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JB/008/040/001

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1820 Aug. 31

§ Domination impossible
§. Creoles unwilling.
Creolian jealousy of foreigners unappeared
§ to Creole rulers unendurable

54 74 or 11
But, military force being
thus necessary, the Colony
by supposition not paying
taxes, only by taxes,
imposed in Spain, could
it be kept up.

55 75 or 12
So much as to prospect
of submission from subject
many in Creolia.
From emolument attached
to Creolian offices, no
adequate benefit could
be looked for by them,
adequate to the burthen.
Before the change, next
to none, was the share
allotted to Creolia.

56 76 or 13.
Not but that the
that share can not but
have been contemplated
by Constitution-makers.

57 77 or 14.
But 1. By no such satisfaction,
in ruling few,
would undisturbed submission
be secured. For,
on the subject many, it
would depend, whether
any approvers of the taxes
should be continued,
and, thence, whether any
taxes should be approved
and paid.

58 78 or 15.
2. Nor, to any considerable
extent, would Creolian
ruling few be satisfied.
To them, all colleagues
and co-sharers, from Spain,
would be foreign intruders;
worse than utter
foreigners; because coming
as successors, to
those who came as masters.
To Creolian functionaries
in Creolia, those from
Spain would be what
Ultra Royalist emigrés
are to the newly risen
ruling few in France: &
vice versa: each an object
of jealously and envy
to the other.


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§ Domination impossible
§. Creoles unwilling.
Creolian jealousy of foreigners unappeared
§ to Creole rulers unendurable

59 79 or 16
In Constitution, as to several
departments, special
provision for keeping the
offices out of the hands of
foreigners.
1. Per Art. 225, all the Offices
of any one of the seven state
Ministers.
3. By 251. all judicial offices.
2. By 231. the 40 offices of the
Count of State.

80 or 17.
Beneficial or not to ruling
few in Spain, these exclusions
are not so to do.
in Creolia. In the latter
only is it so to them. No
foreigners could naturally
be more unwelcome in
Spain, than Spabiards so
sent in Creolia.
1. Little expectation could
any Creole have of being
Minister of State in Spain.

60 81 or 18
2. As little of being appointed
to an Office belonging
to the Judicial Establishmt.
in Spain. While Creolia
might expect to be filled with
swarms of lawyers sent
from Spain, all to find
subsistence at the expence
principally of ruling few,
some to return home with
fortunes made there.

Relinquishment profitable
61 82 or 19
Not that, considering the
unfurnished state in which
Creolian minds have been
kept by Spanish policy,
for some time, more appropriate
jurisprudential
aptitude, moral and
intellectual, might reasonably
be expected in Spain
than in Creolia.
Item Thence, Creolia emancipated,
and choice free, considerable
benefit might
be derived to Creolia from
the resorting to Spain for
some of the chief functionaries
of this class.


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§ Domination impossible
§. Creoles unwilling.
Creolian jealousy of foreigners unappeared
§ to Creole rulers unendurable

62 82(a) or 19(a)
Relinquishment profitable
1. So in Naples, and other parts
of Italy: though, with still
greater benefit, to U.S.; impregnated
with the good points of
English judicature, in considerable
degree from its corruptions.
2. Further advantage, freedom
from temptations and suspicions
attached to local connections: Hence, formerly in Italy,
habits and even laws prescribing,
in the small republics
before swallowed with
great despotisms, resort for
such functionaries to other republics.
3. Sole disadvantage, want of
sufficient acquaintance with
the language of the country.
This would lessen every day:
in a short time, vanish.

63 83 or 20
Under a despotism, this, as
well as every other power, will
be liable to be, and frequently
will be, abused. Under popular
government such abuse
is impossible. Why? because
the abuse consists in giving
power over the people to men
unacceptable to the people:
which, in a popular government,
by the supposition,
can not have place.

64 84 or 21
Hence, under a despotism,
nothing more rational than
this jealousy of foreigners: under
a popular government
nothing more absurd.
What danger to U.S. if Emperor
of Morocco or Russia
were capable of being chosen
President.

65 85 or 22.
But the question here is – not
as to conduciveness to good judicature,
but probability of
acceptableness to ruling
and influential few.



Identifier: | JB/008/040/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 8.

Date_1

1820-08-31

Marginal Summary Numbering

54-65

Box

008

Main Headings

emancipation spanish

Folio number

040

Info in main headings field

emancipation spanish

Image

001

Titles

creoles unwilling

Category

marginal summary sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d5 / e4

Penner

john flowerdew colls

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

jeremy bentham

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

3144

Box Contents

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