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1824 May 1.
Constitutional Code.

III and Rationale
Ch. IX Ministers collectively
§. 15 Remuneration
Factitious honor
Arbitrarily conferred
Would convert Republic
into Monarchy
The manner detailed

Ch. Minister's collectively
§ Remuneration.

(a) Art. 13. [arbitrarily
conferred.] Reasons for
the above inhibition
of the sort of institution
indicated: viz evils it
is pregnant with.

1. Evil 1. Destruction of
the Constitution:
conversion of it into a
Monarchy. Proof

52 2.
1. Either by one functionary
or a body, would
the collation be made.

53 3.
2. Otherwise than by one
it could not be made
without departure from
the single seatedness
principle, the advantages
of which have been
brought to view; nor, (as
below,) if by a body, wd.
the evil be lessened.

54 4.
3. No other could the
individual be than
the Prime Minister.

55 5.
4. To a man so situated
for life, and tho' dislocable,
so capable of saving
himself from being
dislocated, sufficient
would this power be
to enable him to become
absolute Monarch.

56 6.
5. In pretence, never
conferred but for extra
service to public: being
arbitrarily conferred, it
wd. in fact be conferred
only for service to himself,
his instruments & favorites,
having for it's main
objects, the acquisition of
this despotism.

---page break---

Ch. Ministers Collectively.
§. Remuneration

57 7.
6. By power in this shape,
little by little, he would
draw into his hands power
in all other shapes,
and with it money and
money's worth in all

58 8.
7. By prospect, confirmed
as occasion served by
experience, of the receipt
of the matter of good
in this shape from his
hands, by themselves or
their connections, the
possessors of the matter
of good in all other shapes
would each of them let
him into a participation
of it.

59. 9.
8. Little by little, he wd.
thus gain over his
immediate locatees, the
Ministers: particularly
the Legislation, Election,
Army, Navy & Finance
Minister: not to speak
of the Justice d<hi rend="superscript">o: all
being subject to his power
of dislocation, however
modified, as per §.

60 10.
9. By each conquest,
means & facility would
be given for each
succeeding one.

61. 11.
10. To the corrupt
obsequiousness, in this case
as in every other, no
communication between
corruptor & corruptee
wd. be necessary: relative
situation wd. suffice.

---page break---

Ch. Ministers collectively
§. Remuneration

62 12
11. For the of
the matter of corruption
in this shape,
note the example.
By one King (England)
a garter sent to another
(Portugal). Sent
it wd. not have been
but under a certainty
of being acceptable.

+63 13.
12. Acceptable to a
Monarch, what would
it not be to anyone of
11. or 12 members of a
Republic — colleagues
in the office of Minister
so checked and
controuled as here.

64 14.
13. As to the self-encreasing
nature of power,
where arbitrary, like
money out at compound
interest, see for example
Athens and Pisistratus:
arbitrary power over the
whole state, of armed &
trained men, many
thousands included
acquired by do. over 50
men, obtained by him,
on some pretence, for
a body guard.

Identifier: | JB/038/235/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 38.



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constitutional code

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constitutional code




ch. ministers collectively / remuneration


marginal summary sheet

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Page Numbering

d8 / e1


john flowerdew colls


j whatman turkey mill 1822


Paper Producer

jonathan blenman


jeremy bentham

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