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JB/015/367/001

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42

4 Justice, is one of those qualities of which a great parade is made
by the moralists of the Aristotelian school. Its is that quality interests are
which is to a great extent taken under the care of the Legislator
& its infractions in are made responsible to the
Criminal Code in their most extensively pernicious consequences.
Justice is generally understood to be the coincidence of
conduct with the dictates of Law or of equity. Where Law that morality.
takes cognizance of injustice With the moral, least and not
with the legal department is our conce present concern,
and the claims of justice stripped of their vague phraseology
will be found to be simply the claims of benevolence.
The claims of benevolence being here the application of the
non-disappointment principle. Injustice, in as far as it
has any definite or definable meaning is the denial
of a pleasure which a man feels he has a right to
enjoy – or the infliction of a pain which he feels he should not be
ought not exposed to suffer. In both cases the dictates of
benevolence are violated towards him. It is a thus
principle that
But the claims of justice disassociated from
the tests which Deontology applies to them are in the
highest
vague & unsatisfactory. The declaration that such
& such an action or such and such an course of
course of action – is just or unjust is mere declamatory
pretence unless at the same time the dependent pleasures &
pains are brought into the calculation. If it could be
proved that evil in the shape of a general balance of
suffering upon the whole grew out of a particular given line
of conduct, – & that it were agreed that such line of conduct were ought to be called justall the
that consequence would simply be that justice & virtue were might be opposed to one another – & that to be just would be
to be immoral. Made secondary to the general happiness – or in
other words to the combined influences of prudence &
benevolence – Justice is entitled to the designation of virtue


Identifier: | JB/015/367/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

015

Main Headings

deontology

Folio number

367

Info in main headings field

Image

001

Titles

Category

linking material

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

f42

Penner

sir john bowring

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

5583

Box Contents

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