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'' | <head>1822 June 27</head> | ||
<head>Economy</head> | |||
<note>Ch. Securities for Electoral Aptit<lb/>1. Power means available<lb/>Exposition <gap/><lb/>mode of restriction<lb/>to what powers <gap/></note> | |||
<p>7. or 1.</p> | |||
<p>These modes of restriction,<lb/>observe to what<lb/> powers respecting applicable.</p> | |||
<p>1. To this, such is its<lb/>simplicity, if restriction<lb/>is applicable, it<lb/>can only be through d<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>.<lb/>applied to the field of <lb/>operative power.</p> | |||
<p>8. or 2.</p> | |||
<p>Cloud hanging over the<lb/><hi rend="underline">source</hi> of power in<lb/> a state. By Constituents,<lb/>restriction may<lb/>be applied to the power<lb/>constituted by them:<lb/>to the power of their<lb/> operatives. But to<lb/>Constituents power, by<lb/>whom shall restriction<lb/>be applicable?<lb/>Of Constituents who<lb/>the Constituents?</p> | |||
<p>9. or 3.</p> | |||
<p>In fact, in a Constitutional<lb/>Case, the operatives are Constituents<lb/>of the future<lb/>Constituents. By these<lb/>operatives, the initiative<lb/>function exercised: and the consumative<lb/>is left to be<lb/>exercised <add>actively</add> by future constituents<lb/>and operatives,<lb/>passively by <lb/> the acquiescence<lb/>of non-constituents.</p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p>10. or 4.</p> | |||
<p>Objections to restrictions<lb/>on power of operatives:<lb/>thence or d<hi rend="superscript">o</hi>. of constituents.</p> | |||
<p>1. Danger of anarchy and<lb/>its evils.</p> | |||
<p>In such restriction is<lb/>contained a virtual declaration<lb/>that if the restriction<lb/>be broken, disobedience<lb/> of the Citizens<lb/>to the operative is<lb/>authorised and invited.<lb/>Such disobedience some<lb/>will manifest, others not:<lb/>here there is anarchy<lb/> and civil war,<lb/>each party to the other<lb/>rebels.</p> | |||
<p>11. or 5.</p> | |||
<p>2. Inconsistency; the<lb/> less apt in morals and<lb/> intellectuals attempting<lb/>to impose chains on the<lb/> more apt: if these are<lb/>more apt than their<lb/> predecessors, so will their<lb/> successors be more apt<lb/>than they unless in either<lb/>time improvement is<lb/>at a maximum, and<lb/>even then the successors<lb/>will not be.</p> | |||
<p>12. or 6.</p> | |||
<p>Constitutional operatives<lb/>to which this difficulty attaches.</p> | |||
<p>1. In a federative constitution,<lb/>tracing the limits between the supreme<lb/>power in each <lb/>state, and the power of<lb/>the General Government<lb/><add>In</add></p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p>12 or 6 contin<hi rend="superscript">d</hi>.</p> | |||
<p>In such a Constitution,<lb/>this is a matter of absolute<lb/>necessity.</p> | |||
<p>13. or 7.</p> | |||
<p>2. Penning a Declaration<lb/>of Rights: viz. for security<lb/>and tranquillity to citizens<lb/>in their character of subjects.</p> | |||
<p>14. or 8.</p> | |||
<p>For obviating the danger attached<lb/>to this case, sole<lb/>resource, good temper<lb/>on both sides: guides to<lb/>understanding man in<lb/> power may receive without<lb/>invitation; chains to <lb/>his <hi rend="underline">will</hi>, not.</p> | |||
<p>15. or 9.</p> | |||
<p>Under the cognizance<lb/>of judicatures may the<lb/>boundary lines between<lb/>General Government. Power<lb/>and Particular States<lb/>power be naturally expected<lb/>to cease.</p><p>16. or 10.</p><p>No so<lb/>Supreme Operative's power<lb/>and subject Citizen's<lb/>security as traced in a<lb/>Declaration of Rights.<lb/>Public opinion tribunal<lb/>is the Tribunal chiefly<lb/>looked to in this case.</p><p>17. or 11.</p><p>Indispensable in both<lb/>cases a body of laws<lb/> <foreign>in terminis</foreign> throughout<lb/>and rationalized: <foreign>in terminis,</foreign> <hi rend="underline">not</hi>that there<lb/> may be no doubt about<lb/> the words; nationalized,<lb/>that, if doubtful,<lb/>the doubt may be cleared <lb/>away by indication of<lb/><add>the</add></p><pb/><p>the good aimed at:<lb/>the Code really existing<lb/>not imagined by each<lb/>one a different one, for<lb/>his own purposes.</p> | |||
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}} | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}} |
1822 June 27
Economy
Ch. Securities for Electoral Aptit
1. Power means available
Exposition
mode of restriction
to what powers
7. or 1.
