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JB/037/185/001

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1823. July 2
Constitut. Code.III Rationale
Ch. 5. Constitutive
§. 1. [Constitutive in the people, why]

Enemies of the people and mankind all who take of glory, dignity, property

As in the situation of Monarch in every By the above particularity in the case of the Monarch
the above composed cases situations namely those of Monarch the necessity is saved of entering into the like particularity in any the case
that of any hand any state of men which Aristocracy of any other of those the cases in which the interest of the proposed competitor to the
claims of the here proposed Democratic States is so indisputably opposed to that
that of of the greatest number of those whom they aspire whose happiness and unhappiness
they claim to have in their hands.

Of appropriate moral aptitude the deficiency
comparative deficiency and thence its necessary consequence misrule will be equally certain in the case
of where in which the choice of those by whom the affairs
of common to all are managed is in the hands of any number
less than the greatest. Within this range are included the
cases forms of government following.

1. An absolute Monarchy hereditary

2. An absolute Monarchy elective

3. An absolute Aristocracy more or less numerous, hereditary

4. An absolute Aristocracy more or less numerous,
elective

5. An absolute Aristocracy more or less numerous, the
members some hereditary, others elective.

6. A mixt government composed of a Monarch, hereditary
or elective, and an Aristocracy, hereditary, or
elective or mixt.

A mixt government in which the supreme power is in the conjunct hand composed of a Monarch, with
or without an Aristocracy of either of the above three
kinds, and a body representative body composed of
Deputies elected by the people; namely the
whole greatest number of people as above, or a portion more or less considerable
of the people.

In this latter case, whatsoever portion of the supreme
power the delegates of the people were are invested with, in respect of the
exercise of it they will be divested of all appropriate moral
aptitude, by corruptive influence corruption: by the influence exercised
on the will of those Agents and delegates Agents and of the people, by the share in
means of the share in the supreme power and with it sweets of Government Code which is
lodged in the hands of the one or the few, or of the
one and the few as the case may be. This case is that of
corruption: of in which more particularly further on, under another head.


Identifier: | JB/037/185/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 37.

Date_1

1823-07-02

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

037

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

185a
"a" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 185.

Info in main headings field

constitut. code

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d11 / e11

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

11400

Box Contents

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