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<p><del><!-- indent --> Probity caution and intelligence were the leading<lb/> terms in <add>that point of </add>the enquiry which <unclear>lend</unclear> Judges in general<lb/> for its object: the same terms will serve to guide<lb/> us here. </del></p>
<p><!-- indent --> Probity caution and intelligence were the leading<lb/> terms in
<p><del><!-- indent -->As to <hi rend='underline'>probity,</hi> that quality, considered with references<lb/> to Judges in general, <add>stood as we saw <del>stood</del><del> upon the basis<lb/> of <hi rend='underline'>responsibility</hi>: that is upon the degree of <del>their </del> <del>dependence<lb/> <del>upon public opinion</del><del> of their situation with reference<lb/> to the opinion of the people. </add> <gap/> rested as we<lb/> <del>saw upon the ground of true responsibility upon<lb/> the degree pf responsibility in which the terms of<lb/> his appointment placed him. </del> <del>Single Judges<lb/> <unclear>as</unclear> found to be preferable in <add>this</add> <del>every</del> <del>point of view<lb/> <add>on every account</add> to <unclear>tribes</unclear> of Judges. Why? &#x2014; Because on so<lb/> many <del>accounts</del> <del>different ways, <add>their</add> <del>that</del> dependence<lb/> <add>grows</add> was <del>weaker and weaker in <add>arithmetical proportion</add> proportion to their<lb/> <add>to their multitude</add> number.</del><del>What shall we say <add>then</add> of a tribunal <add>in</add> which<lb/> the very idea of such dependence, even in the slightest<lb/> degree, is altogether out of the question? But<lb/> this absolute <del>dependence</del><del> <add>independence</add> of every thing which can<lb/> <add>serve to</add> guard the probity of a judicial character, is<lb/> of the very essence of a a Jury. In every other<lb/> scheme of judicature all ranks of Judges are<lb/> in some shape or other subject to the law of responsibility<lb/>. Juries are absolutely exempt from it:<lb/> and it is the great boast of the admirers of the institution<lb/> that they are so. No despotism that <del>ever</del><del><lb/> was <add>ever</add> exemplified or devised, <add>ever was so comparable</add> <del>was ever equal</del><del> to<lb/><lb/> the despotism of a Jury: here caprice, and every <add>interested</add>   </del>  </p>
                        <add>that point of </add>the enquiry which <unclear>lend</unclear> Judges in
 
                    general<lb/> for its object: the same terms will serve to guide<lb/> us here. </p>
                <p><!-- indent -->As to <hi rend="underline">probity,</hi> that quality, considered
                    with references<lb/> to Judges in general, stood as we saw <del>stood</del> upon
                    the basis<lb/> of <hi rend="underline">responsibility</hi>: that is upon the
                    degree of <del>their </del> dependence<lb/> upon public opinion of their
                    situation with reference<lb/> to the opinion of the people. <gap/> rested as
                    we<lb/> saw upon the ground of true responsibility upon<lb/> the degree pf
                    responsibility in which the terms of<lb/> his appointment placed him. Single Judges<lb/>
                    <unclear>as</unclear> found to be preferable in <add>this</add>
                    <del>every</del> point of view<lb/>
                    <add>on every account</add> to <unclear>tribes</unclear> of Judges. Why?
                    &#x2014; Because on so<lb/> many <del>accounts</del> different ways,
                        <add>their</add>
                    <del>that</del> dependence<lb/>
                    <add>grows</add> was <del>weaker and weaker in <add>arithmetical
                        proportion</add> proportion to their<lb/>
                        <add>to their multitude</add> number.</del>What shall we say <add>then</add>
                    of a tribunal <add>in</add> which<lb/> the very idea of such dependence, even in
                    the slightest<lb/> degree, is altogether out of the question? But<lb/> this
                    absolute <del>dependence</del>
                    <add>independence</add> of every thing which can<lb/>
                    <add>serve to</add> guard the probity of a judicial character, is<lb/> of the
                    very essence of a a Jury. In every other<lb/> scheme of judicature all ranks of
                    Judges are<lb/> in some shape or other subject to the law of
                    responsibility<lb/>. Juries are absolutely exempt from it:<lb/> and it is the
                    great boast of the admirers of the institution<lb/> that they are so. No
                    despotism that <del>ever</del><lb/> was <add>ever</add> exemplified or devised,
                        <add>ever was so comparable</add>
                    <del>was ever equal</del> to<lb/> the despotism of a Jury: here caprice, and
                    every <add>interested</add>
                </p>




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Latest revision as of 09:45, 4 February 2020

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Probity caution and intelligence were the leading
terms in that point of the enquiry which lend Judges in general
for its object: the same terms will serve to guide
us here.

As to probity, that quality, considered with references
to Judges in general, stood as we saw stood upon the basis
of responsibility: that is upon the degree of their dependence
upon public opinion of their situation with reference
to the opinion of the people. rested as we
saw upon the ground of true responsibility upon
the degree pf responsibility in which the terms of
his appointment placed him. Single Judges
as found to be preferable in this every point of view
on every account to tribes of Judges. Why? — Because on so
many accounts different ways, their that dependence
grows was weaker and weaker in arithmetical proportion proportion to their
to their multitude number.
What shall we say then of a tribunal in which
the very idea of such dependence, even in the slightest
degree, is altogether out of the question? But
this absolute dependence independence of every thing which can
serve to guard the probity of a judicial character, is
of the very essence of a a Jury. In every other
scheme of judicature all ranks of Judges are
in some shape or other subject to the law of responsibility
. Juries are absolutely exempt from it:
and it is the great boast of the admirers of the institution
that they are so. No despotism that ever
was ever exemplified or devised, ever was so comparable was ever equal to
the despotism of a Jury: here caprice, and every interested


















Identifier: | JB/035/028/003"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 35.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

1-4

Box

035

Main Headings

constitutional code; evidence; procedure code

Folio number

028

Info in main headings field

Image

003

Titles

defects inseparable from the constitution

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

4

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

f1 / f2 / f3 / f4

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::floyd & co [britannia with shield emblem]]]

Marginals

jeremy bentham

Paper Producer

arthur young

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

10621

Box Contents

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