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<!-- pencil annotations --> <p> + 2 Inserenda <note>52</note><lb/> Observations</p> <note>II Board<lb/>§.9<lb/> Country <gap/></note> <p> ....To a local authority rather than to the <lb/> Treasury, the Secretary of State's Office <del>because it</del> <add> in the <del>Board</del> <lb/> <add> proposed Board (in which latter case the nomination though formally in the Board would be substantially in one or other of the two </add><lb/><!-- remaining text and (?)subsequent additions [+]1 and [+]2 obscured by slip of paper clipped over the right hand margin  --> is only by <del><gap/></del> local vicinity and personal <lb/> acquaintance that a<add>any sufficient</add> judgment can be formed <lb/> of the <del>qu</del> personal qualifications of <del> individuals</del> <add> candidates</add></p> <p>2.  To <del> an inde</del> a single <del> Magistrate</del> <add> member</add> selected<lb/> from the <del> whole</del> body of <add> licencing</add> Magistrates, <del> that there</del> <add> rather</add> <lb/> <add> than to the whole body that there</add> may be a determinate and conspicuously<lb/> situated individual responsible <add>in each instance <hi rend="superscript">[+]1</hi></add> for the propriety<lb/> of the choice, and that <add><del>in default of <unclear>persons</unclear> </del> [+]2 </add> there may be a <lb/> <del>quantity</del> <add> mass</add> of patronage <add> collected in one <add> <del>a single</del> </add> hand <add> of </add> sufficient <add> magnitude</add> to <lb/> afford an adequate <del> and appropriate payment</del> <add><del> as well as more appropriate recompense</del></add><lb/><add> recompense, and that too more apposite as well as more<lb/>economical than a pecuniary one</add><lb/>for the <del>trouble</del> <sic>burthen</sic> of the Office £2. to an authority<lb/> distinct from and <del> independent of</del> <add> in a manner unconnected <unclear>with</unclear></add> the <hi rend="underline">Board</hi><lb/> for <add>again</add> another reason, <foreign>viz</foreign>: that the power of placing<lb/> and the power of displacing may <add> rest</add>  <unclear>all</unclear> in different<lb/> hands. <add>[+]3</add> If <hi rend="underline">both</hi> <unclear>houses</unclear> were in the Board, the <lb/> danger would be that in case of unfitness on the <lb/> part of the subordinates, the <del> <unclear>House</unclear> Superior <add>to </add> whose</del> <add> particular Chamber <del>of the</del></add> <lb/> <add> <del>Board</del> to whose</add> recommendation he owed <add> had been indebted for</add> his appointment from<lb/> the Board, would (by the nature, whatever they were,<lb/> that gave birth to the recommendation, <add> or </add> reinforced<lb/> by sentiments of sympathy and commiseration ) <lb/> be induced to <add> continue his position and </add> support to the subordinate, notwithstanding<lb/> his unfitness; and the <add> other Members</add> <del> <gap/> of the Board</del><lb/> rather than give offence to a colleague <del>with whom</del> <add> in whose company</add><lb/> they were destined to pass so large a portion of their<lb/><add> lives</add></p><!-- marginal text which has all been crossed through --> <note><add> if they</add> were altogether<lb/> destitute of this <add> onerous</add> <del><gap/></del><lb/> of <del>getting rid</del> <add> ridding themselves</add> of an <lb/>unfit subordinate<<lb/> they would be <del> liable<lb/> <gap/> <gap/> <gap/> to <lb/> find themselves like<lb/> a work man without<lb/>hands.<lb/>remain explicitly <lb/> exposed to the <gap/> </del> <lb/> responsible for <lb/> <del> <gap/></del> <add> mischief</add> which it <lb/> would be out of <lb/> their power to <lb/> prevent: <del> or to require</del><lb/> and subjected to <lb/> the mortification of<lb/> witnessing mismanagement without the power of correcting it</note>
<!-- pencil annotations --> <p> + 2 Inserenda <note>52</note><lb/> Observations</p> <note>II Board<lb/>§.9<lb/> Country <gap/></note> <p> ....To a local authority rather than to the <lb/> Treasury, the Secretary of State's Office <del>because it</del> <add> in the <del>Board</del> <lb/> <add> proposed Board (in which latter case the nomination though formally in the Board would be substantially in one or other of the two </add><lb/><!-- remaining text and (?)subsequent additions [+]1 and [+]2 obscured by slip of paper clipped over the right hand margin  --> is only by <del><gap/></del> local vicinity and personal <lb/> acquaintance that a<add>any sufficient</add> judgment can be formed <lb/> of the <del>qu</del> personal qualifications of <del> individuals</del> <add> candidates</add></p> <p>2.  To <del> an inde</del> a single <del> Magistrate</del> <add> member</add> selected<lb/> from the <del> whole</del> body of <add> licencing</add> Magistrates, <del> that there</del> <add> rather</add> <lb/> <add> than to the whole body that there</add> may be a determinate and conspicuously<lb/> situated individual responsible <add>in each instance <hi rend="superscript">[+]1</hi></add> for the propriety<lb/> of the choice, and that <add><del>in default of <unclear>persons</unclear> </del> [+]2 </add> there may be a <lb/> <del>quantity</del> <add> mass</add> of patronage <add> collected in one <del>a single</del> </add> hand <add> of </add> sufficient <add> magnitude</add> to <lb/> afford an adequate <del> and appropriate payment</del> <add><del> as well as more appropriate recompense</del></add><lb/><add> recompense, and that too more apposite as well as more<lb/>economical than a pecuniary one</add><lb/>for the <del>trouble</del> <sic>burthen</sic> of the Office £2. to an authority<lb/> distinct from and <del> independent of</del> <add> in a manner unconnected <unclear>with</unclear></add> the <hi rend="underline">Board</hi><lb/> for <add>again</add> another reason, <foreign>viz</foreign>: that the power of placing<lb/> and the power of displacing may <add> rest</add>  <unclear>all</unclear> in different<lb/> hands. <add>[+]3</add> If <hi rend="underline">both</hi> <unclear>houses</unclear> were in the Board, the <lb/> danger would be that in case of unfitness on the <lb/> part of the subordinates, the <del> <unclear>House</unclear> Superior <add>to </add> whose</del> <add> particular Chamber <del>of the</del></add> <lb/> <add> <del>Board</del> to whose</add> recommendation he owed <add> had been indebted for</add> his appointment from<lb/> the Board, would (by the nature, whatever they were,<lb/> that gave birth to the recommendation, <add> or </add> reinforced<lb/> by sentiments of sympathy and commiseration ) <lb/> be induced to <add> continue his position and </add> support to the subordinate, notwithstanding<lb/> his unfitness; and the <add> other Members</add> <del> <gap/> of the Board</del><lb/> rather than give offence to a colleague <del>with whom</del> <add> in whose company</add><lb/> they were destined to pass so large a portion of their<lb/><add> lives</add></p><!-- marginal text which has all been crossed through --> <note><add> if they</add> were altogether<lb/> destitute of this <add> onerous</add> <del><gap/></del><lb/> of <del>getting rid</del> <add> ridding themselves</add> of an <lb/>unfit subordinate<<lb/> they would be <del> liable<lb/> <gap/> <gap/> <gap/> to <lb/> find themselves like<lb/> a work man without<lb/>hands.<lb/>remain explicitly <lb/> exposed to the <gap/> </del> <lb/> responsible for <lb/> <del> <gap/></del> <add> mischief</add> which it <lb/> would be out of <lb/> their power to <lb/> prevent: <del> or to require</del><lb/> and subjected to <lb/> the mortification of<lb/> witnessing mismanagement without the power of correcting it</note>


