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In proportion as the result of the division or
rather multiplication of barriers that must be passed
through ere a measure reaches the end of its career,
is favorable to fictitious delay, fictitious delay is resorted to in
preference to argument. But it is in the nature of government
argument, on the supposition that the end pursued
is the universal interest and not particular interest:
that of the farther from being preponderantly beneficial
a measure is – the more likely it is to be put
aside by argument; the more highly beneficial, the
less likely to be thus put aside: whereas factitious
delay contributes according to the length of it –
contributes in the same proportion in the one as in
the other, to put aside the best and the worst.
If, in consequence of precipitation, a measure
the effect of which is upon the whole preponderantly evil
receives the sanction of law, the evil is not incapable
of being removed by a subsequent law: whereas whatever
is the sum of the delays produced in all measure
without distinction by the dilatory system remains
for ever uncompensated.
True it is that where by reason of precipitation,
a measure productive of a balance on the side of evil
receives the sanction of law – so long as the law
remains unrepealed, the evil continues on the increase.
But, by the supposition, being, as it is,
indebted for its existence to precipitation and nothing
else – being such that had it not been for the precipitation,
it would not have passed but would have
been rejected – rejected before the evil had begun to show
itself – still more surely will the system be rid of it,
and now that the correctness of the general anticipation
judgement has been demonstrated by experience.
Identifier: | JB/044/083/001 "JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 44.
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044 |
constitutional code |
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083 |
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001 |
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copy/fair copy sheet |
1 |
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recto |
c9 / f9 |
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j whatman turkey mill 1829 |
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jonathan blenman |
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1829 |
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13868 |
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