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<p>And, content, with me, to abandon themselves<lb/> [without reserve] wholly & solely to the guidance<lb/> of this principle.</p><pb/>  | <p>And, content, with me, to abandon themselves<lb/> [without reserve] wholly & solely to the guidance<lb/> of this principle.</p><pb/>  | ||
<del><p>It is manifest, that if a <gap/> of maxims be <gap/> <add>so <gap/></add><lb/> <hi rend='underline'>reason</hi>, that reason must <unclear>ultimate</unclear></p></del>  | |||
<note>truth cannot rest <add>stand</add> upon an eternal circle of opinions</note><lb/>  | |||
<p><add><del>they</del></add> It is manifest that in a series of maxims <gap/><lb/> connected that one of them shall be the reason<lb/> of the other, the last reason+ <note>+i:e: that which is <del>itself</del> <add>of</add> such <add>a nature</add>, that no reason can be given or [reasonably] required, but is itself <add><gap/> of</add> the reason of all the rest,</note> must always be <gap/><lb/> <hi rend='underline'>fact</hi>. <del>For a matter <add>one</add> of <gap/> <add>To for <gap/></add> If a reason be<lb/> <add>demanded of</add> sought for an opinion</del> To him who demands the<lb/> reason for any opinion, <add>recognized to be <add>for a</add> general <add>one</add></add> it is no answer to give<lb/> him another opinion: for if he were disposed to<lb/> rest the matter upon opinion he might as well <add>have</add> <gap/><lb/> taken up with the first of them at once.<lb/> One opinion can never be the sufficient reason<lb/> of another.</p>  | |||
<note>verifiable by evidence</note><lb/>  | |||
<p>An opinion is <add>simply</add> what a person <del><gap/></del> thinks.+ <note>+upon a given subject</note><lb/> a general opinion is what most persons think:+ <note>+upon that subject</note><lb/> an universal opinion+ <note>+happening if to <add>such a thing</add> to exist) or (supposing there is such a thing in the world as an universal opinion upon any question)</note> is what all persons think.<lb/> <del>Suppose</del> I hear <del>a certain opinion</del> <add>any opinion no matter what</add> given for universal:<lb/> I ask the reason of it. If all persons<lb/> think so, say I, <hi rend='underline'>why</hi> is it that they think?<lb/> what <hi rend='underline'>makes</hi> them, what <hi rend='underline'>causes</hi> them to think?<lb/> <note>To what is it owing?</note> It is plain that, to give me another <add>such universal</add> opinion can<lb/> be no+ <note>+final</note> answer to my question: nor can he who gives<lb/> me such an answer have any reason to expect I<lb/><pb/>  | |||
should be satisfied with it. the answer is, people<lb/> think <hi rend='underline'>this</hi>, because they think <hi rend='underline'>that</hi>: but why do<lb/> they think <hi rend='underline'>that</hi>? it is plain <del>I have <gap/></del> that the <gap/> <add><gap/></add><lb/> which determined me to ask a reason for the 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi> opinion,<lb/> <del>must</del> [shall subsist &] determine me to ask <del>that</del> <add>one</add><lb/> for the 2<hi rend='superscript'>d</hi> opinion.</p>  | |||
Introduction
The great advantage of the doctrine of
 Expectation is that it presents all along
 a certain matter fact, on which the opinion pronounced
 in any instance that such a thing is right or
 wrong, is equity or is not equity, is founded.
 Whereas the currant maxims that are in used the way of
 being to be appealed to for the decision of the 
 questions of distinctive Jurisprudence, either
 professedly rest the matter upon a bare opinion,
 of which no reason further than the universality
 of it is pretended to be given, or if they profess
 to give
& of balance of Utilities  Now the matter of fact is no other than this viz. the state of sensations upon the commission of an act of the persons within the circle of it's influence: viz. of emotions..... partly present, partly future in certainty partly future in contingency,  all together at their present value
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A maxim to be just & intelligible intelligible must openly
 refer to, & to be just must be founded in or at
 least justifiable by, a balance of utilities, i:e: <add>or in other words by</add> a computation of happiness
 & unhappiness.
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The weights that are to be put vested in into the seals of
 Equity are Grains of Happiness, & Unhappiness.
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These maxims are only do no more than announce that
 one had the Ballance inclines [in the several cases to which
 they relate]+ +according to the opinion of him who delivers them which they describe to this or the other side. they do not
 announce.
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And, content, with me, to abandon themselves
 [without reserve] wholly & solely to the guidance
 of this principle.
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It is manifest, that if a  of maxims be  so 
 reason, that reason must ultimate
truth cannot rest stand upon an eternal circle of opinions
they It is manifest that in a series of maxims 
 connected that one of them shall be the reason
 of the other, the last reason+ +i:e: that which is itself of such a nature, that no reason can be given or [reasonably] required, but is itself  of the reason of all the rest, must always be 
 fact. For a matter one of  To for  If a reason be
 demanded of sought for an opinion To him who demands the
 reason for any opinion, recognized to be <add>for a general one</add> it is no answer to give
 him another opinion: for if he were disposed to
 rest the matter upon opinion he might as well have 
 taken up with the first of them at once.
 One opinion can never be the sufficient reason
 of another.
verifiable by evidence
An opinion is simply what a person  thinks.+ +upon a given subject
 a general opinion is what most persons think:+ +upon that subject
 an universal opinion+ +happening if to such a thing to exist) or (supposing there is such a thing in the world as an universal opinion upon any question) is what all persons think.
 Suppose I hear a certain opinion any opinion no matter what given for universal:
 I ask the reason of it. If all persons
 think so, say I, why is it that they think?
 what makes them, what causes them to think?
 To what is it owing? It is plain that, to give me another such universal opinion can
 be no+ +final answer to my question: nor can he who gives
 me such an answer have any reason to expect I
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should be satisfied with it. the answer is, people
 think this, because they think that: but why do
 they think that? it is plain I have  that the  
 which determined me to ask a reason for the 1st opinion,
 must [shall subsist &] determine me to ask that one
 for the 2d opinion.
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 jeremy bentham  | 
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