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JB/038/144/001

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1823. April 29.
Constitut. Code

20.
A self-acting democracy,
is so near to anarchy,
that, except in a community
too small to defend itself,
it can not have place,
and may therefore be here
laid out of consideration.

21.
Mixture of a composite
Government may be
1. Monarchy with Aristocracy.
2. Monarchy with Democracy.
3. Aristocracy with democracy.
Monarchy with aristocracy
and democracy.

22.
Most numerous, pure Monarchies.

23.
Not exemplified to any
considerable extent, pure
aristocracies.

24.
Of pure democracy, viz.
representative, the highest
and only compleatly established
is the cluster of
partially incorporated republics,
the Anglo-American.

25.
Of a mixture of Monarchy
with Aristocracy and
no democracy, examples
scarce exist.
[☞ Enquire as to the Netherlands.]

26.
Of mixture of Monarchy
with democracy without
Aristocracy, examples are
Spain and Portugal.


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27.
Of mixture of Monarchy
with Aristocracy and Democracy,
though in different
proportions, England
and France.

28.
As to use made of these
instruments of misrule,
the case of the bipartite
mixture of democracy
and that of the tripartite,
are so nearly the same,
that what is said of one
will apply to both.

29.
In so far as either or
both the others are mixt
with Monarchy, Monarch's
will feel's obstruction.
The sensation being unpleasant,
endeavour is
of course constantly employed
in removing the
obstruction: lessening
the resistance of opposing
wills.

30.
In Monarchs, is every
where wholly or mostly
the power of placing in
offices: to all or most of
which the external instruments
of felicity, power,
money, with or without
factitious honor are attached:
thus is the matter
of reward, i.e. of good
at his disposal, to the
amount of the excess of
the value of the agreeable
appendage above the
ain, if any, attendant
on the labour necessary
to the discharge of the
duty.


---page break---

31.
Use of the body which,
in a mixture of representative
democracy with
Monarchy, possesses power
co-ordinate with Monarch's,
faculty of frustrating
his desire and endeavour
to serve the sinister
interest, at the expence
of universal do.

32.
Hence, the members, collectively
taken, are, or are
supposed to be, located by
members of the whole
community, in such proportion,
as that between
their aggregate interest, &
that of the whole, there is
no difference.

33.
But, suppose this true,
the interest, and thence the
will, of the majority, wd.
be in constant opposition
to Monarch's. His is
to maximize the mass of
the instruments of felicity,
applicable to his own use:
their's to minimize it.

34.
Every where, Monarch's
sinister interest, and corresponding
desire and endeavour
is – to sacrifice
to itself the universal interest:
to maximize it's
own benefit at expence of
universal interest. Of each
number of a democratical
representative body, joined
or not with the Monarchy, it
is the duty to prevent, or at
least minimize such sinister
sacrifice.


Identifier: | JB/038/144/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 38.

Date_1

1823-04-29

Marginal Summary Numbering

20-34

Box

038

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

144

Info in main headings field

constitut. code

Image

001

Titles

Category

marginal summary sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

e2

Penner

john flowerdew colls

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

jeremy bentham

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

11781

Box Contents

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