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86
But though the test of virtue be usefulness – or in other words the
production of happiness – virtue being, as above, that which is beneficial & vice
that which is pernicious to the community, – there is no identity between
virtue & usefulness – for there are many beneficial actions which do not partake
of the nature of virtue. Virtue demands effort. Of all the actions of man
those which preserve the individual & those which preserve the species
are undoubtedly the most beneficial to the community. But there is
no virtue in these. As regards effort – tho' effort is needful to virtue. &
to the production of virtue, it is not needful that the time of the effort
should be the very moment when the virtue is practised. All that is
necessary is that the virtuous act should be of that character for
the production of which in the conduct of most off men an effort is
required. For the habit whose formation required an such effort acts at
last without requiring such an impulse. Take for instance the
confining anger within the limits prescribed by prudence & benevolence.
If, in which there could be no virtue without contemporaneous effort, then
would virtue arrived then arrived at its consummation cease to be virtue.
It is curious enough that in the Aristotelian
school an exclusion is put upon virtue when it is exercised in the highest
degree – where any thing remains of inclination to be subdued, however perfect
the subjugation may be, – then the title of virtue is refused, – & to the decidedly superior
claim, the inferior title of semi-virtue or half virtue is awarded.
Semi virtutes, says the Oxford compend sunt virtutum quasi quasi
condimenta et bona dispositiones ad violutis habitum, sed tarner intefram virtutes
non nondum habent.† Compend p 69
Semi-virtus fgitur est, continues the author quix mediocritatem⊞ ⊞ The allusion here is to another Aristotelian tenet that in every case virtue consists – that every species of virtue consists – in mediocrity
servat, sed cum aliqua difficultate affectibus Rationis imperis reluctantibus et cegre parentibus
Atqui in hoc a virtute perfecta distinguitus quam ture se sciat
aliquis assequutum . cum et Ratio præcribet quod rectum est it Affectus sine cilla
Teluctantra Rationes dictamina sequuntur.
According to this, virtue consists in doing without the
cost of any sacrifice what is right to be done, – & for every whole virtue there
should consequently be a half-virtue. And, with a limitation for which it is
not very easy to discover the reason, the half-virtues are paired off with the whole virtues. Harum tot fere genera statui possant quot sunt virtutes perfecta†
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