JB/037/249/001

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1823 July 20
Constitut. Code

Nor would the balefulness of this state of things be diminished by
resting the legislative and the executive power in one and the same hand.
On the contrary they would but be encreased. Mutual corruption would not indeed
exist: but self-corruption would take its place. Corruption would not be have
divided between two seats, it would be concentrated in one. For giving
effect to the virtual sinister contract between legislative and executive
when they were in different hands, this pretences, discussions and formalities could
not but be necessary: then both are and by all of them those requisites together, time
to an indefinite amount in indefinite quantity be might be necessitated. Now that they are
in one and the same hand, none of those retardatives and temporary
bars are necessary. Necessary and Such offices as are at once useful
and necessary, necessary to the maintenance of his power authority he can
not but establish: such emolument if any, as is necessary to engage
the willing unreluctant services of individuals qualified capable of performing exercising the functions
belonging to the several offices in a sufficiently apt manner he
can but establish: But to the affording him the Needless and useless
offices, and offices without function he may establish in any number
and to all and each of them he may attach emolument to on whatever
excess he pleases. But in his case, to his reaping sinister be
at the expence of the people sinister benefit to himself in whatsoever
quantity he pleases, no one of all those requisites instruments of corruption evil mischief is necessary.
In any number, in any number of classes one breeds another, and any
number of grades one above and below another he may create
offices, with functions consisting in nothing but service of self humiliation
and demonstration of respect towards his single person, and
to those offices worse than useless to everybody but himself and the several
possessors he may attach respectively, at the expence of the people, masses of emolument
of whatever magnitude he pleases. But the magnitude of the
sinister benefit reaped at the expence of the people does not in this
case dispo as in the other deposed upon the quantity of official pay
in this case as in the other. The needless and useless offices are not necessary to his obtainment the depriving
the people of the money, and when he has got it he may apply
it to his own amusement gratification in whatever shape he pleases.

He may build with it
employ it building pyramids
churches, pagodas: he
may buy up the largest and
most glittering stones the earth
produces and load his mistresses
with them. But in
that source one object if of growing
to the intensity of which
there are no limits, of
a desire ever insatiable
and encreasing is the military
force at his command,
the greater the mass of it is
the greater in his own view
at least is his security
against other states and
his own subjects against
retribution for the injuries which it will be his pride to keep on both, and the more efficient his means of extending at the expence of other States, the field of his dominion and
injury and for every injury and the faculty of adding gratification
to gratification and injury to
injury with an the assurance
of receiving for every such injury
a reward of praise.

Identifier: | JB/037/249/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 37.
Date_1	1823-07-20	Marginal Summary Numbering
Box	037	Main Headings	constitutional code
Folio number	249	Info in main headings field	constitut. code
Image	001	Titles
Category	text sheet	Number of Pages	1
Recto/Verso	recto	Page Numbering	e7
Penner	jeremy bentham	Watermarks	j whatman turkey mill 1822
Marginals		Paper Producer	jonathan blenman
Corrections		Paper Produced in Year	1822
Notes public		ID Number	11464
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