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133
Good nature. It is nearly allied with sociability – but is with
reference to virtue & vice, completely ambiguous. So much of it as is
natural – or part of the distinctive individual character; it cannot be deemed a
virtue. That portion of it which is acquired, which is the result of reflection supposing it can be distinguished &
separated from the rest, may be virtuous. In as far as it is combined when Associated
with benevolence – it is, like sociability, nearly synonymous with friendliness.
It has in it a greater mixture than sociability of the natural with the
moral character. If wholly natural constitutional it is no more a virtue than beauty –
or strength is a virtue – it adds agreeableness to social intercourse whether
conduct be virtuous or not. That part of good nature, which, not
independently of physical tendencies, has grown into a habit of become effective
benevolence – that, and that alone is virtue – but it is not the good
nature that is the virtue – it is the effective benevolence. So again
good nature may lend itself to the service of imprudence of or
improbity. The disposition to please another has not unfrequently
been the cause of misconduct. Even in common parlance a
man is sometimes said to have been led astray by his
good nature. It may be the weakness upon which temptation
acts – & the pleasure of gratifying the person who appeals
to it may close the eyes to the consequences of ever
consequent evil.
Identifier: | JB/015/284/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
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sir john bowring |
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