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Justice
Prudence & effective benevolence it cannot be too often repeated, being the only
intrinsically useful virtues, all other virtues must derive their value from
them, & be subservient to them.
Is justice then a subservient & inferior virtue? And if so, to which is it subordinate?
Before the art of logic was understood, & especially before the business of arrangement
in any thing like correctness or completeness was accomplished, ideas respecting virtue &
names designating those ideas were introduced. The relations between virtue & virtue were
vague & obscure; – the descriptions of them confused, the points of coincidence & of difference
indeterminate or undetermined. Logically speaking they were disparate, – mathematically speaking
they are incommensurable.
Of the virtues the Aristotelians introduced the definitions & classification of the virtue we have seen. Of these virtues
several have been divided into species. But on examination you it will find be found that
under the same generic names virtues are classed which have no assignable
relation to each other, – & others some in which the character of the genus under which
they are arranged, is not discoverable. The modifications of put forward under
one virtue, not unfrequently belong to another, & the department of & on
a glance at the whole, the appearance is of strange entanglement & perplexity.
Tho' the Linnæus of Natural History has appeared in the world, & restored its
chaos – into order and harmony – the Linnæus of Ethics is yet to come.
Justice under the system of utility is a modification of benevolence – it
belongs to the present work wherever the political sanction, – or the power of the
law does not apply – it belongs to it wherever the sanction of moral obligation
when is unenforced by penal visitation.
The inadequacy & imperfection of the political or legal sanction is
experienced in a considerable part of the field of morality – & a demand will
be created for the dictates of the moral sanction as guided by utility in the following cases:
Where the legal sanction. is to be silent, – or in other words makes no provision
for the case in point.
Where the legal sanction is inconsistent with or opposed to the greatest happiness
principle.
Where the dictates of the legal sanction are confused or unintelligible.
Where they are impracticable.
In all these cases the dictates of justice will be the dictates of benevolence
& the dictates of benevolence – the dictates of utility.
It would assist clearness of conception if the word probity
were subjected to the terms justice, – with which it is pretty completely synonymous
– at least if there be a difference it is rather grammatical than ethical –
for tho' a man says with propriety, I will do you justice, he cannot say I will do you probity, – tho' every act of injustice done would be an act
of improbity, – & conversely every act of improbity an act of injustice.
The term word justice is clogged with other significations which render
it less efficient as an ethical term. It may for example be employed as
a subject substitute for the term judicature. He by whom the powers
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Identifier: | JB/015/270/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
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deontology |
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270 |
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001 |
justice |
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f120 |
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sir john bowring |
j whatman turkey mill 1827 |
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jonathan blenman |
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1827 |
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5486 |
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