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JB/028/176/004

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12)

NOTE [b]

Code and Institutes respects them only in as far as the
propositions they contain are propositions taking for
their object sorts of actions; in respect of these alone
but the potentate of whose will they contain the expression, acted as
a Legislator: in respect of such propositions, if any as to be purport to take for their object or individual actions of individual persons, he even be considered to have any not otherwise acted than he acted in an
the capacity in which he acted can be considered as no other than a inept one; being partly
that of a simple Historian, partly that of Legislator.
Historian in as much as he relates such and such acts
of judicial power to have been exercised on such and such individual
persons for such and such reasons individual
actions: Legislator in as much as he commands acts intimates it as his will that
of power of the sort in question to shall be exercised in future
on individual persons of the sort in question for individual
acts of the sort in question: having giving the individual objects as
patterns, and leaving some each man that may be concerned, from the prospect contemplation of those
patterns to make up the for himself ideas of the sorts they respectively belong
to, as he can.

Happily It may be objected that from the notion of
language these objects of the Law jurisprudence (viz: – persons, acs, and as also
perhaps generally frequently things) cannot be expressed but in sorts: since
names of things and of acts are all almost names of sorts: and
(that) although the names of persons may be individual
viz: what are called proper names, yet is the idea of a sort of person
compleatly expressed by the name of the individual
coupled with the names of the sorts of things and acts
to which he stands related in the most narrow description
of that can be given of the objects of a other proposition
of Law, he is represented as standing related. This is
very true; but the sorts of pers acts things and persons
thus necessarily expressed are commonly frequently so narrow as not
to agree to any individuals beyond those to which they were


Identifier: | JB/028/176/004
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 28.

Date_1

Marginal Summary Numbering

not numbered

Box

028

Main Headings

comment on the commentaries

Folio number

176

Info in main headings field

common law particular laws

Image

004

Titles

[[titles::note [a] / note]]

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

4

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

b9 / e10 / b11 / e12

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

[[watermarks::[monogram] [britannia symbol]]]

Marginals

jeremy bentham

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

9441

Box Contents

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