JB/034/003/002

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1820. April 25

1

Powers everyone to British
and Despotic Monarchs

1. Supreme legislative power
in the hands of the Monarch
alone.

—

4. Supreme Executive
power, in respect of the
power of appointing men
to almost all Official situation
between Administrative
) which and removing them
in most instances

III. Supreme Executive or
Judicial power, in respect
of the ower of appointing
men to almost
all Official Judicial
situations, and with in
few exceptions, removing
them from the same.

1. This power in the hands
of the Monarch alone

4. Counter Securities mostly
peculiar to British
Subjects

1. The superior
Common Law Judges and two of thethird of the
Superior Equity Judges
throughappointed by the Monarch
not removable by him.

2. Of In some instances
Judges subordinate to the
above irremovable in like
manner: instanced the
Welsh Judges, and
the Chief Justice of Check
and Ely

III. Causes of inefficiency in these

2.

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II

Securities Checks peculiar to
British SubjectsMonarchs

1. The power not exercised
but with the concurrence
of the House of Lords:undo
of the House of Commons in
which some Members
who are dependent for their
scale on the free suffrages of
the people.

II. The power not exercised
but with the concurrence
of other persons, one or
more who are responsible
for the exercisemanner in which of it.

I. The Judge whose power shapes: the mass of those favours being of boundless magnitude.
is superior to thatthose of the
greater part of their part

1. All the to
Judges appropriate
together the the Judge of a
single-seated judicatory
the Lord High Chancellor
appointed by the Monarch
and removable by him at
pleasure

2. The irremovable Judges
appointed, all of them at
the recommendation of
this removable one.

3. All of them susceptible
of and rationally looking
for favour, to themselves their
less and and defend into

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III

Circumstances rendering
those checks insufficient

Causes of inefficiency

1. The Members of the House
of Lords as such, known as
particular interest, in con with
the Monarch, and opposition
to the interest of the people
They are ma for their seat None of the
dependent, any of them
in the people.

2. The Members of the Commons
House are most of
them in appointed either by
themselves, or by Members
of the House of Lords. By
the free suffrage of the people
the number of Members
places is not marge enough
to constitute a majority
in one case

Of the suffrages given, an
indeterminately larg large
member are divested of
freedom, either by c
or intimidation of both.

When chosen they all
not all of them under the
influence of the matter of
good in all shapes, operating
upon their hearts minds in
the character of the matter
of allowing inviting them
to sacrifice to the partial
and sinister interest of the
Monarch the convivial
interest of the people

—

11. 1. The person thus responsible
may be changes by
the Monsrch at pleasure:
so that, if one will not do
what is desired, there is always
another that will.

2. The responsibility is
mainly so in form and
. The right of accusation
is confined to
a majority of the House
of Commons whose conduct constantly
is constantly Determined by acting under an above-mentioned
sinister interest.
The power of judication
is confined to the
House of Lords in which
the cond a majority is constantly
determined by thea similar same
in sinister interest.

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Identifier: | JB/034/003/002"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 34.
Date_1	1820-04-25	Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	034	Main Headings	constitutional code
Folio number	003	Info in main headings field	despotism british monarchy and pure democracy compared in parallel views
Image	002	Titles
Category	plan	Number of Pages	2
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering
Penner	jeremy bentham	Watermarks	john dickinson & co 1813
Marginals		Paper Producer	a. levy
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year	1813
Notes public		ID Number	10277
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