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57
Self regarding prudence comprises in its domain actions & thoughts, – or rather
external & internal actions, for thoughts are only internal or mental actions. Its dictates
exercise it in so direct the choice between actions, – & or the choice between thoughts as to promote
the greatest happiness to the individual concerned.
As regards external actions what prudence can do, & all that prudence can
do is to choose between the present & the future , – and in so far as the aggregate
of happiness is increased thereby to give preference to the greater future over the lesser
present pleasure. But of two portions of happiness of equal magnitude one present &
the other not present, the one present will always be greater in value than that which
is future, the value of the future pleasure being measured by & in proportion to its remoteness adjacency – and
in case of uncertainty, by that of the measure of its uncertainty. If time be out of the question, – if
two portions of happiness present themselves, – equal in value & equal in remoteness –
or equal in value, notwithstanding remoteness, – virtue is not concerned in the
choice between them, – it is a matter not of virtue, but of taste.
Under this head that of self-regarding prudence as we have had there has been occasion to remark come several of those
virtues which Aristotle, & guided by him other moralists to this day, have put on
a line with prudence, – each being, in fact prudence presenting itself in its general
some shape or other, – and each requiring for its exercise the sacrifice of the present to the future.
These virtues are 1 Temperance, 2 Continence, 3 Fortitude, 4 Magnanimity and
5 Veracity. Subtract prudence from each of these, – & the residuum will be almost
nothing. If there be under any circumstances any virtue left after the subtraction
of prudence the small result residuum of virtue must be benevolence, – if it be not whatever else
any thing else it remains however it may pretend to the name of virtue will be nonsense, – it will be imposture. If the interest of others
be concerned in the exercise of the prudential virtues by ourselves, – the prudence is
not purely self-regarding, but extra-regarding. But if neither the our own greater
future happiness nor the happiness of others to an extent greater than the
sacrifice demanded by a particular action is promoted by it, – that sacrifice is
mere asceticism, it is the very opposite to prudence, – it is the offspring of
delusion, – it is miscalculating or uncalculating folly blindness: – since to sacrifice any,
the least particle of pleasure for any other purpose than that of obtaining for
a man's self or any some other person a greater quantity of pleasure, or of avoiding
a more than equivalent quantity of pain is not virtue but folly; – and to
cause or endeavor to cause any other person to give up any particle of
pleasure for any other purpose than in exchange for a greater quantity of
pleasure, or to save him from a more than equivalent quantity of pain
is not virtue – it is vice, it is not benevolence, – it is malevolence, – it
is maleficence is not beneficence, it is maleficence.
"Sperne Voluptates" says Horace "docet empta dolore voluptas"
"Spurn pleasures; purchased pleasure teacheth pain". Silly is the precept, – sadly
silly if taken to the letter, – but no such silly notion had the poet in his head. No
such silly notion did he mean to inculcate. He was thinking of the verse, not
of the morality, & when the option is between truth & rhythm, – between
serving & pleasing, – extraordinary indeed must be the poet who makes any other
choice than was made by Horace. What he really meant to inculcate was that
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