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52

But how should Hume be safe from error who makes a sense of
virtue a feeling referable to no results, the groundwork of good
conduct. "An action" he says "is virtuous or vicious because its view
"causes a pleasure of or uneasiness of a particular kind" iii 28. But
what action is there to which in different men will not produce different
feelings? "To have the sense of virtue" he proceeds "is nothing but to
"feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of
"a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We do
"not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases, but in feeling
"that it pleases after such a particular manner we in effect feel that it is
"virtuous. The same is implied in our judgments concerning all kinds
"of beauty & tastes & sensations, our approbation is implied in the
"immediate pleasure they convey to us".

Truly it is inexplicable how all mankind should have possessed this
new sense – this moral sense, – without ever dreaming of it till the last
century. And since the exercise of this sense is a pleasure, – well
is its inventor intitled to Xerxes & Tiberius's reward! But if
original, – if organic it would be as strong in savage as in civilised
life – is that contended for?

But this moral sense instead of being or giving a reason
is after all only an artifice to avoid giving a reason. It affords in reality
no criterion to distinguish right from wrong, what ought to be done from
what ought not to be done. It does not answer the question. Ought I to
do this or not? It may say peremptorily, Yes! or No! but it Suppose the
partisan of the moral sense says No! & he were asked why? – He could only say:
My moral sense approves condemns it. But if farther pushed
by an inquiry as to what he meant by his moral sense, – he could
say but declare that it was painful to do it: And then if asked for
evidence of that pain, – he might rejoin that all the wise & the good
felt it – but if more moderate & accurate he might content himself by
averring that he felt it. In the first case he throws the whole question
back upon authority which cuts, but does not untie the Gordian Knot, – and
makes all morality arbitrary – in the second, he gives me as a reason for not
doing a thing that it would give him pain were he to do it. If he were to show
that it would give me pain he would do something – but the case is by the supposition just the contrary – for if it did, I should never think of
asking him doing it, nor of asking him the question.

Identifier: | JB/015/377/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 15.
Date_1		Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	015	Main Headings	deontology
Folio number	377	Info in main headings field
Image	001	Titles
Category	linking material	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering	f52
Penner	sir john bowring	Watermarks	i i smith & son 1831
Marginals		Paper Producer	maria edgeworth
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year	1831
Notes public		ID Number	5593
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