★ Keep up to date with the latest news - subscribe to the Transcribe Bentham newsletter; Find a new page to transcribe in our list of Untranscribed Manuscripts
49
11 Amity or Friendship is neither a vice nor a virtue until it is
brought into the domains of prudence or benevolence. It is merely
a certain state of the affections implying an attachment to particular
objects. Now that attachment may be pernicious, – indifferent, – or
beneficial. It may be pernicious to Indifferent it can scarcely be
for that would suppose motives & consequences of pain & pleasure
without any balance for a result, – a case so rare in the field of
human action as scarcely to be worthy of consideration. Amity
that may be pernicious to both parties, – in which case it violates
both prudence & benevolence – it may be pernicious to the man
who bestows his amity in a & in that state of things the laws of
prudence forbid its exercise – without being pernicious to the man
who confers it may be so to the man who receives is the object of the amicable word
or deed, in which case it is maleficent. Again where the pleasures
on either side are more than counterbalanced by the pains on the
other, there is a clear loss to happiness, – and consequently to virtue.
Where amity is the source of mutual benefit prudence & benevolence
are served to the extent of that mutual benefit – always supposing
that the consequences of the words or actions which the are the source
of that benefit do not extend beyond the parties. For no result of
happiness to those parties will make their friendship virtuous if
that friendship destroy more happiness elsewhere than they have
created for themselves.
Identifier: | JB/015/374/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
|
|||
---|---|---|---|
015 |
deontology |
||
374 |
|||
001 |
|||
linking material |
1 |
||
recto |
f49 |
||
sir john bowring |
|||
5590 |
|||