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122
Amity or Friendship
The pleasures & pains of amity are those of the popular or moral sanction in
miniature, – in the one case their source is a determinate individual in the other
an indefinite multitude.
When is it desirable that the pleasures of amity should be reaped? Whenever they
may be reaped without the production of preponderant evil, – without violation of
the laws of self-regarding prudence. To what length may their pursuit be
carried? To exactly the length which is consistent with the cardinal virtues of prudence & benevolence.
And it will be found that between these pleasure & the pleasures & pains of amity there
is rarely any competition.
To obtain the favor – the amity of another the obvious course is to do him service. These
ought to be services ought to be li limited only by the considerations of benevolence & prudence. The
limits which effective benevolence applies to the exercise of amity are precisely the same
as apply to the pursuit of wealth. If the services necessi derived from him whose
amity is you courted be the conferring on you a portion of wealth, – the pursuit of
wealth is the pursuit of amity: – & in precisely so far as the pursuit of wealth with the enjoyments
& exemptions derivable from it, is repugnant to benevolence, so is the pursuit of amity.
The pleasures derivable from this pursuit have this distinctive & interesting
character, – that prudence & benevolence are almost equally concerned in their production.
For however selfish the desire may be, – however unrelieved by
the social sympathy, – the effects of it are not the less purely beneficial to the
parties concerned. The interest of him who courts the amity of another, may be
served or not served as may happen – the person courted has his interest served
to an extent nearly equal to that he would have obtained for himself if he had himself
sought the pleasure conferred. And tho' it is not sympathy, – not benevolence
that has produced the pleasure, yet it is not the less produced – & thus the good produced
tho' not arising from a primary virtue is as valuable as if it arose from it.
The sole value of benevolence itself consists in its tendency & aptitude to produce beneficence.
And from thus And no evil can grow from the excess of the friendly affections
except when they interfere with the primary virtues.
Proportioned to the value of the services which a man is
deemed to be able & willing to confer on others will be the number of competitors
in those services. In this as in every other case competition will produce
jealousy – & each competitor who is believed to have obtained the a greater share
than another may be to that other an object of envy. This envy will endeavor
to produce a reaction of ill-will on the person who is the object of envy, – and
one of its immediate objects effects will be an effort to lower the envied receiver
of favors, in the eyes of him who confers them.
Nevertheless, there exists a tribunal, – that which deals out
the decisions of good repute, – or general esteems before which this contention for
benefits is always carried on – & every man is a member of that this tribunal who
chooses to take a part in its awards. Before this tribunal every man who
seeks to detract from the merits of another man acts the part of an informer
& as his motives are conduct is usually attributed to a sinister & disreputable motive. Be
his motives what they may, – dishonorable, or dislogistic phrases will probably
attach to his conduct, – & thus the popular sanction be brought to bear
upon the self-regarding impulse.
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Identifier: | JB/015/272/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
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deontology |
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272 |
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001 |
amity or friendship |
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recto |
f122 |
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sir john bowring |
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5488 |
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