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misrule: in effect<lb/> | misrule: in effect<lb/> | ||
an instrument for it.</p> | an instrument for it.</p> | ||
<p><note>Creoles unwilling</note><lb/> | |||
<note>Creoles unwilling</note><lb/> | |||
2.<lb/> | 2.<lb/> | ||
1. As to intellectual aptitude,<lb/> | 1. As to intellectual aptitude,<lb/> | ||
Line 30: | Line 29: | ||
so will Spanish for<lb/> | so will Spanish for<lb/> | ||
governing Creolia: in<lb/> | governing Creolia: in<lb/> | ||
both parts apt | both parts apt men may<lb/> | ||
alike be outvoted by unapt.</p> | |||
<p><note>Creoles unwilling or Corruptive influence</note><lb/> | |||
3.<lb/> | |||
2. As to appropriate probity.<lb/> | |||
Sympathetic ebullition<lb/> | |||
subsided, and succeeded<lb/> | |||
by self-regard,<lb/> | |||
with its calculations, Creolian<lb/> | |||
Members, instead of<lb/> | |||
<del>viligant</del> vigilant Inspectors,<lb/> | |||
will be creatures<lb/> | |||
and instruments.</p> | |||
<p>4.<lb/> | |||
Into Cortes enter men<lb/> | |||
self stiled Representatives<lb/> | |||
of the several Ultramarine<lb/> | |||
provinces,<lb/> | |||
received as such by<lb/> | |||
Council of State, by whom<lb/> | |||
they were got together:<lb/> | |||
and, thence, by Cortes.<lb/> | |||
Yet, in no instance have<lb/> | |||
they been chosen by<lb/> | |||
those whose Representatives<lb/> | |||
they are stiled. By<lb/> | |||
those alone who, at the<lb/> | |||
time, happened to be on<lb/> | |||
the spot. The mode of<lb/> | |||
Election, was it free? Not<lb/> | |||
unless <add>secret, as per</add> Art 73. If not thus,<lb/> | |||
they could not but have<lb/> | |||
<del>they could not but have</del><lb/> | |||
entered free of hopes and<lb/> | |||
fears from Council (or<lb/> | |||
Junta) from whom their title<lb/> | |||
to be received came<del>s</del>, their<lb/> | |||
Spanish Colleagues to whom<lb/> | |||
they must have owed the being<lb/> | |||
actually received.</p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p><head>§ Representative no Security<lb/> | |||
Creole Members Corrupt</head></p> | |||
<p><note>Creoles unwilling</note><lb/> | |||
5<lb/> | |||
From a Cortes so composed, | |||
no wonder if <add>should</add> the comminatory<lb/> | |||
clauses in the Proclamation<lb/> | |||
<del>are entered</del> <add>be <gap/></add>. Obedience will<lb/> | |||
not follow, unless, in Creolia,<lb/> | |||
feelings are opposite to what<lb/> | |||
they are in Spain. More<lb/> | |||
likely, if before disposed to<lb/> | |||
submission, will they be<lb/> | |||
rendered averse by it, by<lb/> | |||
being told they have done<lb/> | |||
what they have not done:<lb/> | |||
chosen whom they have not<lb/> | |||
chosen.</p> | |||
<p>6.<lb/> | |||
Good in England where<lb/> | |||
imposture is the basis of<lb/> | |||
the Constitution: in one<lb/> | |||
branch, fictitious election;<lb/> | |||
in the two others, factitious<lb/> | |||
dignity, and fictitious excellence.<lb/> | |||
But English impostures<lb/> | |||
are old: this Spanish,<lb/> | |||
new – all interests<lb/> | |||
adverse, all eyes open, all<lb/> | |||
hearts (and hands) prepared<lb/> | |||
for resistance.</p> | |||
<p>7.<lb/> | |||
Yet, on the whole, I condemn<lb/> | |||
it not: I might myself<lb/> | |||
have joined in it. Under<lb/> | |||
the Constitution it<lb/> | |||
could not but have been<lb/> | |||
done. For information,<lb/> | |||
thence intellectual aptitude,<lb/> | |||
nothing better could<lb/> | |||
have been: but sharing<lb/> | |||
in power is different from<lb/> | |||
furnishing information</p> | |||
<p>8.<lb/> | |||
In appearance, temporary<lb/> | |||
only is the arrangement<lb/> | |||
itself: so, per Constitution<lb/> | |||
28. to 100: but, in<lb/> | |||
effect, permanent. For, by<lb/> | |||
these so stiled representatives<lb/> | |||
of Creolia, is the fate<lb/> | |||
of Creolia to be decided.<lb/> | |||
Not as bearers of wishes<lb/> | |||
and information, but as<lb/> | |||
co-legislators, do they act.</p> | |||
<pb/> | |||
<p><head>§ Representative no Security<lb/> | |||
Creole Members Corrupt</head></p> | |||
<p><note>Corruptive influence</note><lb/> | |||
9.<lb/> | |||
Suppose these Creole members<lb/> | |||
all chosen in the best mode –<lb/> | |||
the matter will not be much<lb/> | |||
mended. In Spain would<lb/> | |||
every object of ambition be<lb/> | |||
disposed of; by some agreement<lb/> | |||
secretly formed between<lb/> | |||
influential members<lb/> | |||
in Council and d<hi rend="superscript">o.</hi> in Cortes<lb/> | |||
instrument corruptive influence;<lb/> | |||
victims, Creole<lb/> | |||
ruling few in Creolia, in<lb/> | |||
Creolia and Spain, subject many.</p> | |||
<p>As vultures to carcase<lb/> | |||
place-hunters from Creolia<lb/> | |||
to Madrid (note<lb/> | |||
that, for the lucrative offices<lb/> | |||
in Creolia, some Creoles<lb/> | |||
would be added to the<lb/> | |||
Spaniards.</p> | |||
<p><note>Corruptive influence</note><lb/> | |||
10.<lb/> | |||
At Madrid, Creolian Elections<lb/> | |||
would be settled<lb/> | |||
by a secret Committee, composed<lb/> | |||
of Legislators and Executives.<lb/> | |||
In Spain, as in<lb/> | |||
England every thing sham.</p> | |||
<p><note>Corruptive influence</note><lb/> | |||
11.<lb/> | |||
Thus would Spanish Constitution<lb/> | |||
be <del>pursued</del> <add>poisoned</add>: Creoles,<lb/> | |||
howsoever averse, the<lb/> | |||
<del>pursuers</del> poisoners.</p> | |||
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{{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{ | {{Metadata:{{PAGENAME}}}}{{Ready_For_Review}} |
1820 Aug. 29
§ Representative no Security
Creole Members Corrupt
Creoles unwilling: or Corruptive influence.
