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JB/015/226/001

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Definition of Virtue defined

Virtue is the head of a numerous large family. The virtues are the
members of it. The scene presented offered to the imagination is that of a
parent followed by numerous numerous offspring. Latin being the source
whence the word is derived & the word being of the Feminine gender
the image presented is that of a mother, surrounded by her daughters. An appellation
gives an idea of existence, – but virtue is a fictitious entity, growing out
of the imperfection of language – of language created long before the
phenomena of mind were studied or understood.

Virtue not having a superior genus is not susceptible of what is commonly
meant by a definition, – which is a reference to some generic appellation
embracing it. By the medium of its conjugates it is capable of being expounded
& when the words a virtuous act, – a virtuous habit – or a virtuous disposition, are used
a tolerably determinate conception is conveyed by them to the mind.

When a man says of an act that it is virtuous he merely
conveys an opinion that it merits his approbation. And thereon comes
the inquiry what is the ground of that opinion.

On looking closely into the matter it will be found
that the ground in different places is very different – so that it would
not be very easy to give a general answer. If the answers be correct they
will be different – & to collect them all, – intricate & all-comprehensive as they are
boundless must be the researches in the field of geography & history.
And thus it is that when it is required demanded why an act is virtuous – or what
constitutes the virtue of an act – the only response to so important
an inquiry will be, when thoroughly sifted. It is virtuous because I
think it to be so & its virtue consists in its having my favourable
opinion.

A new ground will be is put forward here. The ground
of approbation will be the tendency tendency of an act to increase happiness – the ground
of reprobation the tendency of an act to diminish happiness.

† Note. What, it will be perhaps said, deny the existence of virtue? Virtue an empty name.
No such thing as virtue! Horrible – What an opinion must such a man have
of human nature! What good – what useful information can be expected from him.
What, of any sort, but the most pernicious. If virtue is an imaginary thing, so
also must vice be – and thus virtue & vice will be on a level. Alike creatures
of the imagination – alike objects of indifference. It is thus sometimes that
a novel form of expression is met, – vituperated & dismissed – but no clear
idea can possess the mind until a separation has taken place between that which is real and that which is fictitious. The fictitious may be an instrument
which the unsatisfactory state of language compels us to employ for the
purposes of introducing realities. Virtuous deeds – virtuous propensities – are
existent things – and for all practical purposes the result is the same. Two
persons may employ a very different phraseology tho' their meaning may be
identical.


Identifier: | JB/015/226/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

015

Main Headings

deontology

Folio number

226

Info in main headings field

Image

001

Titles

virtue defined

Category

linking material

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

f81

Penner

sir john bowring

Watermarks

j & m mills 1828

Marginals

Paper Producer

john fraunceis gwyn

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

1828

Notes public

ID Number

5442

Box Contents

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