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JB/042/580/001

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1823 May 22
Constitutional Code

3
Ch. XII Judiciary Collectively
(3 §. 29 Located how
Not in Constitution

4
Connected thus with
and dependant on the head of a party,
under the favour of the Judge
might thus be all along
shewn to every member
of that party his unjust
disfavour to the opposite
party.

Ratiocinative.

But, the individual thus indicated recommended by to the great body by their this
intellectual guide — who would he be? He would be that individual,
whoever he were, who in the eyes of their leader, if the people
would added in the highest degree had to the power the desperation and desire to promote
the particular and sinister interest of this same leader
at the expence, and by the proportionable sacrifice of all other the universal interests.

By this supposition between the leading individual in the
character of patron and the aspirant candidate for the Judgeship in the
character of protegé, there would be a corrupt connection: a
connection founded constituted by a community of particular and sinister
interest, both acting in opposition to the line of duty
and universal interest. By the Judge on every occasion, undue
favour would be shewn not only to the leader himself, but
to all persons specially connected with him by the any ties whether of
self regarding interest or sympathy. But for the his maintenance
in the soli such his situation — the situation of one who is the object
of general confidence the leader would have feel the need of attaching
to himself by the like ties the majority in question and in
particular of those from whom influence has now had most assistance
to hope for assistance and most opposition to fear.

Ratiocinative.

Here then would be a Judge, who being located by the
influence of the head of a party, [and moreover by that same party continually
exposed to be dislocated (such at any rate is the arrangement
here proposed)] would be in a state of constant dependence
on that same party. Being in a state of dependence upon that
same party taken as a whole, and they at the same time individually in a
state of dependence upon him, here between the functions
in question and the most influential persons in the District would be
a sort of league defensive and offensive against all the rest. By
partiality in their favour, impartiality in his would pro tanto
be destroyed and the maximum of partiality substituted. He making himself
an instrument of depredation and oppression in every other shape for
their
their benefit, they would
all the while give him their
support while exercising
depredation and oppression
for his own benefit, and
for the benefit of the several
other individuals specially connected with him by any speculation whether of self-regarding interest or sympathy.




Identifier: | JB/042/580/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 42.

Date_1

1823-05-22

Marginal Summary Numbering

4

Box

042

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

580

Info in main headings field

constitutional code

Image

001

Titles

ratiocinative

Category

text sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

d3 / e3

Penner

jeremy bentham

Watermarks

j whatman turkey mill 1822

Marginals

jeremy bentham

Paper Producer

admiral pavel chichagov

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

1822

Notes public

ID Number

13503

Box Contents

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