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<p>In things <add>propositions</add> the alternatives, of which have <add>originally</add> clearly different <lb/> | <p>In things <add>propositions</add> the alternatives, of which have <add>originally</add> clearly different <lb/> | ||
influence on <del>the</del> General Happiness | influence on <del>the</del> General Happiness-Justice follows Utility, <lb/>in those which are indifferent, general expectation <lb/> | ||
from whence springs up a derivative Utility | from whence springs up a derivative Utility-thus that <lb/> | ||
one Brother should kill another is contrary to Justice <lb/> | one Brother should kill another is contrary to Justice <lb/> | ||
because contrary to original Utility. But that the Younger <lb/> | because contrary to original Utility. But that the Younger <lb/> | ||
Brother should succeed in preference to the | Brother should succeed in preference to the elder <lb/> | ||
instead of the elders succeeding in preference to him, <lb/> | instead of the elders succeeding in preference to him, <lb/> | ||
events originally equally indifferent to public Utility <lb/> | events originally equally indifferent to public Utility <lb/> | ||
(or suppose them so) is unjust only because the <lb/> | (or suppose them so) is unjust only because the <lb/> | ||
general expectation is contrary.</p> | general expectation is contrary.<lb/></p> | ||
<p>Is then that unjust in Essex, which is just in <lb/> | <p>Is then that unjust in Essex, which is just in <lb/> | ||
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one Brother might in general kill another (tho' in particular <lb/> | one Brother might in general kill another (tho' in particular <lb/> | ||
cases assignable & assigned it is otherwise) <lb/> | cases assignable & assigned it is otherwise) <lb/> | ||
is unjust in Kent as well as everywhere else.<lb/> | is unjust in Kent as well as everywhere else.<lb/></p> | ||
If it were not for general expectation which is fixed <lb/> | <p>If it were not for general expectation which is fixed <lb/> | ||
<sic>immoveably</sic> by a Law or a series of consistent Judgm< | <sic>immoveably</sic> by a Law or a series of consistent Judgm<hi rend='superscript'>ts</hi>.<lb/> | ||
it would be as reasonable & as <del><gap/><gap/><gap/></del> <add>consonant</add> <lb/> | it would be as reasonable & as <del><gap/><gap/><gap/></del> <add>consonant</add> <lb/> | ||
to utility to determine such a question in one day one way <lb/> | to utility to determine such a question in one day one way <lb/> | ||
and in the next another, as according to any other method—<lb/> | and in the next another, as according to any other method—<lb/> | ||
<sic>immoveably</sic> I mean, 'till an opposite Law should give <lb/> | <sic>immoveably</sic> I mean, 'till an opposite Law should give <lb/> | ||
to general expectation an opposite direction.</p> | to general expectation an opposite direction.<lb/></p> | ||
<p>Men at large,<note>Lay Gents.</note> having often no opinion of | <p>Men at large,<note>Lay Gents.</note> having often no opinion of præjudication, ground <lb/> | ||
their expectation on an opinion of Natural Justice or Original <lb/> | their expectation on an opinion of Natural Justice or Original <lb/> | ||
Utility, hence it is that they are so much less <lb/> | Utility, hence it is that they are so much less —<lb/> | ||
frequently satisfied with the decisions than Lawyers or <lb/> | frequently satisfied with the decisions than Lawyers or <lb/> | ||
(in proportion) than Litterati—v. M.S.4<hi rend='superscript'>o</hi>.101.<lb/> | (in proportion) than Litterati—v. M.S.4<hi rend='superscript'>o</hi>.101.<lb/></p> | ||
Expectation itself is grounded either 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. on the opinion of <lb/> | <p>Expectation itself is grounded either 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. on the opinion of <lb/>præjudication, or 2<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi>. on the opinion of original Justice <lb/> | ||
or dictate of the Law of Nature or 3<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi>. on the opinion of <lb/> | or dictate of the Law of Nature —or 3<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi>. on the opinion of <lb/> | ||
original Utility.</p> | original Utility.<lb/></p> | ||
The opinion of | <p>The opinion of præjudication takes place when there are <lb/> | ||
individual facts or rather individual <sic>groupes</sic> of facts—<lb/> | individual facts or rather individual <sic>groupes</sic> of facts—<lb/> | ||
with their decisions known to the person forming it, analogous <lb/> | with their decisions known to the person forming it, analogous <lb/> | ||
enough in his eyes the [groupes of facts to the fact <lb/> | enough in his eyes the [<sic>groupes</sic> of facts to the fact <lb/> | ||
in question to have the Idea of such a species, raised from <lb/> | in question to have the Idea of such a species, raised from <lb/> | ||
them by any course <add>of</add> <sic>abstration</sic>, of which the fact in question <lb/> | them by any course <add>of</add> <sic>abstration</sic>, of which the fact in question <lb/> | ||
may be considered as another individual, and thence <lb/> | may be considered as another individual, and thence <lb/> | ||
as having been by a specific law, raised in the like manner by <add>abstraction</add> <lb/> | as having been by a specific law, raised in the like manner by <add>abstraction</add> <lb/></p> | ||
< | |||
