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<head>1821. Sept<hi rend="superscript">r</hi> 15.<lb/>
 
Collectanea.<lb/>
 
Norway<lb/>
4</head>
<p>make laws independently of the concurrence &amp; consent of the King.<lb/>
In this case the repetitions of the Law adopted by a Legislature, repetitions<lb/>
which take place because sanction has been refused, do not<lb/>
in the least destroy what there is permissions in the principle; for it<lb/>
is not presumable, that when a King rejects what three different Legislature<lb/>
have proposed to him, that rejection should not be founded<lb/>
upon considerations of such importance, that for the interests of the<lb/>
State, of which the King always judges more impartially than the<lb/>
Legislature, since he is above all personal interests, this law was of<lb/>
such a nature that it never ought to have adopted.</p>
<p>No Constitutional Sovereign willingly exercises the right of<lb/>
veto in the face of the national representation; but the right ought to<lb/>
exist, because it is its preserving essence; and it affords legal means<lb/>
of checking dangerous ebullition without having recourse to force,<lb/>
before which law is silent. This ebullition often originates in some local<lb/>
pretensions, wounded self love or disappointed ambition. A Representation<lb/>
which dreads its King, or questions his Counsel, &amp; which in<lb/>
consequence of this dread or this mistrust, would become an exclusive<lb/>
Legislature; itself provokes the danger which by <add>a</add> false calculation it<lb/>
had in view to provide against. If the conflict be once begun &amp; if the<lb/>
Legislature prevail, there exists no more Monarchy, it would <unclear>reign</unclear><lb/>
supported by anarchy. If on the contrary the Legislature should be<lb/>
overcome, Liberty would fall with it; for where is the <hi rend="underline">Prince who does</hi><lb/>
<hi rend="underline">not profit of success in policy?</hi></p>
<p>This dilemma which can not be disputed by lessons of history<lb/>
&amp; recent experience; is too dangerous for a rational &amp; enlightened<lb/>
nation finally to risk such chances. The King has too much<lb/>
confidence <add>in the wisdom of</add> his Norwegian subjects, not to suppose that they also<lb/>
will perceive the disastrous consequences &amp; that they will be<lb/>
anxious to give all the necessary rectification to this part of their<lb/>
fundamental law. In all difficult crises, the King will always<lb/>
look to them with confidence.</p>


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Revision as of 05:39, 24 June 2021

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1821. Septr 15.
Collectanea.
Norway
4

make laws independently of the concurrence & consent of the King.
In this case the repetitions of the Law adopted by a Legislature, repetitions
which take place because sanction has been refused, do not
in the least destroy what there is permissions in the principle; for it
is not presumable, that when a King rejects what three different Legislature
have proposed to him, that rejection should not be founded
upon considerations of such importance, that for the interests of the
State, of which the King always judges more impartially than the
Legislature, since he is above all personal interests, this law was of
such a nature that it never ought to have adopted.

No Constitutional Sovereign willingly exercises the right of
veto in the face of the national representation; but the right ought to
exist, because it is its preserving essence; and it affords legal means
of checking dangerous ebullition without having recourse to force,
before which law is silent. This ebullition often originates in some local
pretensions, wounded self love or disappointed ambition. A Representation
which dreads its King, or questions his Counsel, & which in
consequence of this dread or this mistrust, would become an exclusive
Legislature; itself provokes the danger which by a false calculation it
had in view to provide against. If the conflict be once begun & if the
Legislature prevail, there exists no more Monarchy, it would reign
supported by anarchy. If on the contrary the Legislature should be
overcome, Liberty would fall with it; for where is the Prince who does
not profit of success in policy?

This dilemma which can not be disputed by lessons of history
& recent experience; is too dangerous for a rational & enlightened
nation finally to risk such chances. The King has too much
confidence in the wisdom of his Norwegian subjects, not to suppose that they also
will perceive the disastrous consequences & that they will be
anxious to give all the necessary rectification to this part of their
fundamental law. In all difficult crises, the King will always
look to them with confidence.



Identifier: | JB/109/203/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 109.

Date_1

1821-09-15

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

109

Main Headings

Folio number

203

Info in main headings field

Collectanea

Image

001

Titles

Category

Collectanea

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

E4

Penner

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

35858

Box Contents

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