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<note>Rewarding</note> | <note>Rewarding</note> | ||
<note>On what it depends <lb/>whether the <lb/>force of reward <lb/>thus applied <lb/>will be sufficient<lb/></note><p>It has just been observed that <del>the</del> in the<lb/>application of this principle the reward may be<lb/>made to act with a force proportioned to the necessity<lb/> which a man is under of the thing in<lb/>which the reward consists: this force will in many<lb/>cases be considerable; and perfectly sufficient for<lb/>the purpose. It has indeed <del>by</del> been said <add>observed</add> [on the<lb/>other hand] in <add>o</add>n another place <add>occasion</add> that the effect of<lb/><del>punishment</del> reward is weak in comparison to that<lb/>of punishment: so weak <del>as</del> that in <del>certain</del> <add>many</add> cases it<lb/><del>can</del> <add>could</add> not with safety be trusted to alone. Notwithstanding<lb/>this there are cases enough in which the<lb/>necessity a man is under of obtaining it is so<lb/>great, that the force with which it is capable<lb/> of being made to act in the capacity of an inducement<lb/>is sufficient for the purpose. This is<lb/>evident enough in several of the examples above<lb/>cited: I will mention that of the stamp-duties as<lb/>being the first. | <note>On what it depends <lb/>whether the <lb/>force of reward <lb/>thus applied <lb/>will be sufficient<lb/></note><p>It has just been observed that <del>the</del> in the<lb/>application of this principle the reward may be<lb/>made to act with a force proportioned to the necessity<lb/> which a man is under of the thing in<lb/>which the reward consists: this force will in many<lb/>cases be considerable; and perfectly sufficient for<lb/>the purpose. It has indeed <del>by</del> been said <add>observed</add> [on the<lb/>other hand] in <add>o</add>n another place <add>occasion</add> that the effect of<lb/><del>punishment</del> reward is weak in comparison to that<lb/>of punishment: so weak <del>as</del> that in <del>certain</del> <add>many</add> cases it<lb/><del>can</del> <add>could</add> not with safety be trusted to alone. Notwithstanding<lb/>this there are cases enough in which the<lb/>necessity a man is under of obtaining it is so<lb/>great, that the force with which it is capable<lb/> of being made to act in the capacity of an inducement<lb/>is sufficient for the purpose. This is<lb/>evident enough in several of the examples above<lb/>cited: I will mention that of the stamp-duties as<lb/>being the first. The case is it is impossible to<lb/>draw in precise terms any universal line between<lb/>the negative idea of not doing service and the positive<lb/> idea of doing disservice: between the negative idea <lb/>of forbearing to reward, and the positive idea of<lb/>applying punishment. <note>Note<lb/>Upon this distinction<lb/>turns the distinction between<lb/>influence and prerogative.<lb/></note> If the good in question is<lb/>expected, and the expectation is so strong as that the<lb/> <note>event</note></p> | ||
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23
Indirect
Rewarding
On what it depends
whether the
force of reward
thus applied
will be sufficient
It has just been observed that the in the
application of this principle the reward may be
made to act with a force proportioned to the necessity
which a man is under of the thing in
which the reward consists: this force will in many
cases be considerable; and perfectly sufficient for
the purpose. It has indeed by been said observed [on the
other hand] in on another place occasion that the effect of
punishment reward is weak in comparison to that
of punishment: so weak as that in certain many cases it
can could not with safety be trusted to alone. Notwithstanding
this there are cases enough in which the
necessity a man is under of obtaining it is so
great, that the force with which it is capable
of being made to act in the capacity of an inducement
is sufficient for the purpose. This is
evident enough in several of the examples above
cited: I will mention that of the stamp-duties as
being the first. The case is it is impossible to
draw in precise terms any universal line between
the negative idea of not doing service and the positive
idea of doing disservice: between the negative idea
of forbearing to reward, and the positive idea of
applying punishment. Note
Upon this distinction
turns the distinction between
influence and prerogative.
If the good in question is
expected, and the expectation is so strong as that the
event
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Identifier: | JB/087/147/003"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 87. |
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indirect legislation |
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147 |
indirect |
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jeremy bentham |
[[watermarks::gr [crown motif] [britannia with shield motif]]] |
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27672 |
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