<p>In the rules of the transmission of property & in many <lb/> | <p>In the rules of the transmission of property & in many <lb/> | ||
concerning the original distribution, [that which we <lb/> | concerning the original distribution, [that which we —<lb/> | ||
have so much of under the name of] Natural Justice <lb/> | have so much of under the name of] Natural Justice <lb/> | ||
is nothing but conformity to <hi rend='underline'>General expectation.</hi><lb/> | is<add>+</add> nothing but conformity to <hi rend='underline'>General expectation.</hi><lb/> | ||
hence it is 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. that <hi rend='underline'>that</hi> Justice may truly be said to be <lb/> | hence it is 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. that <hi rend='underline'>that</hi> Justice may truly be said to be <lb/> | ||
different concerning many points among different people, <lb/> | different concerning many points among different people, <lb/> | ||
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that Justice may be alter'd in some measure in many <lb/> | that Justice may be alter'd in some measure in many <lb/> | ||
instances by positive institution; it cannot indeed be <lb/> | instances by positive institution; it cannot indeed be <lb/> | ||
altogether, because in three cases General Expectation may <lb/> | altogether, because in three cases <hi rend='underline'>General Expectation</hi> may <lb/> | ||
be changed by that means in great measure but not <lb/> | be changed by that means in great— measure but not <lb/> | ||
entirely. 3<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi>. while in other instances it can be | entirely. 3<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi>. while in other instances it can be <sic>scarse</sic> at <lb/> | ||
all be alter'd because that expectation cannot be so. <lb/> | all be alter'd because that expectation cannot be so. <lb/> | ||
4<hi rend='superscript'>thly</hi>. Hence too we see where that expectation is <unclear>neuter</unclear>, <lb/> | 4<hi rend='superscript'>thly</hi>. Hence too we see where that expectation is <unclear>neuter</unclear>, <lb/> | ||
either entirely, as having no principle <add>to</add> govern it or very <lb/> | either entirely, as having no principle <add>to</add> govern it or very <lb/> | ||
variable & irresolute as having opposite ones which <lb/> | variable & irresolute as having opposite ones which —<lb/> | ||
are nearly equal, how vain & useless are the laborious <lb/> | are nearly equal, how vain & useless are the laborious <lb/> | ||
efforts which we see made by Jurists on so many occasions <lb/> <note>On which side the natural Justice lays</note>for the discovery of Natural Justice <add>when in truth there is no such thing as Natural Justice</add> in those cases <lb/> | efforts which we see made by Jurists on so many occasions <lb/> <note>On which side the natural Justice lays</note>for the discovery of Natural Justice <add>when in truth there is no such thing as Natural Justice</add> in those cases <lb/> | ||
on either side: and Utility follows <add>adheres to</add> | on either side: and Utility follows <add>adheres to</add> Certainty on which <lb/> | ||
side soever that can be pitched. 5<hi rend='superscript'>thly</hi>. Hence lastly we may <lb/> | side soever that can be pitched. 5<hi rend='superscript'>thly</hi>. Hence lastly we may <lb/> | ||
perceive, why certain expectations may be made in some <lb/> | perceive, why certain expectations may be made in some <lb/> | ||
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a manifest tho' less general utility in those particular <lb/> | a manifest tho' less general utility in those particular <lb/> | ||
cases may carry the expectation along with it. <lb/> | cases may carry the expectation along with it. <lb/> | ||
<note>< | <note>All <sic>Oconomical</sic> regulations are of this sort being almost all but so many stoppages or unnatural direction of the current of Trade. </note> | ||
Natural Justice in regard to the distribution of Property <lb/> | Natural Justice in regard to the distribution of Property <lb/> | ||
is founded either 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. Upon original Utility or 2<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi> upon <lb/> | is founded either 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. Upon original Utility or 2<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi> upon <lb/> | ||
expectation—</p> | expectation—<lb/></p> | ||
<note>Entail in Baronics Expectation <unclear>ubi stat.</unclear> indifferent is in respect of original utility. </note> | <p><note>Entail in Baronics </note> <note>Expectation <unclear>ubi stat.</unclear> indifferent is in— respect of original utility. </note> | ||
This Expectation is <add>built</add> founded 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi>. upon an opinion of original utility or 2<hi rend='superscript'>dly</hi>. Upon certain propensities of the <del>or</del> <lb/> | |||
imagination—When a disposition | imagination— When a disposition Counteracts either <lb/> | ||
that opinion, or those propensities "(according)" which governs <lb/> | that opinion, or those propensities "(according)" which governs <lb/> | ||
the case) It is only the perfect and universal <lb/> | the case)<add>:</add> It is only the perfect and universal <lb/> | ||
notriety of that disposition that can reconcile it to <lb/> | notriety of that disposition that can reconcile it to —<lb/> | ||
