JB/070/019/001

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In things propositions the alternatives, of which have originally clearly different
influence on the General Happiness—Justice follows Utility,
in those which are indifferent, general expectation
from whence springs up a derivative Utility—thus that
one Brother should kill another is contrary to Justice
because contrary to original Utility. But that the Younger
Brother should succeed in preference to the
instead of the elders succeeding in preference to him,
events originally equally indifferent to public Utility
(or suppose them so) is unjust only because the
general expectation is contrary.

Is then that unjust in Essex, which is just in
Kent? Yes, under the above circumstance. For that
one Brother might in general kill another (tho' in particular
cases assignable & assigned it is otherwise)
is unjust in Kent as well as everywhere else.
If it were not for general expectation which is fixed
immoveably by a Law or a series of consistent Judgmts.
it would be as reasonable & as consonant
to utility to determine such a question in one day one way
and in the next another, as according to any other method—
immoveably I mean, 'till an opposite Law should give
to general expectation an opposite direction.

Men at large,Lay Gents. having often no opinion of prejudication, ground
their expectation on an opinion of Natural Justice or Original
Utility, hence it is that they are so much less
frequently satisfied with the decisions than Lawyers or
(in proportion) than Litterati—v. M.S.4o.101.
Expectation itself is grounded either 1st. on the opinion of
prejudication, or 2dly. on the opinion of original Justice
or dictate of the Law of Nature or 3dly. on the opinion of
original Utility.

The opinion of prejudication takes place when there are
individual facts or rather individual groupes of facts—
with their decisions known to the person forming it, analogous
enough in his eyes the [groupes of facts to the fact
in question to have the Idea of such a species, raised from
them by any course of abstration, of which the fact in question
may be considered as another individual, and thence
as having been by a specific law, raised in the like manner by abstraction
INTROD. Utility Original: x Nat. Justice = Expectation [BR][1][]
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In the rules of the transmission of property & in many
concerning the original distribution, [that which we
have so much of under the name of] Natural Justice
is nothing but conformity to General expectation.
hence it is 1st. that that Justice may truly be said to be
different concerning many points among different people,
because among these people the expectation concerning
these points are different: 2dly. hence also it is that
that Justice may be alter'd in some measure in many
instances by positive institution; it cannot indeed be
altogether, because in three cases General Expectation may
be changed by that means in great measure but not
entirely. 3dly. while in other instances it can be scarce at
all be alter'd because that expectation cannot be so.
4thly. Hence too we see where that expectation is

Identifier: | JB/070/019/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 70.
Date_1		Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	070	Main Headings	of laws in general
Folio number	019	Info in main headings field	introd. utility original & nat. justice = expectation
Image	001	Titles
Category	copy/fair copy sheet	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering
Penner		Watermarks	[[watermarks::gr [crown motif] [britannia with shield motif]]]
Marginals		Paper Producer
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year
Notes public		ID Number	23134
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