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<p>And, content, with me, to abandon themselves<lb/> [without reserve] wholly &amp; solely to the guidance<lb/> of this principle.</p><pb/>
<p>And, content, with me, to abandon themselves<lb/> [without reserve] wholly &amp; solely to the guidance<lb/> of this principle.</p><pb/>


<del><p>It is manifest, that if a <gap/> of maxims be <gap/> <add>so <gap/></add><lb/> <hi rend='underline'>reason</hi>, that reason must <unclear>ultimate</unclear></p></del>
<note>truth cannot rest <add>stand</add> upon an eternal circle of opinions</note><lb/>
<p><add><del>they</del></add> It is manifest that in a series of maxims <gap/><lb/> connected that one of them shall be the reason<lb/> of the other, the last reason+ <note>+i:e: that which is <del>itself</del> <add>of</add> such <add>a nature</add>, that no reason can be given or [reasonably] required, but is itself <add><gap/> of</add> the reason of all the rest,</note> must always be <gap/><lb/> <hi rend='underline'>fact</hi>. <del>For a matter <add>one</add> of <gap/> <add>To for <gap/></add> If a reason be<lb/> <add>demanded of</add> sought for an opinion</del> To him who demands the<lb/> reason for any opinion, <add>recognized to be <add>for a</add> general <add>one</add></add> it is no answer to give<lb/> him another opinion: for if he were disposed to<lb/> rest the matter upon opinion he might as well <add>have</add> <gap/><lb/> taken up with the first of them at once.<lb/> One opinion can never be the sufficient reason<lb/> of another.</p>
<note>verifiable by evidence</note><lb/>
<p>An opinion is <add>simply</add> what a person <del><gap/></del> thinks.+ <note>+upon a given subject</note><lb/> a general opinion is what most persons think:+ <note>+upon that subject</note><lb/> an universal opinion+ <note>+happening if to <add>such a thing</add> to exist) or (supposing there is such a thing in the world as an universal opinion upon any question)</note> is what all persons think.<lb/> <del>Suppose</del> I hear <del>a certain opinion</del> <add>any opinion no matter what</add> given for universal:<lb/> I ask the reason of it. If all persons<lb/> think so, say I, <hi rend='underline'>why</hi> is it that they think?<lb/> what <hi rend='underline'>makes</hi> them, what <hi rend='underline'>causes</hi> them to think?<lb/> <note>To what is it owing?</note> It is plain that, to give me another <add>such universal</add> opinion can<lb/> be no+ <note>+final</note> answer to my question: nor can he who gives<lb/> me such an answer have any reason to expect I<lb/><pb/>
should be satisfied with it. the answer is, people<lb/> think <hi rend='underline'>this</hi>, because they think <hi rend='underline'>that</hi>: but why do<lb/> they think <hi rend='underline'>that</hi>? it is plain <del>I have <gap/></del> that the <gap/> <add><gap/></add><lb/> which determined me to ask a reason for the 1<hi rend='superscript'>st</hi> opinion,<lb/> <del>must</del> [shall subsist &amp;] determine me to ask <del>that</del> <add>one</add><lb/> for the 2<hi rend='superscript'>d</hi> opinion.</p>





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Introduction

The great advantage of the doctrine of
Expectation is that it presents all along
a certain matter fact, on which the opinion pronounced
in any instance that such a thing is right or
wrong, is equity or is not equity, is founded.
Whereas the currant maxims that are in used the way of
being to be appealed to for the decision of the
questions of distinctive Jurisprudence, either
professedly rest the matter upon a bare opinion,
of which no reason further than the universality
of it is pretended to be given, or if they profess
to give

& of balance of Utilities Now the matter of fact is no other than this viz. the state of sensations upon the commission of an act of the persons within the circle of it's influence: viz. of emotions..... partly present, partly future in certainty partly future in contingency, all together at their present value
---page break---

A maxim to be just & intelligible intelligible must openly
refer to, & to be just must be founded in or at
least justifiable by, a balance of utilities, i:e: <add>or in other words by</add> a computation of happiness
& unhappiness.


---page break---

The weights that are to be put vested in into the seals of
Equity are Grains of Happiness, & Unhappiness.


---page break---

These maxims are only do no more than announce that
one had the Ballance inclines [in the several cases to which
they relate]+ +according to the opinion of him who delivers them which they describe to this or the other side. they do not
announce.


---page break---

And, content, with me, to abandon themselves
[without reserve] wholly & solely to the guidance
of this principle.


---page break---


It is manifest, that if a of maxims be so
reason, that reason must ultimate

truth cannot rest stand upon an eternal circle of opinions

they It is manifest that in a series of maxims
connected that one of them shall be the reason
of the other, the last reason+ +i:e: that which is itself of such a nature, that no reason can be given or [reasonably] required, but is itself of the reason of all the rest, must always be
fact. For a matter one of To for If a reason be
demanded of sought for an opinion
To him who demands the
reason for any opinion, recognized to be <add>for a general one</add> it is no answer to give
him another opinion: for if he were disposed to
rest the matter upon opinion he might as well have
taken up with the first of them at once.
One opinion can never be the sufficient reason
of another.

verifiable by evidence

An opinion is simply what a person thinks.+ +upon a given subject
a general opinion is what most persons think:+ +upon that subject
an universal opinion+ +happening if to such a thing to exist) or (supposing there is such a thing in the world as an universal opinion upon any question) is what all persons think.
Suppose I hear a certain opinion any opinion no matter what given for universal:
I ask the reason of it. If all persons
think so, say I, why is it that they think?
what makes them, what causes them to think?
To what is it owing? It is plain that, to give me another such universal opinion can
be no+ +final answer to my question: nor can he who gives
me such an answer have any reason to expect I

---page break---
should be satisfied with it. the answer is, people
think this, because they think that: but why do
they think that? it is plain I have that the
which determined me to ask a reason for the 1st opinion,
must [shall subsist &] determine me to ask that one
for the 2d opinion.




Identifier: | JB/070/022/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 70.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

070

Main Headings

of laws in general

Folio number

022

Info in main headings field

[[info_in_main_headings_field::introd. utility rests on fact - expectation a fact - others on opinion - one opin[io]n no reason for another]]

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

2

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::gr [crown motif] [lion with vryheyt motif]]]

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

23137

Box Contents

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