Justice because such a notriety <add>operates</add> well <add>so as to</add> turn the expectation <lb/> | Justice because such a <sic>notriety</sic> <add>operates</add> well <add>so as to</add> turn the expectation <lb/> | ||
the other way at least a degree of notriety equal <lb/> | the other way at least a degree of <sic>notriety</sic> equal <lb/> | ||
to the number of persons entertaining the prevalent opinion, <lb/> | to the number of persons entertaining the prevalent opinion, <lb/> | ||
where there is a diversity of opinions.</p> | where there is a diversity of opinions.<lb/></p> | ||
<head> | |||
INTROD. Utility <del><gap/></del> Original: x Nat. Justice = Expectation [BR][1][]</head> | |||
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In things propositions the alternatives, of which have originally clearly different
influence on the General Happiness-Justice follows Utility,
in those which are indifferent, general expectation
from whence springs up a derivative Utility-thus that
one Brother should kill another is contrary to Justice
because contrary to original Utility. But that the Younger
Brother should succeed in preference to the elder
instead of the elders succeeding in preference to him,
events originally equally indifferent to public Utility
(or suppose them so) is unjust only because the
general expectation is contrary.
Is then that unjust in Essex, which is just in
Kent? Yes, under the above circumstance. For that
one Brother might in general kill another (tho' in particular
cases assignable & assigned it is otherwise)
is unjust in Kent as well as everywhere else.
If it were not for general expectation which is fixed
immoveably by a Law or a series of consistent Judgmts.
it would be as reasonable & as consonant
to utility to determine such a question in one day one way
and in the next another, as according to any other method—
immoveably I mean, 'till an opposite Law should give
to general expectation an opposite direction.
Men at large,Lay Gents. having often no opinion of præjudication, ground
their expectation on an opinion of Natural Justice or Original
Utility, hence it is that they are so much less —
frequently satisfied with the decisions than Lawyers or
(in proportion) than Litterati—v. M.S.4o.101.
Expectation itself is grounded either 1st. on the opinion of
præjudication, or 2dly. on the opinion of original Justice
or dictate of the Law of Nature —or 3dly. on the opinion of
original Utility.
The opinion of præjudication takes place when there are
individual facts or rather individual groupes of facts—
with their decisions known to the person forming it, analogous
enough in his eyes the [groupes of facts to the fact
in question to have the Idea of such a species, raised from
them by any course of abstration, of which the fact in question
may be considered as another individual, and thence
as having been by a specific law, raised in the like manner by abstraction
In the rules of the transmission of property & in many
concerning the original distribution, [that which we —
have so much of under the name of] Natural Justice
is+ nothing but conformity to General expectation.
hence it is 1st. that that Justice may truly be said to be
different concerning many points among different people,
because among these people the expectation concerning
these points are different: 2dly. hence also it is that
that Justice may be alter'd in some measure in many
instances by positive institution; it cannot indeed be
altogether, because in three cases General Expectation may
be changed by that means in great— measure but not
entirely. 3dly. while in other instances it can be scarse at
all be alter'd because that expectation cannot be so.
4thly. Hence too we see where that expectation is neuter,
either entirely, as having no principle to govern it or very
variable & irresolute as having opposite ones which —
are nearly equal, how vain & useless are the laborious
efforts which we see made by Jurists on so many occasions
On which side the natural Justice laysfor the discovery of Natural Justice when in truth there is no such thing as Natural Justice in those cases
on either side: and Utility follows adheres to Certainty on which
side soever that can be pitched. 5thly. Hence lastly we may
perceive, why certain expectations may be made in some
cases, detracting from without injuring a rule of Natural Justice, may because
a manifest tho' less general utility in those particular
cases may carry the expectation along with it.
All Oconomical regulations are of this sort being almost all but so many stoppages or unnatural direction of the current of Trade.
Natural Justice in regard to the distribution of Property
is founded either 1st. Upon original Utility or 2dly upon
expectation—
Entail in Baronics Expectation ubi stat. indifferent is in— respect of original utility.
This Expectation is built founded 1st. upon an opinion of original utility or 2dly. Upon certain propensities of the or
imagination— When a disposition Counteracts either
that opinion, or those propensities "(according)" which governs
the case): It is only the perfect and universal
notriety of that disposition that can reconcile it to —
Justice because such a notriety operates well so as to turn the expectation
the other way at least a degree of notriety equal
to the number of persons entertaining the prevalent opinion,
where there is a diversity of opinions.
INTROD. Utility Original: x Nat. Justice = Expectation [BR][1][]
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