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1820. Aug. 5. 1822 Aug. 4
§ Corruptive influence
68 or 12.
On functionaries, all instruments of felicity that appear within their reach, not as instruments of corruptive influence: the greater the ratio of them to the aggregate, the greater their efficiency in that character.
69 or 13.
Like every other that has a representative system, Spanish Monarchy teems with useless, needless, over-paid places, and sinecures; factitious dignities: these operating as bounties on worthlessness, granted at the expence of subject many.
All this mass of felicity will be operating as corruptive influence on subject many's representatives, engaging them to maximize public expenditure for the profit on it.
Even without the corruptive influence attached to the dominion in question, there would be enough to engage, sooner or later, a constant majority in the track of depredation – ruling few in a constant breach of trust: much more with it.
70 or 14.
Thus, in time, Spain, even without the dominion, under its Monarchy, would be what England is now: but the dominion will would give promptitude to the effect.
71 or 15.
As Englishmen, Spaniards will thus convert themselves into imposters and their dupes, if, by complimenting one another, they come into the persuasion that they are of a mould different from that of other men.
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§ Corruptive influence
⊞ 72 16 or 1.
In a pure Monarchy, representation none, no place for corruptive influence: no power for it to be exercised or no need of it. King's will is done without it. Thus in Spain before the change.
73. 17. or 2.
In a Republic, not only legislators but administrators being immediately, or by the intervention of others, (interventionally) removable, as well as chosen, by the people, and, if need be, punishable, corruptive influence has no power. No person or persons exist having, in their hands, patronage enough to engage a majority of the Legislators to injure their constituents. Thus in Anglo America.
74 18. or 3.
In a mixt Monarchy in which though legislators are chosen by the people, and in the choice of? administrators, the people, by their representatives, have a principal part, another part is performed by an irremovable functionary, by whom legislation may be indefinitely suspended, and, without whose concurrence, offices can not be filled: corruptive influence can not but have power. Thus in Spain since the change.
19 or 4.
As to its efficiency can never cease, and may always encrease, sooner or later, unless stopt by Revolution, it can not but convert the mixt into a pure Monarchy.
75 20 or 5.
Though the time can not be fixt, by every encrease given to the matter of corruptive influence, particularly crown splendour, dignity factitious, dominion, war, extent and duration of war, the conversion must be accelerated.
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§ Corruptive influence
76 21 or 6.
To say that, by money in hands of an irremovable functionary in the view of subordinates or co-ordinates, they shall not be corrupted, is to say that, by water, they will not be moistened, by fire warmed, or by arsenic poisoned.
77. 22 or 7.
By Townsend II. 261. shewn existence and operation, on a Cortes, of the matter of corruptive influence, their occasional resistance to it, and the final removal of that resistance by increase of Dominion in the person of Emperor Charles 5, who, to Spain, added so many other dominions.
78 23 or 8.
Since the change, from coercive force exercised over them on the Cortes, as King can do nothing with Cortes, so long as Cortes sits, people have nothing to apprehend. But as the whole expenditure of Government will be in the hands of men, each chosen by the King out of those presented to him, all this money will, without need of discourse, be operating upon the breasts of the Members of the Cortes in the shape of matter of corruptive influence.
79 24. or 9.
Provision by Article 129, 130, against corruptive influence – its inadequacy.
During his deputation, and for a year afterwards, no deputy can obtain, for self or another, employment, King's grant, pension, or dignity from King.
80 25 or 10.
Per J.B. letter no such interdiction: for,
1. It gives license and establishment to whatever modes are not interdicted.
2. I tends to establish a delusive persuasion of security against corruptive influence: giving non-obtainment on the modes interdicted as conclusive evidence of uncorrupt, of uncorruptive: though it amounts not to presumptive.
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V. Corruptive influence.
81. 26 or 11.
Inefficacious, were it ever so much more extensive, wd such interdiction be, unless a man had neither dependent, relation, or secret trustee for benefit of self, or any such connection.
82 27 or 12.
Reason for incapacitating men holding good things, in possession or expectancy, at the pleasure of executive functionaries, from voting in the Cortes – their being operated upon by the corruptive influence is certain, if the good thing amounts to a maintenance.
☞ N.B. Say that the means of minimizing the effect of corruptive influence would have to of place: suffice it to say that, by so large a mass as would be produced by the dominion, its force would be irresistibly augmented: the popular constitution of the provisional government notwithstanding.
83 16
⊞ Corruptive influence, if, by it be means, that by which functionaries or others are made to act in opposition to the universal interest, and thence to their duty may exist & operate under every government: purely monarchical, as well as mixt; he in whose favour it operates may be an individual or the legislator: it may be his work or that of the law itself.
But, in common intendment, it means that which, in the mixt monarchy operates upon the possession of a power lodged in the hands of men chosen by the great body of the people to apply a controul to the power of those in whose favour, by weakening or destroying the controul, it operates. This understood.
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Identifier: | JB/038/102/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 38.
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1820-08-05 |
[[marginal_summary_numbering::68 or 12 - 71 or 15, 72 [or] 16 or 1 - 74 [or] 18 or 3, 19 or 4, 75 [or] 20 or 5 - 82 [or] 27 or 12, 83 [or] 16 [sic]]] |
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constitutional code |
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constitut. code |
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corruptive influence |
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john flowerdew colls |
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