1.
By the part given in the
Government to Creoles
their lot (it may be said)
is more favourable than
that of the people in other
distant dependencies.
No: for though detrimental
to subject many in
Spain, this arrangement
is so likewise to Creolia:
in form a security against
misrule: in effect
an instrument for it.
Creoles unwilling
2.
1. As to intellectual aptitude,
while Creolia Members
are unfit for governing
Spain, viz by deficiency
of local information,
so will Spanish for
governing Creolia: in
both parts apt men may
alike be outvoted by unapt.
Creoles unwilling or Corruptive influence
3.
2. As to appropriate probity.
Sympathetic ebullition
subsided, and succeeded
by self-regard,
with its calculations, Creolian
Members, instead of
viligant vigilant Inspectors,
will be creatures
and instruments.
4.
Into Cortes enter men
self stiled Representatives
of the several Ultramarine
provinces,
received as such by
Council of State, by whom
they were got together:
and, thence, by Cortes.
Yet, in no instance have
they been chosen by
those whose Representatives
they are stiled. By
those alone who, at the
time, happened to be on
the spot. The mode of
Election, was it free? Not
unless secret, as per Art 73. If not thus,
they could not but have
they could not but have
entered free of hopes and
fears from Council (or
Junta) from whom their title
to be received cames, their
Spanish Colleagues to whom
they must have owed the being
actually received.
---page break---
§ Representative no Security
Creole Members Corrupt
Creoles unwilling
5
From a Cortes so composed,
no wonder if should the comminatory
clauses in the Proclamation
are entered be . Obedience will
not follow, unless, in Creolia,
feelings are opposite to what
they are in Spain. More
likely, if before disposed to
submission, will they be
rendered averse by it, by
being told they have done
what they have not done:
chosen whom they have not
chosen.
6.
Good in England where
imposture is the basis of
the Constitution: in one
branch, fictitious election;
in the two others, factitious
dignity, and fictitious excellence.
But English impostures
are old: this Spanish,
new – all interests
adverse, all eyes open, all
hearts (and hands) prepared
for resistance.
7.
Yet, on the whole, I condemn
it not: I might myself
have joined in it. Under
the Constitution it
could not but have been
done. For information,
thence intellectual aptitude,
nothing better could
have been: but sharing
in power is different from
furnishing information
8.
In appearance, temporary
only is the arrangement
itself: so, per Constitution
28. to 100: but, in
effect, permanent. For, by
these so stiled representatives
of Creolia, is the fate
of Creolia to be decided.
Not as bearers of wishes
and information, but as
co-legislators, do they act.
---page break---
§ Representative no Security
Creole Members Corrupt
Corruptive influence
9.
Suppose these Creole members
all chosen in the best mode –
the matter will not be much
mended. In Spain would
every object of ambition be
disposed of; by some agreement
secretly formed between
influential members
in Council and do. in Cortes
instrument corruptive influence;
victims, Creole
ruling few in Creolia, in
Creolia and Spain, subject many.
As vultures to carcase
place-hunters from Creolia
to Madrid (note
that, for the lucrative offices
in Creolia, some Creoles
would be added to the
Spaniards.
Corruptive influence
10.
At Madrid, Creolian Elections
would be settled
by a secret Committee, composed
of Legislators and Executives.
In Spain, as in
England every thing sham.
Corruptive influence
11.
Thus would Spanish Constitution
be pursued poisoned: Creoles,
howsoever averse, the
pursuers poisoners.
Identifier: | JB/008/023/001"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 8. |
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1820-08-25 |
1-11 |
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008 |
emancipation spanish |
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023 |
emancipation spanish |
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001 |
representation no security / creole members corrupt |
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marginal summary sheet |
1 |
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recto |
e1 |
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john flowerdew colls |
[[watermarks::[prince of wales feathers] i&m 1818]] |
||
arthur wellesley, duke of wellington |
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1818 |
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3127 |
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