These modes of restriction,
observe to what
powers respecting applicable.
1. To this, such is its
simplicity, if restriction
is applicable, it
can only be through do.
applied to the field of
operative power.
8. or 2.
Cloud hanging over the
source of power in
a state. By Constituents,
restriction may
be applied to the power
constituted by them:
to the power of their
operatives. But to
Constituents power, by
whom shall restriction
be applicable?
Of Constituents who
the Constituents?
9. or 3.
In fact, in a Constitutional
Case, the operatives are Constituents
of the future
Constituents. By these
operatives, the initiative
function exercised: and the consumative
is left to be
exercised actively by future constituents
and operatives,
passively by
the acquiescence
of non-constituents.
---page break---
10. or 4.
Objections to restrictions
on power of operatives:
thence or do. of constituents.
1. Danger of anarchy and
its evils.
In such restriction is
contained a virtual declaration
that if the restriction
be broken, disobedience
of the Citizens
to the operative is
authorised and invited.
Such disobedience some
will manifest, others not:
here there is anarchy
and civil war,
each party to the other
rebels.
11. or 5.
2. Inconsistency; the
less apt in morals and
intellectuals attempting
to impose chains on the
more apt: if these are
more apt than their
predecessors, so will their
successors be more apt
than they unless in either
time improvement is
at a maximum, and
even then the successors
will not be.
12. or 6.
Constitutional operatives
to which this difficulty attaches.
1. In a federative constitution,
tracing the limits between the supreme
power in each
state, and the power of
the General Government
In
---page break---
12 or 6 contind.
In such a Constitution,
this is a matter of absolute
necessity.
13. or 7.
2. Penning a Declaration
of Rights: viz. for security
and tranquillity to citizens
in their character of subjects.
14. or 8.
For obviating the danger attached
to this case, sole
resource, good temper
on both sides: guides to
understanding man in
power may receive without
invitation; chains to
his will, not.
15. or 9.
Under the cognizance
of judicatures may the
boundary lines between
General Government. Power
and Particular States
power be naturally expected
to cease.
16. or 10.
No so
Supreme Operative's power
and subject Citizen's
security as traced in a
Declaration of Rights.
Public opinion tribunal
is the Tribunal chiefly
looked to in this case.
17. or 11.
Indispensable in both
cases a body of laws
in terminis throughout
and rationalized: in terminis, notthat there
may be no doubt about
the words; nationalized,
that, if doubtful,
the doubt may be cleared
away by indication of
the
---page break---
the good aimed at:
the Code really existing
not imagined by each
one a different one, for
his own purposes.
Identifier: | JB/038/054/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 38. |
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1822-06-27 |
7 or 1 - 17 or 11 |
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038 |
economy as to office |
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054 |
economy |
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001 |
ch. securities for moral aptitude / power minimization / expository matter / modes of restriction / to what powers applicable |
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marginal summary sheet |
1 |
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recto |
e2 |
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john flowerdew colls |
[[watermarks::i&m [prince of wales feathers] 1818]] |
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arthur wellesley, duke of wellington |
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1818 |
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11691 |
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