of acts as such is any such epithet as that of virtuous
ever attributed. For a species of action to be regarded
as having a claim to the appellation of virtuous,
it seems necessary that some effort should in
some degree have accompanied it. Of this effort,
the nature would be different according to the mode
in which the action is virtuous of which presently.
To be beneficial, an action must be so either to the
agent himself or to another person or other persons
or to both. In so far as being thus beneficial to the agent himself it is
virtuous a virtue is considered as being exercised
by the performance of it: and this virtue is termed
Prudence viz. in particular self regarding Prudence.
In so far as being beneficial to others it is also
virtuous, virtue in another shape is considered
as exercised by the performance of it. This virtue
is termed beneficence.
In so far as the intention or disposition
In so far as the effect which it is the intention or
disposition to produce is regarded as being in the opinion
of the agent beneficial to others, the action
it termed benevolent and the virtue benevolence:
and this whether any benefit to any other person be
or be not among the effects of it.
Next as to the effort in of the understanding
in one case — of the will in the other
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