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Virtue according to our view of it consists in Before the title of virtue is demanded for an action its conduciveness to happiness must
be proved. According to Aristotle and his Oxford disciple virtue consists in
mediocrity – so in Latin at least, for it may be thought that moderation is
the more fit translation of mediocritas – but at all events it is mediocritas.
And here let it be remarked by the way that if morality had been
intended for use – if it had been thought good enough for the business of life, –
a living language and not a dead one would have been employed for teaching it – the language of the many, not the language of the few. Now what
is the value of a definition? That we may know the thing defined. Of a description?
Clearly that we may recognize the thing described. And let us see whether the
end is accomplished here.

The virtue is named – another name is found on which it stands is stuck between two qualities of the same character which are not virtues – in one
of thewhich the qualities of the virtues are deficient – a third in which in the other they are excessive – here
is your designation of virtue – here is the part example running thro' the whole string of virtues.
Here The only thing then needful is to show what on each occasion is the
exact quantity of the quality out of which virtue is made – to produce it
ready for use, exactly correctly weighed out – neither too much nor too little – for if you
have get it not in the exact quantity get what you may – you will not get virtue.

But for this all important example object you will find no help from
our moralist. There are he tells you three doses of the moral medicine – there is the proper dose –
the excessive dose & the deficient dose. For the proper dose there is health
& safety – in the others peril & perdition. Has he not noted down the
sanatory quantity? Not he! Are there no figures – no means of estimate in
his prescription? Nothing or what of it like them. In the field of medicine But

If a physician treat of diseases he does not satisfy himself
with scribbling down their names – but thinks it useful, – finds it necessary indeed
to record their symptoms – in order that others may Not so our moralist. His
virtues are names – without symptoms – he talks of virtue – but how virtue is
to be separated from that which is not virtue forms no portion of his care.

Even common phraseology, – the accustomed use of the terms
of right & wrong, – justice & injustice – have in their habitual employment a
more decided bearing upon the welfare of society than is given to the virtues by
the ethical Oxonian. All men have a sort of notion that Government and legislation – and
morality and religion & morality have or ought to have a beneficial
influence upon the public happiness. On what other ground indeed can they be
recommended? But on that ground the Oxford moralist makes no stand.

Identifier: | JB/015/234/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
Date_1		Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	015	Main Headings	deontology
Folio number	234	Info in main headings field
Image	001	Titles
Category	linking material	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering	f88
Penner	sir john bowring	Watermarks	m 1826
Marginals		Paper Producer
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year	1826
Notes public		ID Number	5450
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