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Morals. Virtue what. 1795 Sept. 8 Virtue what Morals
Virtue — what
Virtue Virtuous is under
every system of
Morals a common
name epithet attributed
to human
actions considered
in the
light of their
being apt to be
repugnant to the inclination
of the
agent: i:e: to a
certain degree and
in a certain respect
painful to
him
Under the system
of utility, virtuous
is a common epithet
attributed
to actions to such only as are mensed to be of a
tendency beneficial
to the community
upon the
whole, considered
in the light of their
being apt to be
repugnant to the
inclination of the
agent.
Utility alone,
though ever so
great is not can not be un-
-derstood -derstood even under the system of utility to bring
an action under
the denomination
of virtuous. The
act so useful
as the act of eating.
It is more
than useful: it
is absolutely necessary.
Without
it the species
would soon perish.
Yet neither
according under the
to the system principle
of utility nor
under any other
system was the
act of eating
when one was an
what one liked
to eat ever considered
as an exercise act
of virtue —
ever set down
in the catalogue
of virtuous acts.
It may be reckoned
an act of
virtue — in a man — to abstain
from eating what
he
likes: for instance
in order that a
friend or other fellow
creature who
is in want may
eat the more:
or in order to
save himself
from an indisposition
which
he may apprehend
would be
the consequence
of such an indulgence. In
the one case the
abstinence is an
exercise of the
social virtue of
benevolence: in
the other, of the
self-regarding
virtue of temperance.
It may be reckoned
an act of
virtue in a man
to eat what he
does not like:
for instance to
take a bolus recommended
to
him in the way
of medicine. This
virtue, as far as
it
it goes is of the
self-regarding
class, and may be
referred to the general
head of
prudence.
Self-denial then
under the principle system
of utility no
less than under
the system of asceticism
itself,
is essentially included
in the
idea of virtue
Not that it is
necessary to the an
act's coming under
the denomination
of a virtuous act,
that the individual
act in question
should be
attended with pain —
should be an act
of self-denial:
all that is necessary
that it should
be of a species
of act which in
the individual
instances of its
exercise is apt
to be so attended:
on
on the contrary
so long provided
it be of such a
species, the more
pure from all
pain, the more
highly fraught with
pleasure the exercise
of it is in
the individual
instance, the more
exalted the virtue.
Take for instance,
generosity. Generosity
must can not, in
the general exercise
of it but be
attended with a
certain degree of
uneasiness and
self-denial: since
it essentially consists
it is of the
essence of it to
be attended with
the sacrifice of
a portion of that which is the
universal object
of desire. Yet
the purer the pleasure
it is understood
to be attended
with, the freer from
every thing of uneasiness
and regret,
the
the stronger is the
proof it is understood
to afford
of a virtuous mind,
of a mind habitually
inured to
the exercise of
virtue. — Why?
— because the purer
the pleasure with
with which an act (natu of a
species to which uneasiness
is so natural and
in the first instance
universal a concomitant)
is accompanied in
any individual
instance, the stronger
the proof it
affords of an habitual
exercise of
virtue: since it is
habit and habit
alone that can
get the better of
original repugnance
and convert acts
which on first trial
are unpleasurable
into pleasurable
ones.
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Identifier: | JB/014/016/002 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 14.
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1795-09-08 |
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deontology |
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016 |
morals - virtue what |
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rudiments sheet (brouillon) |
2 |
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recto |
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jeremy bentham |
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4779 |
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