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Revision as of 17:06, 16 March 2015

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+ 2 Inserenda 52
Observations

II Board
§.9
Country

....To a local authority rather than to the
Treasury, the Secretary of State's Office because it in the Board
<add> proposed Board (in which latter case the nomination though formally in the Board would be substantially in one or other of the two

is only by local vicinity and personal
acquaintance that aany sufficient judgment can be formed
of the qu personal qualifications of individuals candidates

2. To an inde a single Magistrate member selected
from the whole body of licencing Magistrates, that there rather
than to the whole body that there may be a determinate and conspicuously
situated individual responsible in each instance [+]1 for the propriety
of the choice, and that in default of persons [+]2 there may be a
quantity mass of patronage collected in one a single hand of sufficient magnitude to
afford an adequate and appropriate payment as well as more appropriate recompense
recompense, and that too more apposite as well as more
economical than a pecuniary one

for the trouble burthen of the Office £2. to an authority
distinct from and independent of in a manner unconnected with the Board
for again another reason, viz: that the power of placing
and the power of displacing may rest all in different
hands. [+]3 If both houses were in the Board, the
danger would be that in case of unfitness on the
part of the subordinates, the House Superior to whose particular Chamber of the
Board to whose recommendation he owed had been indebted for his appointment from
the Board, would (by the nature, whatever they were,
that gave birth to the recommendation, or reinforced
by sentiments of sympathy and commiseration )
be induced to continue his position and support to the subordinate, notwithstanding
his unfitness; and the other Members of the Board
rather than give offence to a colleague with whom in whose company
they were destined to pass so large a portion of their
lives

if they were altogether
destitute of this onerous
of getting rid ridding themselves of an
unfit subordinate<
they would be liable
to
find themselves like
a work man without
hands.
remain explicitly
exposed to the

responsible for
mischief which it
would be out of
their power to
prevent: or to require
and subjected to
the mortification of
witnessing mismanagement without the power of correcting it



Identifier: | JB/150/712/002"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 150.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

150

Main Headings

police bill

Folio number

712

Info in main headings field

Image

002

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d2 / f52

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

jeremy bentham

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

50933

Box Contents

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