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<head>SECT. III. Divine Law</head><lb/> "they can never be put in<unclear><del>to</del></unclear> any competition together<lb/> Locke's <unclear>whim</unclear> is the reverse. <del>He thinks</del> His notion<lb/> is that moral truths, propositions of morality<lb/> are strictly demonstrable; susceptible of an <unclear>questionable reading</unclear><lb/> equal to that of mathematical ones. Whereas that<lb/> of revealed truths comes short of being equal<lb/> to it. He thinks with Archbishop <unclear>Gillotson</unclear> that<lb/> the evidence those had of them at first <del>to them</del><unclear>questionable reading</unclear> when<lb/> these were revealed, the Apostles* for example, was<lb/> no greater than that of their senses: for it was<lb/> that of their senses and no other. He thinks that<lb/> demonstration, <del>comes next</del> in point of certainty, <add>comes next</add>:<lb/> and that History comes after all. <del>deleted text</del> He thinks that<lb/> what <add>passes through man's mouth <del>deleted text</del> and</add> depends upon <del>deleted text</del>his <unclear>questionable reading</unclear> can be at most<lb/> but probable. He <hi rend='underline'>might</hi> have thought, whether he did<lb/> or no, that it is easier for a man, or many men<lb/> to make a mistake, or tell a lie, or forge a his-<lb/>-tory, than for fourteen men <add>for example</add> to have each of them<lb/> two father's: than for God to dictate contradictions:<lb/> for an all-powerful being <del>not</del> to be <add>not</add> able,<lb/> or an all-benevolent one<del>deleted text</del> not willing to speak<lb/> plain.
<head>SECT. III. Divine Law</head>


<p>"they can never be put in<del>to</del> any competition together
<lb/>
Locke's notion is the reverse. <del>He thinks</del> His notion
<lb/>
is that moral truths, propositions of morality
<lb/>
are strictly demonstrable; susceptible of an evidence
<lb/>
equal to that of mathematical ones. Whereas that
<lb/>
of revealed truths comes short of being equal
<lb/>
to it. He thinks with Archbishop Tillotson that
<lb/>
the evidence those had of them at first <del>to them</del> whose
<lb/>
view were revealed, the Apostles for example, was
<lb/>
no greater than that of their senses: for it was
<lb/>
that of their senses and no other. He thinks that
<lb/>
demonstration, <del>comes next</del> in point of certainty, <add>comes next</add>:
<lb/>
and that History comes after all. He thinks that
<lb/>
what <add>passes through man's mouth and</add> depends upon <del>man's</del> <add>his</add> voracity can be at most
<lb/>
but probable. He <hi rend='underline'>might</hi> have thought, whether he did
<lb/>
or no, that it is easier for a man, or many men
<lb/>
to make a mistake, or tell a lie, or forge a history,
<lb/>
than for fourteen men <add>for example</add> to have each of them
<lb/>
two <sic>father's</sic>: than for God to dictate contradictions:
<lb/>
for an all-powerful being <del>not</del> to be <add>not</add> able,
<lb/>
or an all-benevolent one <del>or</del> not willing to speak
<lb/>
plain.
</p>




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Latest revision as of 10:11, 4 February 2020

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SECT. III. Divine Law

"they can never be put into any competition together
Locke's notion is the reverse. He thinks His notion
is that moral truths, propositions of morality
are strictly demonstrable; susceptible of an evidence
equal to that of mathematical ones. Whereas that
of revealed truths comes short of being equal
to it. He thinks with Archbishop Tillotson that
the evidence those had of them at first to them whose
view were revealed, the Apostles for example, was
no greater than that of their senses: for it was
that of their senses and no other. He thinks that
demonstration, comes next in point of certainty, comes next:
and that History comes after all. He thinks that
what passes through man's mouth and depends upon man's his voracity can be at most
but probable. He might have thought, whether he did
or no, that it is easier for a man, or many men
to make a mistake, or tell a lie, or forge a history,
than for fourteen men for example to have each of them
two father's: than for God to dictate contradictions:
for an all-powerful being not to be not able,
or an all-benevolent one or not willing to speak
plain.



Identifier: | JB/096/059/004"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 96.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

096

Main Headings

comment on the commentaries

Folio number

059

Info in main headings field

sect. iii divine law

Image

004

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

4

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

f6 / d7 / f8 / d9

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::[gr with crown motif] propatria [britannia motif]]]

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

31063

Box Contents

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