xml:lang="en" lang="en" dir="ltr">

Transcribe Bentham: A Collaborative Initiative

From Transcribe Bentham: Transcription Desk

Keep up to date with the latest news - subscribe to the Transcribe Bentham newsletter; Find a new page to transcribe in our list of Untranscribed Manuscripts

JB/037/247/001

Jump to: navigation, search
Completed

Click Here To Edit

1823 July 19
Constitut. Code

Suppose the Executive to Supreme Exec this mass of patronage to be
all of it in one hand: and as will be seen it can not without disadvantage be in any more.
In every form of government in which the legislature is in one The individual person in whose hand it is with him – the Prime Minister. It is
set of hands and the execution in another – the legislature having the interest of this Minis functionary that direct offices be as in impossible
the of bar, and the execution that of the locating in of the officers thus at his disposal the number be as great as possible, that to each the mass
lucrative or otherwise desirable offices of course: in the one hand has place: the of benefit attached in all shapes be as great as possible, and the mass of burthen as small in all
in those same spots, in the offices the legislature the less the burthen, the greater the value of the patronage. It is his interest
to give commission to those members that they be as numerous high paid and as free from burthensome duty as possible.
It is the interest Thus is already the interest of the Prime Minister: it will
be the interest of the majority of the several members of the legislative body, if upon the supposition
of their having each of them a share in the benefit of this patronage, to
put them in possession of this share nothing more is requisite, than on
But of both legislative and executive any lodged in the same the part of the Prime Minister an effective disposition provided it be
hands of hands the disorder would be still greater worse: and other an effectual one to let them into it. To obtain at the hands of another man
the same or a different hand of any hand this cannot but a benefit in any shape, there is no other course more natural him to bestow so sure as this of the exercising in him an expectation of receiving a correspondent benefit at your hand. Fully apprised alike apprized of this property in human nature, the parties on each side set to work and conduct themselves accordingly. Fearful of seeing his patronage diminished and hopeful of seeing it encreased, the Minister looks out for the most influential of the members of the legislature, notes what individuals are most closely connected with them by the ties of interest in every shape self-regarding and sympathetic, and discovers in those same individuals the merit which gives them an indisputable title to whatever offices he can spare for them. The By every each benefit thus conferred on some, he raises not only in their breasts but in those of all the others, expectations of eventual ulterior benefit, to the in the event of their contributions to confer on him those benefits which to him in his situation are sure objects of desire.
This property in human nature can not be a secret on either
be lodged side.

In every form of government in which the legislative power is in
one set of hands, and the executive in another, corruption has
place of course. To the department of the executive belong all the
several official situations in which by the occupants of the business of the government is carried
on. By the act By the nature of the case Of themselves or by addition made to them
all so many those situations are rendered objects of general desire. Many is constitutes the principal matter of those additions. To The
hand or hands in which in this department the Supreme authority is reposed has
the filling of them up, and it is necessary that it should have.
To the legislative authority it belongs to create and preserve those
desirable and desired situations, to the executive to fill them filled
up. He who has the filling up of an office, has such with him
the patronage of it. To him who has the patronage of an office that
same patronage may be worth nothing of no pecuniary value. But it may be of value
to him and that value as great as not no less than the possession of it: the value to him
of every such office those under his patronage at his disposal the value may therefore
be at any point on a scale, of which the lowest point is and
the highest at a point on the same with their the same point at which it would be if the emoluments of the office were
in his own possession: and he is and to the number of the offices
from which it may happen to him to derive this benefit, there is
no limit. Of the mass of benefit considerable In the same hand the possession of any a small number more
than one creates considerable and jealousy: the patronage of the
whole to the number of thousands and tens of thousands creates .


Identifier: | JB/037/247/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 37.

Date_1

1823-07-19

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

037

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

247

Info in main headings field

constitut. code

Image

001

Titles

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

e5

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

11462

Box Contents

UCL Home » Transcribe Bentham » Transcription Desk