JB/037/359/001

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1824. Oct. 8
Constitutional CodeCh. VI. Legislature
§. 1. Composition: or House one.

Rationale.

Encrease of corruptibility. Encreased facility afforded
to corruption.

The susceptibility as to corruption has been already
stated as a weakness the principal weakness inherent in the constitution of a representative democracy –
in every state there must be one administrative authority
and in every state the members of the legislative authority will
be able and disposed to exchange inclined at the expence of the people
to exchange favours with those of the Administrative and
to join with them in a system of depredation and oppression.

Thus in the aggregate value of those favours is indeed minimized: but minimization is not exhaustive
at the expence of the people. But the quantity aggregate value of those favours
being given, and the condition in life of the person to be operated upon by it the corruptive power of them, will be inversely on
the number of those persons: and, on the rules of the population of the two Houses in the smaller House the
number will be less than in the large.

Where examples were to be given, the importance of this
observation will stand in the clearer point of view.

Of itself the Second House can not establish introduce
anything propose: but there is not anything proposable which it can not
keep excluded. The tending to efficient causes of corruption are continually
in action: and the effect of them continually on the encrease.
Sooner or later therefore unless obviated they can not fail
to destroy the constitution to substitute to it a corrupt despotism.
But whatsoever be the remainders by which the evil is capable of being united
But what that which the Second House has it can not but have in its power is to prevent
the application of them.

Whatsoever gives encrease to Government expence gives encrease
to the mass of the matter of corruption lying at the
disposal of the Government and in particular of the Administrative
department. But scarcely can a new constitution be proposed, but
in some way or other encrease is given to the mass of expence.
If that House over which the power of the people – the contributors
or action acted by itself – had no other to stop bar or clog its measures
it might obviate the danger attached to this expence. But this by the
supposition it has not if any institutes which, sitting under this danger
is beneficial in the one
particular nature, the particular
good effect will naturally
make more impression
as being more obvious sensible and
measurable than the evil
mixture on the addition made to the matter of corruption. On pursuance of the general design of maximising the matter and the effect of corruption This obvious good the Second House will of course take up and trumpet forth and make the most of, and by the of
their the people will be but too naturally moved aside from the contemplation of the distant evils.

Identifier: | JB/037/359/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 37.
Date_1	1824-10-08	Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	037	Main Headings	constitutional code
Folio number	359	Info in main headings field	constitutional code
Image	001	Titles	rationale
Category	text sheet	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering	c2 / d6 / e1
Penner	jeremy bentham	Watermarks
Marginals		Paper Producer
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year
Notes public		ID Number	11574
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