JB/015/229/001

Click Here To Edit

84

Of Virtue in general

Only in so far then as an act it produces happiness or misery can it be an act be properly
called virtuous or virtuous vicious. The terms words Virtue & vice though so habitually employed
are more vague if only been where sense without reference to their consequence but useless, indifferent in conspicuous qualities unless estimated by
their influences on the creation of pain pleasure & pain. They are fictitious
entities spoken of as real for the purposes of discourse & without fictions
of this character, discourse on discussions subjects such as these, discussions could hardly
be carried on. The application of the principle of utility deontology will alone enable
us to discover whether deceptive impressions are conveyed by the employment
of the terms , – and it will be found on a close examination, that virtue & vice
regardedare as has been stated but modifications representatives of two qualities, whereto & their contrari namely, Prudence &
effective Benevolence & their contraries – with the different modifications springing out of them, – & which
regard ourselves, – primarily – & next, all besides ourselves.

For if the effect of virtue were to prevent or destroy more pleasure
than it produced – or to produce more pain than it prevented, – its were more
better called appropriate name would be wickedness & folly – wickedness where as it affected others and might be folly
as respected him who practised it. And if the influence of vice were to
promote pleasure & to diminish pain, vice would be entitled to the names
of beneficence and wisdom.

Virtue is, , the preference given to a greater
good in comparison with a less. But it is called upon for its exercise when the
lesser good is magnified by its adjacency & the greater good diminished by
its remoteness. In the self-regarding part of the field of conduct it is the
sacrifice of a present inclination to a distant personal recompense. In the social
part, it is the sacrifice of a selfish good a man's own pleasure of his own to the obtaining a greater mass sum
of good to be enjoyed by others pleasure for the benefit of others. The sacrifice is either positive
or negative – positive when it is the abandonment of pleasure – negative
when it is the subjection to pain.

The terms self sacrifice or self-denial are obviously appropriate
where the virtue consists in the abstinence from enjoyment – but they are
less properly employed where the good sacrificed is of the negative kind or an exemption from positive pain & the
virtue is found in self-subjection to suffering. But it will be obvious that though
the idea of virtue may be sometimes included in that of the term the idea of sacrifice or self-denial
yet these are by no means synonymous with virtue, – nor are they necessarily included in
the idea of virtue. To the appellation character of virtue, in a great number of cases no doubt the quality
of courage is indispensable – but courage, in so far as it consists in exposure to pain – to
bodily pain for example unaccompanied by danger to life cannot be fitly called
sacrifice – so self-denial cannot be said to have place in cases where a man
abandons nothing which he might have obtained.

Identifier: | JB/015/229/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
Date_1		Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	015	Main Headings	deontology
Folio number	229	Info in main headings field
Image	001	Titles	virtue in general
Category	linking material	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering	f84
Penner	sir john bowring	Watermarks	m 1826
Marginals		Paper Producer
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year	1826
Notes public		ID Number	5445
Box Contents