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JB/044/097/001

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Const Code

20 April 1830 T 23.

Under the US. in the situation here in question
as they are and not dislocable so under neither in in any other
mode are malefactors punishable.

The President, yes: even he is punishable. The Executive Monarch,
he is indis punishable: but of this Aristocracy, let the mischief done
by it be ever so great, no one member is punishable or (as above) so much
as dislocable.

Now suppose a Presidt. disposed to acquire make for or exercise
exorbitant power, where can he look for so fit find fitter instruments. He and they
agreeing — and the smallness of the number especially if the majority suffice + render the agreement
comparatively easy — let him do what he will, he and they are
unpunishable. Oh yes—removed from office he may be for "treason,
bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors" removed indeed
but no otherwise punished. Removed? Yes: but by whom? by
a majority of these Aristocrats, his supposed confederates and delinquents,—not otherwise. not otherwise.

☞ Contrast the mischiefs it to which this institution of the
Senate exposes the Constitution with the imaginariness of the mischiefs
sought to be guarded against by qualification-requiring arrangements.

Yet neither from the antecedent & original establishment of the Constitution to 1787 nor
yet from the establishment of this the Confederation in 1778 — 1781 on
the part of the functionaries in question has delinquency in any
such shape as that in question as yet manifested itself. True: but such
health innoxiousness — to what preventive cause is it to be
ascribed? Not to say any punitive or dislocative arrangement
in this Code, for no such check does it provide. To
what then? To the influence power of the Public Opinion Tribunal
and nothing else: and of this judicatory, had not the liberticide
law of 1807 been suffered to expire, the influence would
have at least been deplorably greatly weakened, if not destroyed
altogether. Public Opinion Tribunal excepted, what is there to
prevent the President in the party with a majority of the
Senate from selling to any foreign State a negative on any
necessary war or useful treaty, or alliance, &c.?



Identifier: | JB/044/097/001
"JB/" can not be assigned to a declared number type with value 44.

Date_1

1830-04-20

Marginal Summary Numbering

Box

044

Main Headings

constitutional code

Folio number

097

Info in main headings field

const. code

Image

001

Titles

Category

copy/fair copy sheet

Number of Pages

1

Recto/Verso

recto

Page Numbering

f23

Penner

richard doane

Watermarks

Marginals

Paper Producer

Corrections

Paper Produced in Year

Notes public

ID Number

13882

Box Contents

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